The Solomon Islands: An Experiment in Decentralization by Premdas, Ralph R. & Steeves, Jeffrey S.
THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: 
AN 'EXPERIMENT IN DECENTRALIZATION 
Ralph R. Premdas 
Institute of International Studies 
University of California, Berkeley 
Working Paper Series 
and 
Pacific Islands Studies Program 
Center for Asian and Pacific Studies 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
Jeffrey S. Steeves 
Department of Economic and Political Science 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
Drs. Ralph R. Premdas and Jeffrey S. Steeves have addressed 
themselves to a particularly important problem. How do newly 
independent states cast off the yoke of colonial rule and return 
self-determination to people at the grass roots level? In the 
Pacific, the move toward the decentralization of government has been 
the strongest in Papua New Guinea. The Solomon Islands have followed 
that lead, and as the authors of this working paper indicate, the 
process is fraught with many difficulties and complexities. The 
issues to which they address themselves will be followed by interested 
observers for a good number of years to come. 
Robert C. Kiste, Director 
Pacific Islands Studies Program 
Center for Asian and Pacific 
Studies 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: 
AN EXPERIMENT IN DECENTRALIZA nON 
by 
Ralph R. Premdas 
Institute of International Studies 
University of California, Berkeley 
and 
Jeffrey S. Steeves 
Department of Economics and Political Science 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Canada 
1985 
Chapter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknow ledgments 
Introduction: Decolonization and Decentralization 
The Solomon Islands: An Introductory Overview 
The Early Evolution of Local Initiative 
Evolution of Decentralization in the 1970s 
Problems of Implementation 
The Commitment to Provincial Government 
Devolution, Participation, and Development 
Some Broad Observations: Theory 
Bibliography 
Notes on Authors 
iii 
1 
10 
32 
48 
84 
118 
143 
156 
160 
166 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada which made it 
possible for us to undertake field research in the Solomon Islands. Professor Ron 
Crocombe and Peter Larmour of the Institute of Pacific Studies at the University 
of the South Pacific in Suva and Robert Igara of the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Cooperation (SPEC) provided helpful insights and resources. 
In the Solomon Islands, many politicians, public officials and Solomon 
Islanders contributed to our research efforts. Among them, David Kausimae O.B.E. 
provided a wealth of information and insights into the decentralization experiment. 
Mr. Wilson Ifunaoa, then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Local Government, welcomed us to the Solomons and extended resources from his 
department to assist us in this project. Mr. Emilio Bulo, the Chief Electoral 
Officer and Mr. Francis Saemala, then Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, 
offered extensive assistance to us. We also were assisted graciously by Mr. 
Solomon Mamaloni, the current Prime Minister, Mr. Lawry Wickham, M.P. and Mr. 
Waita Ben, M.P. The Clerks of the Honiara Town Council and of Malaita, 
Guadalcanal and Western Provinces guided us expertly through the town and 
provincial government structures. The Chief Archivist, the Auditor General and 
the Head of the Government Printery assisted us ably in the collection of 
documentary material. Mr. Bart Ulufa'alu now Finance Minister in the Mamaloni 
government and Joses Taungenga of Nadepa were very helpful. We would also like 
to thank Dr. Ian Scott of the University of Hong Kong for his gracious hospitality 
and assistance. Dr. M.J. Campbell of the Canberra College of Advanced Education 
was helpful in supplying the historical context of decentralization in the Solomon 
Islands. We are deeply indebted to the many other individuals who gave freely of 
their time and insights. 
Special thanks are due to Gwen Boechler for her patient and diligent 
assistance in typing the manuscript. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: DECOLONIZA nON AND DECENTRALIZA nON 
Decolonization of the Third World has generally been taken to refer to the 
formal acquisition of sovereign status by colonial territories. A new flag is hoisted 
as the imperial power departs. With a new constitution embodying a replica of the 
political institutions drawn from the polity of the ex-colonial master, the new 
nation embarks on a course proclaimed to be democratic. The legitimacy of the 
new nation is founded on the assertion and pre-eminence of people's power. The 
animus inspiring the policies of the new governors ostensibly addresses the needs of 
citizens. Political participation by the grassroots is proclaimed as a fundamental 
idea in the emerging order. 
Operationally, however, and almost invariably, the reality of "returning power 
to the people" has been thwarted. Few cases of meaningful popular control exist 
among the entire group of one hundred or so Third World countries which were 
decolonized since World War II. The pattern points more to the prevalence of 
repressive regimes which have accumulated power through one-party systems or 
military coup d'etats. From the aspiration of serving the people, the state has been 
transformed into an instrument serving the interests of a few. The gap between 
"master" and "servant," a characteristic from the extinguished colonial regime has 
been replicated by a new system of internal domination. A well-armed, top heavy 
central government located in a primal city and controlled by an oligarchy of 
interests dominates a ruralized periphery inhabited by the many. I 
Most Third World countries inherited as part of their formal institutional 
apparatus a centralized and relatively over-developed civil service.2 The physical 
facilities of government are concentrated in a capital city where most public 
servants reside., Also, the major part of budgetary allocations is devoted to this 
urban sector. This pattern persists despite an official rhetoric about government's 
great concern for ordinary people most of whom live in rural areas. Government at 
the center and people at the periphery are literally worlds apart. While linkage was 
greatest just prior to independence when national parties mobilized urban and rural 
residents alike to sever the colonial connection,3 the post-colonial record attests 
either to neglect and/or a one-way top to bottom linkage of an oppressive sort.4 
To successfully undertake "decolonization" would entail at a minimum the 
transfer of responsibility to units of government at the periphery. "Returning 
power to the people" would literally mean bringing government closer to the 
people, especially to the majority who are rural dwellers. During colonial times in 
many parts of the Third World, the mode of connection between the center and the 
periphery was executed through a French-type prefectorial district administrative 
structure staffed by expatriate officers who exercised wide-ranging powers.5 
Regional administrative dominance was but an extension of central coercive 
control exercised from the capital city. There was not a two-way flow of views 
involving mutual exchange and reconciliation of divergent interests. 
On a day-to-day basis, the will of the colonizer was enacted in the lives of 
the colonized through the primary device of the colonial bureaucracy. It was the 
civil service that symbolized the ongoing relentless colonial presence in its 
extractive and repressive form. To adapt to its basic penetrative and control role, 
the colonial bureaucracy had to be fashioned in a particular way. It was designed 
as a semi-military organization accountable to no local constituents and articu-
lating a fairly steep hierarchy from which commands issued forth to the periphery. 
This structure represented the immediate reality of the colonial state. Even when 
indigenous staff were recruited to manage parts of this bureaucratic octopus, the 
general intent of the creature did not alter. 
When, then, the first challenges against the colonial presence were asserted, 
its aim was directed against the administrative structure, its component parts, its 
agents and physical symbols. Indeed, many of the earliest rebels were once 
seemingly compliant employees within this bureaucracy. Attempts to adapt the 
colonial political and administrative system to its anticipated new status just prior 
to independence were introduced too late and too fast. The civil service was then 
expanded to become the largest employer in the country, provided with more funds 
and partly indigenized. However in practice it remained essentially a structure of 
dominance with ingrained habits of extracting compliance from citizens. As an 
exploitative device, it continued to symbolize a system over which constituents had 
no sense of control.6 
It was the publicly-announced commitment of those who acceded to power 
following independence to "return power to the people.'.? This proposition, 
however, meant different things to different groups. For some, it could only be 
accomplished by the nationalization of all foreign firms coupled with full 
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indigenization of the public service and a radical restructuring of the economy and 
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external trade. But to others, it meant inter alia disaggregating the centralized 
state apparatus and devolution of decision-making powers to regional and local 
communities to conduct their own affairs.9 Government was no longer to be 
something done to the people whether they cared for it or not, but something 
people did themselves guided by their own will and interests. lO Active 
participation in community self-determination was a cardinal principle of decoloni-
. h 11 zatlOn at t e grassroots. 
The implications were clear. The old inherited central public bureaucracy 
had to be dismantled. A new structure with new motifs would have to be forged. 
This would require decentralization of both political and administrative functions 
to units of government within the periphery. For the most part, this would dictate 
that formal units and their staff be re-distributed with wide territorial space. 12 
Face to face contact with elected decision-makers and appointed bureaucrats 
would then be facilitated. 13 Decisions would be derived locally and those 
acountable for implementation would be within easy access. Political responsibility 
would thus be instituted in a new decolonized regime. Power would be returned to 
the people through decentralization. 
The complexity of underdevelopment especially in its political dimension 
suggests that too much emphasis not be placed on any single variable as the most 
critical in altering the structure of society. Decentralization is not propounded as 
the key to the fulfilment of self-determination. We know that such factors as 
external dependency on markets, aid and foreign investment as well as political 
culture, land tenure, the structure of production and distribution, and resource 
endowment among others are powerful forces which constrain political develop-
ment. In this work, we isolate "the politico-administrative" variable since within it 
potentially resides the leverage in modern government by which ordinary people 
can direct collective decisions affecting their daily lives. Lest the experiment in 
local democracy be confused with an exercise in tinkering with the structure of a 
formal organization, we define the nature of decentralization. The term refers to 
both the political and administrative aspect of grassroots government. This was 
succinctly set forth by White as follows: 
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The process of decentralization denoted the trans-
ference of authority, legislative, judicial or administra-
tive, from a higher level of government to a lower. It is 
the converse of centralization and should not be 
confused with deconcentration, a term generally used to 
denote the mere delegation to a subordinate officer of 
capacity to act in the name of the superior without a 
transfer of authority to him. 14 
The political aspect points to the determination of community decision-making by 
those who pay for the services and who are governed by the enacted policies. 
Typically, this is effected through a legitimating principle such as elections. A 
council is established; extensive functions related to practically everything can be 
the responsibility of the deliberative body. It is envisaged not only that items such 
as health services, police, and housing regulation be within the ambit of a council, 
but in a set of upward linkages, these councils collectively can also provide the 
opinions guiding the formation of national issues including foreign policy and the 
strategy of economic development. It is not often that decentralized councils are 
empowered with such far-reaching national responsibilities, but there is no 
compelling reason to prohibit them from doing this if so desired. 15 
The administrative aspect of decentralization refers to the distributing out 
(deconcentration) of administrative tasks of the government bureaucracy to 
subordinate field agencies so that services and functions are dispensed from local 
centers within reasonable reach of every community cluster. The proper 
relationship between the political and administrative aspects of the decentralized 
community government is that the former makes policy while the latter 
implements it. To the process of devolution of decision-making and deconcen-
tration of administration are attributed a number of benefits which we briefly 
recapitulate; 16 0) political responsibility is transferred to the governed; 
democratic self-government is learned by practice; (2) fast and effective decision-
making is facilitated; the indefinite delays in waiting for a remote headquarters to 
give permission for a policy is eliminated; (3) regional diversity is accomodated; (4) 
appropriate, flexible and varied responses to different kinds and rates of change in 
the diverse environments of the country are facilitated; (5) institutional experi-
mentation involving only parts of the polity at a time can be conducted; (6) 
priorities are established according to the interests and problems of an area; (7) 
alternative strategies of development can be devised so as to adapt to local 
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peculiarities, customs, and resources; (8) innovation in techniques of production and 
changes in outlook are more likely; (9) more and better information for planning 
and project identification can be assembled; and (10) a training ground for national 
leadership is established. 
Decentralization consequently is likely to relieve central congestion and 
overload. 17 Chances are that more might also get done than is accomplished from 
centra! direction. Self-help projects are likely to engender enthusiasm. Fears may 
be expressed that the latitude in decision-making suggested by this formula for 
decentralization tends towards facilitating internal fragmentation, ethnic national-
ism, seccessionist movements, and ultimate chaos.1 8 Such a possibility does exist. 
Much of the fear is real but a good deal stems from fear of the people, an anti-
democratic instinct. Much more seriously from a practical standpoint are problems 
related to shortage of skills and the weak taxing base of local communities to 
implement bona fide autonomous councils. The pragmatic issues of staff and tax 
base apart, the decentralized units of provincial and local governments make 
decisions through consent and consultation from constituents at the grassroots. 19 
There is no such thing as complete decentralization or centralization.20 
Every organization is a mixture of the two principles. There is not a dochotomous 
relationship between the two but rather a continuum. Where centralization is 
dominant in the mix, a qualitatively different political order is likely to exist. The 
same is true with a structure with a preponderance of decentralized motifs. 
Hence, it is crucial to note that when extensive decentralized re-organization is 
undertaken, the effects are likely to entail qualitative or revolutionary changes. 
The political system will be transformed radically; a new balance in the distribution 
of power may emerge. 
An immediate implication of decentralization is that power tends to be 
shifted from one center to another. At one level of change, there is an areal or 
spacial dimension. But that is secondary to the upheaval that is likely to follow 
from the political changes.21 Around the established centralized machinery are 
encrusted not only careers and comforts of administrators who in most emerging 
nations are among the most educated, organized and articulate, but also the 
interests of national legislators who have accomodated to the old order. Political 
careers built around the centralized machinery, and urban interests linked to 
overseas holidays and life-styles would be displaced as new localized centers of 
power emerge and proliferate country-wide. A new power structure is likely to be 
born. 
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For those then, who promise to decentralize so as to return power to the 
people, a severe struggle for power, of revolutionary proportions, awaits them. Not 
only political will, but political mobilization and organization linked to the mass of 
peasants and workers would be required to displace the old entrenched machinery. 
A configuration of power can only be destroyed by a corresponding power of equal 
or greater magnitude. The task is likely to be made doubly difficult if the new 
power holders who promised decentralization know little about the extent of the 
dislocation that their experiment entails and what it will take to implement it. 
Decentralization, however, may have been promised only as part of a rhetorical 
exercise in which popular symbols are wielded to provide temporary pa11iatives for 
a desperate situation. When this happens, a dangerous idea, teasingly thrown to the 
masses, may unwittingly be implanted in their minds. It may return to haunt the 
promise makers causing havoc to their comforts. 
In this monograph, we study a case of a new state which had thrown to the 
people the decentralization teaser. The promise was not extended by a 
revolutionary party in a mobilization system. The change was entrusted practically 
to the same bureaucrats in the centralized system whose careers and life-styles 
were to be disrupted by successful implementation. The rhetoric of devolution and 
local responsibility was freely engaged in by those who were about to inherit power 
from the departing colonial master. The promise of decentralization was in fact 
made so as to placate certain sub-national groups which opposed independence 
unless regional autonomy was guaranteed to them. Other sub-national groups 
wanted shifts of political and administrative concentrations after independence to 
the provincial councils as a matter of principle. 
The focus of our study is the Solomon Islands, a South-West Pacific country, 
which became independent in 1978. In 1977, the country's constitutional founding 
fathers promised "decentralization of legislative and executive power.,,22 This 
commitment which was enunciated at a constitutional conference convened in 
London further undertook to establish a special committee "to examine the 
relationship between the National Government, Provincial Governments and Area 
Councils and to recommend on the measures to promote the effective decentraliza-
tion of legislative, administrative, and financial powers."Z3 The country's 
independence was delayed by several years partly because of difficult issues related 
to center-periphery relations. But, as the monograph will show, the demand for a 
greater role to be played by subnational units in the determination of their own 
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affairs has had a long history. After World War II, "Maasina Ruru," an indigenous 
semi-revolutionary movement, erected its own counter-councils juxtaposed to those 
of the colonizer to govern its affairs. It was an act of unprecedented defiance in 
the face of superior British arms. Taxes were not paid to the British authorities 
but to the Maasina councils. "Maasina Ruru" was symbolic of a yearning by the 
colonized peoples of the Solomons to govern themselves. 
In chapter one of the monograph we set forth an overview portrait of the 
Solomon Islands. In chapter two, we begin our discussion of conquest and 
colonization with a special focus on the administrative structures which were 
imposed by the British. In this chapter we discuss "Maasina Ruru." Chapter three 
elaborates on the evolution of decentralization in relation to the approach of self-
government and independence. The British view that local government provides a 
good preparatory training ground for national autonomy gave accelerated emphasis 
to decentralization exercises throughout the 1970s. But much of the debate over 
dis-aggregating the centralized colonial decision-making centers and bureaucracy 
would be tempered by fears of promoting national disunity. The devolution 
experiment was also caught up in a contest for power among the new elites who 
were poised to succeed the departing colonial power. A further complication points 
to the fears and recalcitrance of central government bureaucrats surrounding the 
dimunition of their powers and privileges. The faithful execution of the 
decentralization aims threatened to alter the balance of power. In chapter four, 
we discuss aspects of this struggle which were largely embodied in the 
implementation of a Plan of Operations aimed at devolution. In chapter five we 
discuss in detail the culmination of the devolution debate in the form of the 
Kausimae Committee Report. We conclude by summarizing broad observations 
from the experiment to date. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: AN INTRODUCTORY OVER VIEW 
On July 7, 1978, the Solomon Islands received its independence from Britain. 1 
In 1893 Britain annexed the Solomon Islands declaring the islands a "protectorate." 
Thereafter, the colony was called "The British Solomon Islands Protectorate" or 
"BSIP." From 1893 to 1978, the Solomon Islands remained firmly under British 
control; through those years English values became a measure of what was 
desirable and superior. It was not until the early 1970s that the first strong 
collective indigenous demands for independence were registered.2 The "wind of 
change" which had witnessed the liberation from colonialism of numerous African 
and Asian colonies in the late 1950s and early 1960s did not buffet the shores of 
European colonies in the southwest Pacific until late in the 1960s and in the 1970s. 
Apart from being distant and isolated from much of the agitational movements for 
independence in the rest of the Third World, the Pacific Island colonies were very 
small and generally resource poor? The attractions of independence were muted 
by the prospect of conducting sovereign governments with permanent deficit 
budgets. When the Solomon Islands became independent in the late 1970s, the 
British were most willing to relinquish formal control. The colony was costly since 
its annual budget required a subsidy from the British treasury to be balanced. The 
final acts of Solomon Islands' decolonization were not intense demonstrations of 
joy, but sober calculated conferences designed to solicit aid and technical advice so 
as to provide economic self-sufficiency in the long run. No one can escape this 
somber atmosphere in the Solomons even two years after independence. In the 
capital city, Honiara, and its outlying island provinces, the psychological symbols of 
self-determination are barely visible. The preoccupation is with expanding the 
economic base and enhancing economic opportunities for Solomon Islanders.4 Very 
few strident chauvinistic sounds are heard to nationalize any of the few industries. 
Instead, foreign investors are eagerly sought.5 
The population of the Solomon Islands was estimated in 1980 to be about 
225,000. Its annual growth rate is approximately 3.4 percent. Most of the people 
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are Melanesians but the population is intermixed with small groups of Polynesians, 
Micronesians, Chinese, and Europeans as the following table based on the 1976 
census shows.6 
Table 1: Population by Ethnic Origin (I976) 
Ethnic Type Numbers % of the Total 
Melanesian 183,665 93.3 
Polynesian 7,821 4.0 
Micronesian 2,753 1.4 
European 1,359 0.7 
Chinese 452 0.2 
Others 773 0.2 
Total: 196,823 
Among the Melanesian component, inter-ethnic suspicions and rivalries are 
widespread. The population is distributed over a scattered archipelago of 
mountainpus islands and lowlying coral islands covering a land area of 29,000 square 
kilometers and an ocean area of 803,000 square kilometers. Nearly all of the 
Melanesians live on the six major islands: (1) Choiseul, (2) New Georgia, (3) Santa 
Isabel, (4) Guadalcanal, (5) Malaita, and (6) Makira. The Polynesians tend to live on 
the small island atolls off the main islands. The Micronesians are recent settlers 
who were transplanted from the nearby Gilbert and Ellice Islands when certain 
segments fell victim to natural disasters.7 The Europeans, Chinese and others are 
mainly old residents from the colonizing and commercial groups as well as recent 
arrivals from technical and aid missions. 
The population of the Solomon Islands is distributed over seven provinces and 
the capital city, Honiara, as follows: 8 
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Table 2: Population Distribution (1976 Census) 
Province Population % of the Total 
Malaita 60,043 30.5 
Western 40,329 20.5 
Guadalcanal 31,677 16. 1 
Makira!Ulawa 14,891 7.6 
Santa Isabel 10,420 5.3 
Central Islands 13,576 6.9 
Eastern Islands 10,945 5.5 
Honiara 14,942 7.6 
Total: 196,823 100.0 
Several points from Table 2 are noteworthy for our subsequent discussion. The 
population is distributed not on a single land mass, but fragmented over several 
islands widely separated from each other. Internal to the islands is the 
predominance of small 10calities-· 60 percent of the people living in villages of less 
than 100 people. The average size of a1110calities is 39 people. The census of 1976 
found a total of about 5,000 localities of which only 33 or 0.2 percent had more 
than 300 people.8 Hence, both external and internal physical distribution factors 
point to a very isolated and highly ruralized village-based population. Conse-
quently, communications are a major difficulty in the Solomon Islands. The island 
of Malaita contains the largest population grouping. In modern times, Solomon 
Islanders have come to describe their identity in regional terms. Hence, a person 
from Malaita Province may call himself and be caHed a Malaitan. This is especially 
so when he is away from Malaita. But on Malaita itself, he is likely to be identified 
as a person from either a sub-regional or tribal group. Because of the divergent 
experiences that each island group encountered with missionaries, planters, and 
government administrators over the period of colonization, each island population 
has developed a different image and sterotypical reputation among other Solomon 
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Island groupings.9 In the case of Malaita, it is generally felt that Malaitans were 
the most difficult people to colonize; they resisted foreign intrusion vigorously at 
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various times and places. Among Solomon Islanders, they were the last to 
receive the full modernizing benefits such as schools and aid posts from the 
colonial power. However, by sheer numbers and diligence, Malaitans have become 
the most aggressive and successful bureaucrats and businessmen. In contemporary 
Solomon Islands, there is a widespread fear of what is called "Malaitan domination." 
Constituting only about 30 percent of the total population, their success in 
commerce and government has exaggerated their role in political and economic 
fields. Because of the very high population density on Malaita, out migration to 
other islands has brought many Malaitans in hostile contact with other Solomon 
Islanders. The following table gives the population density in the various 
. 11 provInces: 
Table 3: Population Density 
Land Area Population 
Province 1976 Population (sq. kms.) per sq. km. 
Malaita 60,043 4,543 13.2 
Western 40,329 8,573 4.7 
Guadalcanal 31,677 5,625 5.6 
Makira/Ulawa 14,891 3,561 4.2 
Santa Isabel 10,420 4,014 2.6 
Central Islands 13,576 1,722 7.9 
Eastern Islands 10,945 837 13.1 
Honiara 14,942 21 711.5 
Total: 196,823 28,896 6.8 
Later in the monograph as we delve into the issues related to provincial 
decentralization, we would note the inter-ethnic conflict that is being generated by 
internal migration generally but particularly by Malaitan migration. Suffice it to 
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note here that apart from the capital city, Honiara, with a population density of 
711.5 and the atolls in the Eastern Island group with a density of 13.1, Malaita is 
the most densely populated among the major land areas in the Solomons. The 
freedom of movement provisions in the Solomon Islands constitution has come in 
head-on collision with parochial ethnonational sentiments in the provinces against 
"Malaitan" migration in particular. We provide in Table 3a a statistical portrait of 
the movement of people in the Solomon Islands. 12 The figures show that in 1976 
that about 166,180 or 84 percent of the total population lived in the council area of 
their birth. Of the remaining 26,000 persons who were living outside their Council 
area, nearly half or 11,400 were Malaitans. 
A noteworthy point that is evoked from Tables 2 and 3 is that the Western 
province with 20 percent of the country's population has the largest land area of 
8,573 square kilometers. This land space in the Western province is even larger 
when note is taken that the province, unlike Malaita which is mainly one island, is 
distributed widely over several major island groups including the Shortlands, 
Choiseul, and New Georgia. Guadalcanal Province with 31,677 people or 16.1 
percent of the population is also larger than Malaita. Guadalcanal Province 
occupies a single large island (like Malaita) of 5,625 square kilometers. The main 
resistance to the migration of Malaitans to other provinces comes from the two 
physically largest provinces, Western and Guadalcanal, which are most capable of 
absorbing migrants. The figures in Table 3a show that of the 11,400 Malaitans 
living outside their province, the highest concentraions were in Guadalcanal and the 
West. The issue related generally to national integration and unity. However, the 
salience of provincial parochialism and ethnic fear, renders unity of the Solomon 
Islands a problematic objective. 
Apart from inter-ethnic fears, language and religion also divide Solomon 
Islanders. "Pidgin," a Melanesian trade language, has emerged as a common 
linguistic link among many Solomon Islanders from different indigenous language 
groupings. The "Pidgin" in the Solomons, however, is a weak variant of broken 
English quite unlike the complexity of Melanesian Pidgin in Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu. The point is that the close affinity between English and Solomon Islands 
Pidgin has limited the universality of the latter as a lingua franca among Solomon 
Islanders. In parts of the country, such as the West, Roviana is the lingua franca. 
Some eighty-seven different languages are spoken throughout the country. 
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Table 3a: Solomon Islanders Born in the Solomon Islands by Area of Enumeration--1976 Census 
Council Area Central Makira/ Eastern 
of Birth Western Isabel Islands Guadalcanal Honiara Malaita Ulawa Islands Total 
Western 35339(88) 76 238 315 1287 333 64 21 37,673 
Isabel 122 9532(91) 179 114 721 62 49 35 10,814 
Central Is. 136 46 10491(77) 342 747 135 71 72 12,040 
Guadalcana1 320 97 250 25581(81) 939 255 72 14 27,528 
Honiara 515 283 482 1643 3092(21) 908 220 132 7,275 
Malaita 1686 237 1111 2991 5023 57977(97) 261 59 69,343 
Makira/Ulawa 99 56 104 133 485 120 13714(92) 105 14,816 
(j1 
Eastern Is. 63 51 583 152 554 56 359 10456(96) 12,274 
Not Defined 32 5 2 10 12 20 2 8 91 
Total 38312 10383 13440 31281 12860 59866 14812 10902 191,856 
Total CA 
Population 40329 10420 13576 31677 14942 60043 14891 10945 196,823 
Difference* 2017 37 136 396 2082 177 79 43 4,967 
-------------
* mainly persons not born in Solomon Islands 
Note: (Percentages in Brackets) 
Solomon Islander = Melanesians + Polynesians + Gilbertese 
. .r--:-:-' ~'YKB;~t~~j~:-: -.,'-- ,~_",,:':,- ,-;ff;k;;,~~t;";-'"'~',";e_;:;"-*,'$o;;-;S;-'~~il'522~':j,'':~->~~;;':;;:';;;:'!;"'il:Id"' _______ _ 
Religion in the Solomon Islands is a salient characteristic of social life. 
About 90 percent of the people are Christians of one type or another. It is said 
that the busiest day in the Solomons is Sunday. Church attendance is a high 
participation pursuit. The figures below give the distribution of religious groupings 
in the Solomons. 
Table 4: Religion (1976 Census) 
Denomination Size % of Total 
Church of Melanesia 
(Anglican) 67,370 34.2 
Roman Catholic 36,870 18.7 
South Seas Evangelical 33,306 16.9 
United Church 22,209 11.3 
Seventh Day Adventist 19,113 9.7 
Christian Fellowship 4,822 2.5 
Jehovah Witness, Bahai 
and Others 6,003 3.1 
Pagan 7,130 3.6 
196,823 100.0 
Religion is an important political force in the Solomon Islands. Because of the 
division of the colony during the early colonial era into spheres of religious 
influence by a comity agreement among the main Christian denominations, 
different provinces or groups of provinces tend to have the predominance of one 
denominational group over another. 14 
Turning to the economy of the Solomon Islands, the duality and dominance of 
the agricultural structure is notable. Agriculture provides 70 percent of the gross 
domestic product and 90 percent of the export income. 15 A subsistence sector 
persists beside a monetized sector. It was estimated in 1978 that of a total GNP of 
$75,516,000, the non-cash or subsistence sector contributed about $33,225,000 or a 
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16 little less than half. However, the monetary aspect of the economy has been 
outstripping the non-cash part as the following figures show. I7 
Sector 
Subsistence 
Production 
Monetary Incomes 
Total GNP 
Table 5: Sectors (I978 prices, $'000) 
1975 
$29,806 
28,268 
58,074 
1976 
$31,529 
34,949 
66,488 
1977 
$32,410 
39,129 
71 ,539 
1978 
$33,225 
42,291 
75,516 
The monetary economy of the Solomon Islands is based mainly on four 
primary products: copra, fisheries, timber and palm oil. Together, these four 
products accounted for 85 percent of exports. The early colonizers came mainly to 
exploit the coconut products. This was followed by a period of "blackbirding" when 
large numbers of Solomon Islanders were recruited to work as a cheap source of 
labor on sugar and cotton plantations in Queensland, Fiji, and Samoa. 18 
Until very recently, copra and timber production dominated the economy. In 
1970, they provided about 92 percent of the total export receipts of SI $6.5 
million. 19 Since 1970, the government has embarked on a program of economic 
diversification. Large scale projects were introduced in rice, palm oil, and 
fisheries. By 1978, the contribution of copra and timber to export receipts was 
down to 48 percent while palm oil and fish rose from zero to 37 percent. 20 The 
following table illustrates the more recent breakdown:21 
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Table 6: Exports (SI $'000, 1978) 
Product Value % Share 
Fish and fish preparations $6,833 21.9 
Copra 7,856 25.2 
Timber 7,131 22.9 
Palm oil 4,653 14.9 
Rice and rice products 809 2.6 
Cocoa 596 1.9 
Note must be made of the point that in the expansion of timber, palm oil, fish and 
rice exports, the small holder has barely participated. Large plantations are the 
main holdings on which the new items are produced. In addition, these large scale 
agricultural enterprises are mainly foreign-owned with minority equity 
participation by the Solomon Islands government. 22 
Most imports are manufactured goods, machinery, and transport equipment. 
The balance of trade over the last five years has given the Solomon Islands a small 
surplus annually. The manufacturing sector is still at an early stage of 
development. In recent years, it has expanded mainly in the agro-business 
industries such as palm oil milling, rice milling, fish canning, and saw milling. 
Other small scale industries include boat building, rattan and wood furniture, 
fiberglass goods such as water tanks and canoes, biscuits, tobacco manufacture, 
soft drinks, nails and soap. Employment in the manufacturing sector grew from 650 
in 1971 to 1,400 in 1977 when it accounted for about 8.5 percent of paid 
employment.23 
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Table 7: Cash Income Distribution per Capita (1975) 
Total 
Guadalcanal Makira & Solomon 
Income & Central Eastern Malaita Western Islands 
From Employment 23.8 20.2 14.8 25.8 20.8 
From Cash Crops 17.5 7.7 3.3 41.0 16.0 
Total Cash Income 41.3 27.9 18.1 66.8 36.8 
Table 7(a) shows that of all the provinces, Western is the most advanced. 
Similarly, it shows the Malaitan case to be the least developed. It is worth 
emphasizing that rural households tend to meet their basic food requirements from 
their gardens. Nonetheless, the figures point not only to a lack of cash income 
opportunities but also to the discrepancy in the distribution of these opportunities 
from province to province. Table 8 describes regionally the distribution of 
households without any cash income.26 
The country's National Development Plan 1980-84 commented on the 
challenges and problems evoked by the foregoing statistical data as follows: 
This lack of opportunities in many areas is one aspect of what appears 
to be the over-riding economic and political problem facing Solomon 
Islands at this stage in its development. The economy has been 
growing fast in recent years, but the benefits of that growth have 
improved the conditions of only a section of the population, mainly 
the wage and salary earners, and have reached only limited areas of 
the country, many areas remaining almost entirely unaffected.27 
The problem of creating cash income opportunities is by itself a difficult problem. 
When cast in a rural context where subsistence farming has tended to be dominant, 
it becomes doubly difficult as urbanization drifts in the Third World have attested. 
Compounding the problem even further and rendering it into a volatile political 
issue occurs, as in the case of the Solomon Islands, when the distribution of cash 
income opportunities is skewed in favor of one province against another within a 
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Table 7a: Selected Indices of Involvement in the Cash Economy by Province, 1976 
Santa Central Makira/ Eastern Solomon 
Western Isabel Islands Guadalcanal Honiara Malaita Uluwa Islands Islands 
Cash earners as 96 of 
working age population* 33.9 27.9 45.3 33.4 75.0 8.6 18.3 15.9 28.1 
96 of households growing 
coconuts 82.8 90.0 63.7 53.2 5.8 44.7 62.3 79.0 58.2 
N Smallholder production of 0 
copra per household (tons) 0.89 0.50 0.30 0.31 0.16 0.34 0.21 0.38 
96 of households producing 
food for sale 23.9 10.5 32.6 20.0 0.8 7.2 7.6 24.9 15.2 
96 of households owning a 
radio 30.2 31.0 32.2 27.4 70.9 20.5 21.8 16.9 28.7 
% of households owning a 
sewing machine 40.3 33.4 27.0 20.8 48.9 20.0 22.3 13.2 27.1 
* Cash earners are defined as those in paid employment and self-employed. Working age population is defined as persons 
in the 15-54 age group. 
Sources: Population Census 1926, Preliminary Results, March 1976; and mission estimates. 
----------'""' ...... _ .. _ .. ~ .....-~~I:!~S ;:g; -1J"l!-~ii£'Mjijg~~~AA 
Table 8: Rural Households Without Cash (1974) in Percentages (%) 
Total 
Central &: Eastern &: Solomon 
Guadalcanal Makira Malaita Western Islands 
Households reporting 
No Cash Income 14.6 6.2 25.0 1.0 14.2 
a national framework of inter-ethnic and inter-regional distrust and rivalry. In the 
Solomons, Malaita is on the one hand, regarded as dominant and aggressive, and on 
the other, it is the most impoverished on a per capita basis. The relatively rich 
Western province condemns Malaitan migration yet without development projects 
to employ them, Malaitans need to move to find areas of income and employment 
opportunity. In the land area, for example, Malaita faces extreme shortages. In 
the Western and Guadalcanal provinces, however, land is available albeit under 
traditional tenure patterns.28 Regional economic discrepancies can partly be 
overcome by moving the factors of production to areas of opportunity. In this 
context, that implies facilitating the migration of Malaitans to other parts of the 
5.1. This is a rational plan but it cannot be operationalized in a context of ethnic 
fear and jealousy. 
The demand for decentralization of political powers to provinces is most 
strongly made by provinces which claim that they can best address the issue of 
efficient allocation of scarce resources because they are close to the environment 
in which projects are identified and undertaken. But the observation is inescapable 
that the devolution of economic planning and powers to certain provinces may 
partly be intended to guard their economic resources from others thereby further 
exacerbating regional inequalities, apart from leading to inefficient misuse of 
scarce manpower and other resources. An Asian Development Bank Report 
commented on aspects of the problem as follows: 
An aspect related to the new Development Plan is the 
implementation of government proposals to decentralize decision-
making to provincial governments. This is seen as an important 
requirement if there is to be widespread involvement in development 
and decision-making processes in a country of widely scattered 
islands and poor transport and communication links. A major issue is 
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the extent to which decentralization should be taken. Many of the 
projects, especially those of a resource development nature designed 
to expand export production, will necessarily involve general issues of 
central policy if the best use is to be made of resources and thus may 
be unsuitable for handling at the provincial level. Further, there is 
the question of the availability of trained manpower at all levels to 
enable decentralization to be effective. Such manpower, especially 
of Solomon Islands origin, is already very scarce and to thin it out 
further by too fast a rate of decentralization may prove counter-
productive and detract from the notable progress that has already 
been made in establishing a stnmg economic base.29 
The manpower aspect will, by itself, stimulate migration issues. The problem of 
identifying projects and assigning them to different provinces to effect a regime of 
balanced development and employment opportunities will also trigger· inter-
provincial rivalries and quarrels in the Solomons. 
Finally, in the economic sphere, note must be made of the role of foreign aid. 
The Solomon Islands aspires to a condition of economic self-reliance. However, 
foreign investment and aid are deemed prerequisites to exploiting and expanding 
the country's economic base to realize the objective of self-reliance. At 
independence, the country required a grant-in-aid contribution from the United 
Kingdom to balance its recurrent budget. In 1979 this was reduced to half a million 
out of a total of $27 million in the recurrent budget. In the area of capital 
formation and investment, however, foreign aid is completely dominant. The 
following table illustrates the role of capital funds in relation to recurrent taken 
from the 1980 budget.30 
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Table 9: Recurrent and Capital Budget 
Revenue 
Recurrent: Local 
Capital: 
U.K. Grant-in-Aid 
Development Loans 
- Bilateral 
- Multilateral 
Development Loans: 
- External 
- Local 
- Miscellaneous 
Total: 
$26,500,000 
500,000 
16,446,000 
2,277,000 
8,460,000 
2,000,000 
18,000 
$27,000,000 
18,723,000 
10,478,000 
$56,201,000 
To spend the large amount of aid for development purposes, would require the 
Solomon Islands to utilize its scarce skilled and managerial manpower efficiently as 
well as to rely on expatriate imported skills. The following table points to the 
extent of dependency on foreign skills.31 It results in the transfer of a significant 
portion of monetary incomes to expatriate employees and foreign businesses. 
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Table 9a 
($ million) 
1974 1977 
Wages and Salaries 11.13 17.70 
Expatriates 4.59 6.00 
Others 6.54 lL70 
Operating Surplus 10.72 11.21 
Business 6.61 7.70 
- Companies (4.07) (5.00) 
- Others (2.54) (2.70) 
Government 0.15 0.75 
Households 3.96 2.97 
Total: 21.85 28.91 
From the table, a number of observations are important. In 1977, wages and 
salaries received by expatriate employees amounted to (51) $6 million. In addition, 
the (51) $5 million company surplus went mainly to foreign businesses. Thus, some 
38 percent of all wages and profits accrued to foreign employees and companies. In 
visible day-to-day terms these figures translate as approximately 1,000 expatriates 
who received about (51) $6,000 per capita in contrast to 15,800 Solomon Islanders 
who received a per capita of (51) $740.32 
The disparity in income between Solomon Islander and expatriate is matched 
by disparities between rural and urban dwellers. An estimated rural population of 
170,000 (1974 figures) received cash incomes totalling (51) $6.64 million giving a per 
capital rural income of (51) $40. For the 12,000 Solomon Islanders who resided in 
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the capital city, Honiara, their per capital works out to approximately (SI) $320 or 
. h' h' 1 33 elg t tImes t at m rura areas. 
The provinces struggle to obtain their individual shares of development 
capital for their own people. Inter-provincial rivalry for resources underlines the 
proposition that a larger Solomon Island nationalism is still to evolve; regional and 
ethnic loyalties remain today as powerful political forces in the system. 
The final section in this part describes briefly the main features of the 
Solomon Islands' political system. The Solomon Islands is a constitutional monarchy 
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with a Westminster model parliamentary system of government. A 38-member 
unicameral national Parliament, elected every four years, is the decision-making 
center of formal power. A Prime Minister and a 12-member Cabinet is derived 
from the elected Parliament. A public service exists as the main instrument for 
policy execution and administration. An independent judiciary adjudicates civil and 
criminal conflicts. The entire governmental edifice is established on the principles 
of freedom of speech, religion, movement, etc., embodied in a Bill of Rights in the 
country's constitution. Theoretically, political accountability by office holders 
affirms the proposition that the Solomon Islands government is "a government by 
the people," simply, a democracy. 
No system of formal political institutions can survive without the appropriate 
set of social values and cultural traditions to uphold it. 35 "Political culture" must 
be congruent with "political structure" to ensure a minimal level of legitimacy and 
stability to a polity. In the case of the Solomon Islands, serious issues arise 
regarding the appropriateness of its British-derived constitutional structure for a 
setting that is characterized by small-scale communities, fragmented by ethnic and 
linguistic fissures, and driven by inter-regional distrust and fears.36 A body of 
common opinions on the formal structure of government had more or less emerged 
since the late 1960s when parliamentary committees were established to elicit the 
views of citizens on political and constitutional change.37 In 1960, a country-wide 
nominated Legislative Council was established. This was followed in 1964 with the 
introduction of universal adult suffrage under which a minority segment of the 
Council was elected by the people. Through a systematic approach by which 
nominated members were replaced by elected legislators, combined simultaneously 
by a gradual approach of transferring executive powers to the elected members, 
over a period of 10 years from 1964 to 1974, a fully elective parliament with a 
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cabinet-style executive was put in place as the preferred Solomon Islands form of 
government.38 The gradual approach of transferring legislative and executive 
powers to an indigenous leadership had been standardized by British administrators 
throughout their colonial empire as country after country moved towards 
independence. The blueprint was applied to the Solomon Islands in its quest for 
self-determination. On January 2, 1976, the Solomon Islands was granted internal 
self-government. Full independence followed over two years later on July 7, 1978. 
At that time, the Solomon Islands became a sovereign state joining the United 
Nations as its 150th member and the Commonwealth of Nations as its 37th 
member. The first Prime Minister was Peter Kenllorea from Malaita. 
A parliamentary system on the British Westminster model requires political 
parties as an essential component for its functioning. In the Solomonss the 
introduction of universal suffrage for national elections and the establishment of an 
elective legislature provoked the formation of parties.39 The first efforts in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s were sporadic and for the most part unsuccessful. 
Parties were dissolved as quickly as they were formed. 40 Serious problems arose 
even up to the 1980 general elections about the prospect of a stable party 
government emerging.41 Most parliamentarians contested their seat by utilizing 
their own resources and making their own programmatic appeals. Very few 
concerted party linkages were organized to bring like-minded candidates together 
before the elections prior to 1980. Most parliamentarians simply preferred to be 
independents. In the 1976-1980 period a very uncertain situation existed in 
Parliament.42 Three parliamentary groupings could be identified. The group that 
constituted the government with an appointed Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Ministers lacked a majority. From legislative bill to legislative bill, the 
government had to lobby for a majority to pass its bills into national policies. On 
one notable occassion, the 1978 Appropriations Bill, that is the annual National 
Budget, was defeated because the government failed to mobilize a majority of 
members to its support.43 In parliamentary systems, such a loss as an Appropria-
tions Bill is tantamount to a vote of no confidence. When the Prime Minister of the 
Solomons in these circumstances offered to resign, no one was willing to come 
forward and take his place.44 
When a full party system fails to emerge, another casualty in the 
parliamentary system is the idea of continuity and accountability in policy. 
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Citizens are left to ascertain from issue to issue how their Parliamentarians voted, 
a most difficult civic duty even in developed countries, and rendered doubly 
difficult in the Solomons partly because of the existence of only one newspaper 
which is published weekly and only in English.4.5 The 1980 elections witnessed the 
emergence of several strong parties. The new parliament is more structured than 
before but independents still command the largest bloc of votes.46 It is too early 
to predict how much order and programmatic consistency will be maintained in the 
present setting. 
Political leadership in an unintegrated multi-ethnic state such as the Solomon 
Islands tends to be fragmented. No single leader with towering charisma such as an 
Nkrumah or a Nyerere has emerged on the Solomon Islands' political landscape. 
Leadership is very much determined by specific ethnic and religious criteria. A 
"big man" in Malaita is without similar stature in Santa Isabel. Ethnic suspicions 
suggest that only a kinsman or want ok can be trusted. This perspective is pivotal 
to the legitimacy of government. The present Prime Minister comes from Malaita, 
a province whose people are feared for their aggressiveness and hard work. Fear of 
"Malaitan domination" is a theme that pervades much of Solomon Islands politics. 
The Prime Minister prefers to be reagarded first and foremost as a Christian 
instead of a Malaitan. Lacking full recognition, his strategy in government is to 
recruit leadership associates around him from other provinces. Nevertheless, 
without a body of shared national consensual values, parliamentary challenges to 
the Prime Minister in a government format that institutionalizes the role of an 
Opposition Leader are likely to be popularly interpreted in regional or ethnic terms. 
The Solomon Islands will continue to face a leadership crisis until a comprehensive 
party system emerges to accommodate various particularistic interests under broad 
neutral programmatic manifestos. 
In the political field, some mention must also be made of the public service. 
Like most Third World countries, in the Solomon Islands the public service is the 
largest employer in the country. It is also the most likely source of leadership; the 
educated elites seek employment generally with the government. The background 
of most Cabinet members in particular, and parliamentarians generally, includes a 
period of service with a branch in the government. The Solomon Islands' public 
service consumes two-thirds of the recurrent budget. An attempt is made to 
contain the growth of civil servants to about .5 percent annually. The problem with 
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the public service is not size so much as the need for skilled personnel to execute 
the increasing number of development projects undertaken by the government 
every year. Because most foreign aid is granted to the government for public 
projects, the public service is under growing pressure to recruit skilled overseas 
staff to supplement limited local talent. Overseas officers constitute about 10 
percent of the service and there is a vacancy rate of 16.3 percent.47 Private 
businesses compete vigorously with the government for skilled local staff. 
Emerging as a general issue related to public servants is the extent of their 
involvement in formulating policies. Elected political leaders are formally assigned 
the responsibility of formulating and promulgating policy. However, where public 
servants command the skills and experience in both policy formation and execution, 
politicians and cabinet ministers who are generally less educated and experienced 
tend to give way to the initiatives of senior public servants. In a number of cases, 
charges have been made that public servants and not politicians run the state. The 
issue continues to provoke public debate from time to time. 
The final area in the Solomon Islands political system that needs comment is 
localgovernment. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF LOCAL INITIATIVE 
Part I: Colonization and Local Initiative 
British acquisition of the Solomon Islands in 1893 was not intended to protect 
or promote the interests of the indigenous people. From the outset, systematic 
attempts were undertaken to harness their resources to serve colonial interests. 
The administrative system that was established sought to subjugate Solomon Island 
communities to imperial direction. The 1927 massacre of an official party that 
went among tribesmen on Malaita to collect head taxes underscored locali 
resentment against the colonial administration. The head tax was designed to 
extract resources from the indigenous population to defray the cost of the 
administrative system utilized to establish official foreign control. In a sense, this 
early role of imposed administration would cast a dark shadow of suspicion on 
subsequent reforms of local government however innovative or well intended they 
were. 
When the British government took formal measures to colonize the Solomon 
Islands in 1893, about forty years of "blackbirding" had already been experienced by 
the indigenous population.1 "Blackbirding" was the recruitment of villagers for 
rugged plantation work in Queensland, Fiji and Samoa. While most laborers were 
voluntarily recruited, among both the voluntary and involuntary recruits, injustice 
and exploitation on the plantations were common experiences. Numerous villages, 
then, had developed negative images of persons who were collectively called 
"Europeans. " 
Another major factor that would make European penetration problematic 
would stem from the linguistic and social structure of the Melanesian communities 
in the Solomon Islands.2 By 1900, no "pidgin" had yet evolved to link linguistically 
the indigenous population. Neither was there a dominant local language. 
Languages were many numbering about seventy-four. Solomon Island communities 
were spread over a vast area on the many islands, without a common unifying 
language, rendering the establishment of an integrated administration a formidable 
and frustrating task. Moreover, the language diversity problem would be 
compounded by the nature of Melanesian social organization. A typical indigenous 
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community was a small scale unit containing about 50 to 300 persons. There were 
probably as many as 4,000 to 5,000 such communities. Each was relatively self-
sufficient economically and lacked a hierarchy of leadership that structured 
community decision-making in a readily visible form. "Big men" were persons who 
acquired their stature by merit and performance.3 They rarely possessed coercive 
powers. Community decision making was a collective affair that led to decisions 
by consensus after prolonged village meetings. Separated by parcels of island 
territory, truncated by language diversity, and living in thousands of small-scale 
self-contained communities, Solomon Islanders would present an extremely difficult 
task of colonization to the British administrators. 
By themselves, the characteristic features of Solomon Island society would be 
hard to overcome. But the British colonizers would complicate their goal of 
establishing administrative control by bringing to bear irrelevant forms of 
government they had acquired from other parts of their worldwide empire. In 
Africa, they employed variants of "indirect rule" in social systems that were for 
the most part well structured and led by distinguishable leaders. In the Solomon 
Islands, however, "big men" were not the same as African chiefs. One observer 
commented on these difficulties: 
Imbued with the theory of indirect rule, the British colonizers tend to give 
areas of authority greater importance than in fact they warranted. Local 
leadership, or what appeared to be local leadership, was supported in the 
belief that it was hallowed and confirmed by tradition and could be built 
up into native administrations forming the rationale for the introduction 
of a Native Authority system on the African model.4 
The establishment of indirect rule through a system of "native administration" in 
the Solomon Islands was implemented by an attempt to identify and recruit what 
was arbitrarily and often erroneously deemed to be local leadership by British 
district officers.5 The recruited local "big man" was assigned the pivotal role of 
linking the will of the external ruler with the responses of the indigenous people. 
Apart from the problem of readily identifying the "big man," the British assumed 
that if the "big man" could be coopted or coerced to their purpose, he would be 
sufficiently powerful to compel compliance among villagers. In fact, this was not 
the case; villagers, although small, may have several "big men," each of whom 
would command some "influence" and rarely exercised very extensive powers 
beyond their own village or clan. 
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When the search for a leader was undertaken, it tended too yield a person who 
could speak some English or Pidgin. In most cases, as it turned out, these persons 
would be ex-laborers who had served on plantations in Queensland, Australia. They 
mayor may not have been legitimate community leaders; they were chosen because 
they were able to communicate with the district officers. 6 As a consequence, 
many of the persons who were recruited to serve as intermediaries between the 
village and the new external administration lacked standing in their communities: 
In the early days the use of local agents was pivotal to the promotion of 
government and exploration of the islands. Faced with a plethora of local 
dialects, the British, unable to communicate directly with the people, 
appointed as headmen those with whom they could communicate regard-
less of their standing in the local community? 
Another important problem that the British administrators would encounter related 
to community size. Solomon Islanders traditionally lived in very small scale 
communities in which they practiced a form of face-to-face democracy. Their 
social structure was essentially egalitarian. Beyond their vi11age, the Solomon 
Islander rarely trusted anyone else unless a kinsman. The British however, short of 
skilled manpower, sought to establish larger scale administrative district and sub-
district units encompassing several distinct linguistic groups. 
Until World War II, the system of appointed "headmen" and "indirect rule" 
underwent little modification. 8 A centralized administrative machinery was 
gradually established around clusters of villages. The main accomplishment was 
the termination of inter-tribal warfare. In turn, pacification paved the way for the 
spread of European plantations and missionary activities. 
At no time did the new imposed administration penetrate to the point of 
displacing local customs. In a real sense, two levels of government operated 
simultaneously in the Solomons. First, the informal village-based traditional 
decision-making practices continued to operate but not without interruption or 
modification. Indeed, over time, traditional democracy would be significantly 
eroded by the new economic and social forces that were implanted in Solomon 
Islands society. New criteria for status were emerging as cash cropping spread 
throughout the country. Migration to plantations also would weaken traditional 
obligations among young laborers to their villages. The impact would modify the 
modes of decision making and conflict resolution at the village level, not eradicate 
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or completely supplant them. At another level, and developing greater authority, 
was the colonial administration. The British were learning from their earlier 
mistakes; they were searching in the 1930s for greater congruence between their 
imposed administrative structure and the traditional vlaues and motivations of 
Solomon Island society. If village practices and colonial administrative values 
could be made to coincide to serve imperial interests, it would be ideal. 
An important watershed in thinking occurred after the murder of a British 
district commissioner in Malaita in 1927.9 In company of a large party of officials 
and police, the commissioner sought to enforce the collection of taxes. A Native 
Tax Regulation promulgated in the early 1920s levied a head tax on all males 
between the age of 16 and 60. The district commissioner and his party were 
ambushed with many casualties suffered including the loss of the life of the 
District Commissioner himself. A subsequent commission of inquiry declared that 
one major cause of the incident was that "headmen had been appointed 
10 precipitately and in most cases, they were unacceptable to the people." The 
Moorhouse Report on the incident recommended that traditional values be 
incorporated in the operations of the district administration. 1 1 In turn, this report 
influenced the formulation of a new policy that actively sought to identify and 
recruit local big men and chiefs who commanded influence among villagers. Since 
the task of district administrators involved not only tax collection, but dispute 
settlement, capitalizing on the judicial role of big men would more than likely 
impart greater respect for the district administration imposed by the British. 
Clearly, the form of government adopted by the British administrators faced 
severe challenges. By the 1930s, the district machinery had failed to incorporate 
traditional styles of government in its practices. It took the death of a district 
commissioner to alert the alien rulers that local attitudes to their government were 
for the most part negative. In 1939, a distinguished anthropologist, Ian Hogbin, in 
commenting on the need for effectiveness in district administration in the Solomon 
Islands further underscored the need "to return to the solid foundations of the 
past.,,12 The overall impact was the first initiative at the sub-district level to 
establish informal assemblies of local leaders to participate in both tax collection 
and revenue allocation. This experiment in local initiative was extended in the 
early 1940s to the area of community conflict settlement. Under a New Natives 
Court Regulation promulgated in 1942, a system of native courts throughout the 
Solomons was constituted from local headmen and elders. 13 The native court 
system survived until 1960 progressively extending its jurisdiction from village 
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disputes to criminal matters. However, like the district administration, the court 
system was still substantially an externally imposed institution. Beneath the 
veneer of the formal administrative structures, the Solomon Islander would 
surreptitiously continue practicing collective village decision making and 
adjudicating disputes by his ancient traditional values and practices. 
Forty years of colonial administration starting at the beginning of the century 
and culminating with the inception of World War II, witnessed the establishment of 
a centralized system of district government in the Solomon Islands protectorate. 
No pretense was made that its initial purpose was to institute a regime responsive 
to alien directives. The administrative machinery was the device to implement 
alien dominance over indigenous society. Towards the end of the 1930s, new 
policies were tentatively undertaken to permit a meaningful role for local initiative 
in determining revenue and expenditure in local government operations. If genuine 
local leaders could be tapped to fulfill this purpose, then a new era of local 
government effectiveness would be inaugurated. But until the 1930s, the record 
remained one of "indirect rule" that continued the condition of foreign domination 
and indigenous alienation. 
Part II: World War II: Its Impact on Local Initiative 
Perhaps the most revolutionary event in the development of local init.iative in 
the conduct of grassroots Solomon Islander affairs followed from the impact of 
World War II. The Solomon Islands became a massive battle ground in which allied 
troops, preponderantly American soldiers, fought against large numbers of Japanese 
forces. During the military operations at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Solomon 
Islanders were recruited to serve in a separate labor corps. Contact between 
Solomon Islanders and Americans shattered the old structure of colonial relation-
ships that were maintained between the black indigenous populations and the 
European colonizers. Roger Keesing summed up the effects as follows: 
In all this, Malaitans encountered not only staggering quantities of 
American hardware, but the irreverent egalitarianism of the Americans, 
their wealth, and their generosity with government-issue rations and 
equipment. The ex-colonial officers who commanded the Labor Corps 
faced difficulties in trying to maintain status and prestige on behalf of a 
British establishment that had crumbled in the face of Japanese invasion 
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and been humbled by massive American power and successful liberation. 
They did their best to preserve a heavy-handed control in the racist pre-
war colonial style and to prevent the "natives" from getting "uppity" in 
the face of American largesse and egalitarianism. Their confiscation of 
goods the Labour Corps men had accumulated and attempts to preserve 
pre-war style segregation and subordination only heightened resentment 
among the Malaitans and anti-colonialist sentiment among American 
'1' I 14 ml Itary personne • 
The seeds of defiance against the European colonial administration were sown 
among Solomon Islanders in the war. Not only was the plentitude of American 
goods admired, but values of equality were imparted. Although black American 
soldiers were segregated in the U.S. Army, they were treated "vastly better than 
15 the treatment Solomon Islanders had received from planters and government." 
The general idea imparted to the Solomon Islanders was that through organized and 
collective effort, they might be able to wrest from the British in the post-war 
period better conditions of survival at all levels. 
The post-war period would witness the emergence of a collective movement 
among Solomon Islanders called "Maasina Rule.,,16 The movement which was 
mainly developed on the large populous island of Malaita would embody a 
fundamental challenge to the entire system of imposed government that preceded 
the war. It would forge unprecedented links between the diverse indigenous 
communities on Malaita establishing an island-wide government with a hierarchical 
system of chiefs at district, sub-district, and village levels was constructed within 
a year. Malaitans temporarily submerged their parochial interests and inter-
community differences to develop an entirely new social organization completely 
staffed, led and directed by indigenous people. 18 Mass mobilization of effort was 
directed at undertaking collective economic projects. This was engrafted on 
traditional communalistic values so as to exploit the familiar form of traditional 
village organization as well as to impart legitimacy simultaneously to it. 19 
Together, "Maasina Rule" meaning "Rule of Brotherhood" established an 
indigenous political and social organization paralleling that of the District 
Administration constructed by the European administrators after the war. 
"Maasina Rule" was a novel and unprecedented indigenous government that 
established its own hierarchy of councils from the district to village level. At the 
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pinnacle of the structure was a "Federal Council." To succeed the movement 
needed its own resources to carry out its self-assigned functions of economic 
development. It, therefore, refused to permit its followers to pay the local 
government head tax. It collected its own taxes from its adherents to sponsor its 
t " "" 20 ac IVltIes. 
"Maasina Rule" effectively capitalized on the new ideas generated by the war 
and transformed a compliant people into a rebellious movement seeking the power 
to control their own affairs. "Maasina Rule" was both a collective act of protest 
against alien rule in the pre-war period as well as a set of anticipatory 
revolutionary values reflecting the needs of indigenous Solomon Islanders. It was 
initiated immediately after the war and persisted until 1950. Although suppressed 
eventually, it would leave in its wake a variety of lessons that would transform the 
structure of local administration radically. 
The British government did not dismantle their own local administration when 
confronted with the alternative structure established by Maasina Rule. Posing a 
threat to continued British control of the Solomons, "Maasina Rule" was suppressed 
by the colonial power. Large-scale arrests of its leaders as well as internal 
divisions in the movement led to its dismantling as a viable unified organization in 
the early 1950s. From the movement's achievements especially in relation to the 
scale of its organization and indigenous leadership and motifs, a new attempt would 
be made by the British to establish local councils to win support of the ordinary 
villager as well as to perform effectively. 
In 1953 a new Native Administration Regulation was passed. Under a system 
of direct administration, each district was allocated its own council. This happened 
first on Malaita, where a newall-island Malaita Council was created to supplant 
the Maasina Rule'S "Federal Council." "Maasina Rule" had demonstrated the 
effectiveness of larger viable units of administration built on traditional com-
munalistic values. These ideas were incorporated in the 1953 legislation. Campbell 
noted that "the new councils in fact provided a successful and useful forum for 
breaking down clan barriers and readily accept wider responsibilities.,,21 In turn, 
"this jump forward made possible by the unifying forces on Maasina Rule laid the 
foundation for an effective form of political decentralization.,,22 The important 
point was to design a form of local government that would, at once, be larger in 
scale than the typical small communities in which the people lived to permit 
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viability and yet to be intimate enough to impart trust to groups that had habitually 
distrusted and fought each other. In effect, centralization of administration could 
occur for certain purposes while decentralization of other aspects may be required 
for others. Previous colonial administrative units were not able to fulfill both 
objectives simultaneously. "Maasina Rule" successfully incorporated both princi-
ples of centralized and decentralized administration. Bringing government closer 
to the people in a setting marked by social and cultural fragmentation would 
bedevil the ongoing experiment to find appropriate local government structures for 
the Solomon Islands. 
The period 1953-1963 constitutes a watershed in the evolution of local 
initiative in the Solomon Islands. "Maasina Rule" was effectively suppressed but an 
implicit set of expectations were imparted that indigenous interests would find 
accommodation in the new administrative structures that were to be established 
under the 1953 native administration regulation. A period of intense activity 
followed, witnessed by the spread and consolidation of district administration, local 
councils, and native courts in the country. New executive functions were allocated 
to the councils as well as revenue creating powers. However, when all of these 
developments were accounted for, one salient fact remained as a major aberration 
in the evolution of local initiative in this period. It is that a system of Native 
Administration prevailed under which the elective principle was denied. Members 
of the various local councils were appointed by the High Commissioner from among 
"natives of good standing." 
Changes in the operations of the councils were nevertheless imperative 
between 1953 and 1963. Twenty-four local councils were established throughout 
the Protectorate. They varied in size from the largest, Malaita Council, 
responsible for 50,000 people with a revenue of [17,000 to Duffs Council covering 
150 people with an annual revenue of 113,000. In 1962, it grew to 160,000, that is 
over four-and-a-half times the 1955 figure. Similarly, expenditure in 1955 was 
[34,400; this grew to [59,400 in 1962. Practically, all the revenues were derived 
from native tax. In 1962, of the total of 160,000 total revenues, [52,700 or 87 
percent came from taxes paid by Solomon Islanders. Yet, in this picture, the 
people who paid the taxes were not permitted to elect their own representatives to 
the councils which controlled the disposal of the funds collected. It was estimated 
in 1955 that 65 percent of the revenues was spent on servicing the administration 
of the councils in such areas as payment of salaries and wages of staff and village 
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chiefs.24 Only 27 percent was left for social services, medical care, and education. 
In 1962, the heavy allocation of revenues for salaries and other administrative costs 
had dropped to 34 percent. With more funds then available for other services, 
many councils were engaged in identifying projects such as road construction, 
transport services, wharves, and water supplies. 
The increase in the council budgets and activities underscored the proposition 
that a Change in local initiative in the direction of democratic government was 
required. Not only were councillors appointed and paid without the benefit of a 
direct mass base of village opinion, but the central government retained the power 
to approve all council budgets, by-laws, and other council items. These crucial 
problems apart, the growth in council activities threw up other difficulties. The 
line of difference in responsibilities and functions between the central government 
and local councils was blurred which caused confusion. Similarly, the alternating 
role of headmen as councillors and native court appointees lent itself to confusion 
in roles and abuse.25 Finally, councils which wanted to enter into other fields of 
economic development discovered severe limitations in their permitted bases of tax 
levy as well as in recruitment of skilled staff. 
These developments taken together suggested that drastic changes in local 
administration were called for. To add to the accumulating pressures from below, 
new developments in institutions of the central government were emerging from 
above. In 1960, an appointed Legislative Council for the entire protectorate was 
established incorporating both official and non-official members to advise the High 
Commissioner on colony-wide issues. The first meaningful element in a system of 
gradual constitutional change pointing to self-government was not installed. The 
upshot at the local level was a government White Paper in 1962 titled "The 
Respective Functions of Local Councils and Central Government. ,,26 This paper 
was the prelude to the introduction during the following year of the landmark 
legislation under which a local government ordinance was inaugurated. If self-
determination was the long-term objective, local government would serve as a 
preparatory school to this end. 
The 1963 local government ordinance established councils that were wholly 
elected. It also contained adequate provisions to accommodate various sizes of 
councils. The legislation itself was borrowed and adapted from the Ghana Local 
Government Ordinance. It provided for wide-ranging functions to be undertaken by 
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councils if they wished. The Act contained enough plasticity to permit councils to 
adapt to a range of functions that it wanted to undertake. In 1964, a re-
organization of councils occurred under the 1963 ordinance. Seventeen new 
councils were formed to supercede the previous arrangements. Much pUblicity 
attended the new initiatives in local governments. 
Part III: Performance Under the 1963 Local Government Act: 1963-1973 
The 1963 Act inaugurated a period of great optimism for the role of local 
indigenous opinion in the activities and policies of the councils. Mainly this was 
because the elective principle determined the composition of the councils. When 
the implementation exercise was over, there were 18 local councils which were all 
rural bodies except for the Honiara Town Council. Every part of the Solomon 
Islands fell under the jurisdiction of a rural council, apart from the two remote 
islands of Tikopia and Anuta. The council areas in turn were sub-divided into wards 
so that elections could be conducted on an area basis. Initially, between 1964 and 
1968, election turnout for ward elements was at an impressive 79 percent of voters. 
Later, when the novelty of the ward system wore off and some disappointment in 
council performance became publicly evident, the electoral turnout was reduced to 
about 55 percent which was comparable to turnout for national electoral posts.27 
Below the council unit which for the most part covered wide areas was 
another tier of local government called area committees. Where they were 
established, they were the unit of government closest to the people, built 
essentially on the principle of a separate committee for a separate village, ethnic 
or clan group. What affinity to local sentiment the councils failed to achieve 
because of their incorporation of a multiplicity of discrete language and clan 
groups in their jurisdiction, the area committees in theory were to compensate for 
by their direct accommodation of village or clan interests. Further, area 
committees were composed of local leaders and chiefs who would conduct their 
meetings and decision making on familiar traditional patterns. Because of these 
characteristics of area committees, if they became even moderately operational, 
they could provide a vibrant link between council activities and grassroots village 
opinion. While area committees were a tier of relatively informal government 
below the level of councils, district administration under central government 
control was the tier immediately above the council. The function of the district 
administration was to assist and supervise the councils. 
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Over the ten-year period, the new councils showed some important 
achievements. About 75 clinics and 34 registered schools were constructed to meet 
village needs for health services and education. A total of 120 nurses, half 
employed by the councils and the other half by the central government, staffed the 
clinics and hospitals. In the area of education, the councils assumed responsibility 
for about 10 percent of the instructional process at the primary level. In the area 
of infrastructure, about 150 water supply units were established and some roads 
were built. About 700 to 800 people found employment with the councils receiving 
salaries and wages that were infused in the local economy.28 Finally, the head tax 
levy on adults stimulated villages to enter cash cropping. While revenues were 
received from the levy directly from the people, the central government matched 
the taxes collected by a similar grant contribution. Together, these activities 
played a role in stimulating the local economy. It was esimated that the levies and 
disbursements accounted for the production of $120,000 of copra annually and 
about $300,000 of salaries and wages. 29 
After the accomplishments are tallied, the question that arises is: Why did 
the central colonial government in the early 1970s come under very severe pressure 
to reform the entire local government structure? The 1963 Local Government Act 
appeared to have met the rising demands that were generated from the 1940s and 
1950s for fundamental changes in rural representation. The 1953 Native 
Administration Regulation attempted to expand the scope of the unit governments 
as well as incorporate the bona fide village big men in council decision making. 
The 1962 reforms scrapped the nominated system and replaced it by elective bodies 
reinforced by a system of village-based area committees that tapped into 
traditional leadership structures. It would appear that all basic demands had been 
met by appropriate responses. A comprehensive network of councils had been 
introduced throughout the Solomons. 
At least two sets of interlocking factors would emerge to qualify the success 
of the 1963 derived local government system. Together, they would highlight the 
evolutionary nature of colonial administration as well as attest to the awakening of 
the Solomon Islands people for "more development." First, constitutional changes 
initiated at the protectorate-level in 1960 accelerated dramatically by 1970 when a 
tull ministerial system in a Governing Council was instituted. The nominated 
members of the legislative council were being phased out as general elections under 
universal adult suffrage provided the principal means for the establishment of 
42 
representative democracy. The explosive growth of elective office at the national 
level in anticipation of impending self-government stimulated re-examination of 
the local government structures in relation to the tasks of development. It was 
abundantly clear, as the 1972 constitutional development committee indicated in 
its recommendations, that in any scheme for further devolution of economic and 
political responsibility to the peoples of the Solomon Islands, a substantial measure 
of burden would inevitably fall on local council structures. The solution was to 
expand the role of the councils to enable them to become a crucial partner in the 
ongoing experiment in democracy and development. The second factor that would 
be identified as a cause for further local government reform may be termed 
"internal" and "pragmatic." This refers to the nuts and bolts of local 
administration, to the daily problenls of making a very unfamiliar and alien 
organization develop vitality in the countryside. These factors would severely 
temper any frenzied rush in sentiment that would suggest that development would 
be easy. They would point to severe constraints on implementation. We shall look 
briefly at the 1963-1973 period in the local government experiment to isolate and 
examine the pragmatic difficulties that were thrown up. 
First, let us look at council organization. The councils were bodies that 
operated on Western procedures using a system of committees and subcommittees, 
standing and ad hoc. The procedures that were intended to facilitate participation 
in decision making would become too complex for local leadership to understand 
and fully manipulate. To add to this problem, councils tended to meet only two or 
three times a year. The single council item that evoked much interest and 
deliberation among councillors related to personal allowances for travel and 
attendance. Inevitably, these practices led to regular intervention by district 
administration functionaries from the central government. Abuses in the use of 
funds were frequent. The tier of government below the council, that is, area 
committees, which were supposed to link a large remote council to the specific 
needs of individual villages and communities displayed sporadic activity. Both the 
councils and area committees suffered from problems of leadership recruitment 
since their tasks in relation to rewards did not attract the most able people. Where 
a council assignment promised reward in the form of sitting and travelling 
allowances, it had its attractiveness. But this was a cynical form of political 
participation. The aim of local councils would suffer from the narrow instrumental 
view espoused by villagers and leaders alike that the council was as good as it was 
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useful in providing benefits without corresponding service. The point was that the 
council remained still an alien institution introduced by the colonial administration. 
As such, it was viewed not only cynically, but with a widespread attitude, 
reinforced by the presence of a district commissioner system, that its value was 
only appreciated to the extent that it provided services. The idea of responsibility 
was difficult to implant in village communities which still viewed their loyalty and 
interest in very parochial and intimate terms. 
This leads us to the second factor related to council finances. Local sources 
of revenue primarily from head tax or "basic rate" contributed a very small part of 
total expenditures of council activities. Grants and subsidies by the central 
government constitute over 50 percent of total local council revenues by 1973. 
From 1965 to 1973, these in fact increased from $26,000 to $463,000.30 Most 
central government allocations were assigned to capital projects which in practice 
were in the area of social services thereby providing few revenues in return except 
on an indirect and long-term basis. The critical point from these observations 
about the source of council revenues is that they render the local democratic 
institutions highly dependent on the central government for both their recurrent 
and capital budget. While a weak rural economic base pointing to few available 
cash income opportunities goes a long way in explaining this dependency, it is 
inevitable that the deepening of this dependent condition over the years would 
destroy local pride, initiative, and responsibility. It is posited here that the local 
councils as alien institutions with intricate and esoteric internal procedural 
processes lose their legitimacy as indigenous bodies because of their overwhelming 
dependency on the central government for survival. Close supervision and 
assistance by the district administration as an overlord invariably accompanies, as 
it did in the Solomon Islands, the dependency on the colonial administration. A 
mentality of dependency, in this opinion, had evolved through the colonial period 
and it found most extensive and expansive expression in the operations of the 
council system that was engrafted in the rural areas. 
The utilization of the externally derived funds by the councils presented its 
own hurdles. Implementation of projects required trained staff; responsible use of 
funds entailed the availability of accountants. Both were in short supply. While 
pride may be lost by deriving revenues from central government sources, daily 
confidence by ordinary villagers is eroded when projects and services falter because 
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of lack of skilled manpower. Yet, this was substantially the record that was 
bequeathed by the experiment between 1963-73. A report on the staff situation 
commented: "The most widely heard and valid observation about local councils is 
that their administrative and financial management is weak.,,31 On internal 
management of the councils, the report elaborated: 
In most councils, concepts of simple management and supervision 
techniques are absent. Works [division] is unprogrammed, staff 
discipline vague, financial controls hit-or-miss and office organization 
and records are chaotic.32 
Records have been described as "dusty and rat-catch" while council offices 
"frequently look as if funds ran out before the building was quite finished and have 
never been sufficient for maintenance.,,33 
Overall, the 1963-73 period in local initiative made a bold start in badly 
needed reforms to accommodate rapid social, economic, and constitutional 
changes. The legitimacy of councils was still unanchored in local tradition. 
Performance had the potential of winning acceptance and spreading overall 
legitimacy. The record in this regard is clearly mixed. Some accomplishments 
could be seen and even enumerated. But it appeared that full realization of the 
promise of the 1963 local government act encountered constraints of an historical, 
environmental and cultural nature. The implementation process will be discussed 
at length later. Suffice it to underscore the conclusion of a report on this period 
that said: "Local government in 1973 has itself the appearance of a half-baked 
project. Some parts are well advanced, some have never gotten started and some 
were started but the foreman seems to have lost interest or lost the plans.,,34 With 
new challenges awaiting it in the 1970s, the local government system instituted in 
1963 would undergo yet another phase of drastic re-examination and revision. 
45 
Footnotes to Chapter Three 
1 See Peter Corris, Passa e Port and Plantation: A Histor of Solomon 
Islands Labor Migration (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1973 ; also, J. M. 
Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific 1786-1893 (Sydney, 1948). 
2R• H. Codrington, The Melanesians (Oxford, 1891). 
3G. Cochrane, Big Men and Cargo Cults (Oxford, 1970); A. Strathern, The 
Rope of Moka (Cambridge, 1974). 
4M• J. Campbell, The Development of a New Local Government Image in the 
British Solomons, Seminar Paper, University of Papua New Guinea, Nov. 1974, 
mimeo, p. 1. 
5See A. M. Healy, "Administration in the British Solomon Islands," Journal of 
Administration Overseas, July, 1966, pp. 195-197; also, W. G •. Ivens, The Island 
Builders of the Pacific (London, 1930), p. 86. 
6Campbell, Ope cit. 
7 Ibid., p. 2. 
8Ian Wotherspoon, An Outline History of Local Government in the Solomon 
Islands, mimeo, background submission paper number 8 to the Kausimae 
Committee, pp. 1-3. 
9See Roger Keesing and Peter Corris, Lightning Meets the West Wind (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980). 
10CampbeU, Ope cit., p. 3. See Moorehouse Report, Cmd. 3248, Jan. 1929. 
1 1 Moorehouse Report, Ope cit. 
12H• I. Hogbin, Experiments in Civilization (London, 1939), pp. 142-6. 
13Healy, Ope cit., p. 199. 
14Roger Keesing, "Politico-Religious Movements and Anti-Colonialism on 
Malaita: Maasina Rule in Historical Perspective," Oceania, September, 1978, 
Part II, p. 48. 
15Ibid., p. 49. 
16See C. S. Belshaw, "Native Politics in the Solomon Islands," Pacific Affairs, 
XX, 1947; C. H. Allen, The Marching Rule Movement in the B.S.I.P., unpublished 
thesis, Cambridge University, 1950. 
17K . . eesmg, Ope Clt. 
18Ibid• 
19Ibid• 
46 
20Ibid• 
21CampbeU, Ope cit., p. 6. 
22Ibid• 
23S•S•I•P• Hansard, Second Session, Second meeting, 1962, p. 32. 
24Ibid• 
25Wotherspoon, Ope cit., pp. 1-2. 
26White Paper: The Res ective Functions of Local Councils and Central 
Government (Honiara: Government Printery, 1962 • 
10. 
27 See Plan of Operations (Honiara: Government Printery, October, 1973), p. 
28Ibid• 
29Ibid., p. 14. 
30Ibid• 
31Ibid., p. 16. 
32Ibid• 
33Ibid., p. 17. 
34Ibid., p. 18. 
47 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EVOLUTION OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE 1970s 
The 1970s witnessed an escalation in the evolution of the decentralization 
process accompanied by the transformation of the Solomon Islands from colonial 
dependency to independent South Pacific nation. The period opened with a 
continuation of the colonial pattern; reform proceeded incrementally mainly by 
administrative adjustments. But gtumblings of discontent were beginning to gather 
ominous proportions. 
From 1971 onwards, pressures for local government reform would be 
instigated at both the parliamentary and grassroots levels. Government response 
would be marked by the establishment of several successive committees and the 
issuing of reports recommending changes. 
Several major documentary events marked out this process: 
(1) Report of a Special Select Committee on Constitutional Development 
(November 1972). 
(2) Suggested Reforms to the Existing Local Government Structure in the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Preliminary Report, M. J. 
Campbell (March 1973). 
(3) The Development of Local Government, Plan of Operations 1974-77 
(October 1973). 
(4) The Development of Local Government Policy Statement (November 
1973). 
(5) Report of the Constitutional Committee 1975 (March 1976). 
(6) Constitutional Conference 1977 Principles (March 1977). 
(7) Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference (September 
1977). 
(8) Creation of the Special Committee on Provincial Government in 
December 1977 chaired by David Kausimae. 
(9) Report of the Kausimae Committee 1979. 
(10) Government white paper on the Kausimae Committee Report on 
Decentralization, 1980. 
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By any standard, this must be regarded as an impressive list of reports. At 
least at two junctures, in 1974 when the Local Government Plan of Operations was 
adopted and in 1977 when the Kausimae parliamentary committee on decentraliza-
tion toured the country convening village meetings to elicit views on 
decentralization, the role of local initiative in development became a dominant 
national concern. Steady political steps towards self-government and independence 
partly triggered this preoccupation. The issues of decolonization and local 
grassroots democracy had become enmeshed. The stakes were high with a silent 
political struggle between various interests seeking to influence the role decentral-
ization would play in the emerging new order. The independence constitution would 
embody the distribution of power among the political and administrative actors in 
the government. The final constitutional formula would substantially influence the 
relative access to resources and institutional legitimacy of the competing political 
groups. Hence, underlying the multiple impulses towards local democracy were 
political calculations by power competitors about whose interests should be served 
by the rearrangements in the formal relationship between the center and the 
periphery. 
The British administrators, seemingly standing above the local jockeying for 
power, had a key interest in the way matters were resolved. Their major concerns 
were to maintain national unity and to ensure that their successors were loyalists. 
A number of local political groups aligned themselves to and were supported by the 
British position. To some extent, the devolution of extensive powers from the 
central government to subordinate local units posed a potential threat to the 
coherent formulation of national policy and to the effective implementation of 
programs. Besides, strong semi-autonomous subordinate government units, 
especially where they were co-terminous with discrete ethnic or regional groups, 
could capitalize on decentralization to promote secession. What fed British fears 
about the potential of devolution to invite separatism or open defiance of the 
central government's authority was the source of the most intense demands for 
decentralization. Politicians who were associated with populist and semi-socialist 
ideals and who also tended to be most critical of the impact of colonialism in the 
Solomon Islands were the most vocal advocates of devolving extensive political and 
administrative powers to the grassroots. 
The movement towards local government reform, then, was not strictly a 
technical administrative issue. The contest had crystallized for the most part 
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between two polar groups during the period of the Kausimae parliamentary inquiry 
(1977-80). The Kenilorea-Ied government (1976-81) was associated more with the 
"centralist" position while most of the opposition favored extensive devolution. If 
the Kenilorea government was Christian and pro-capitalist, the opposition elements 
were quasi-socialists who menanced the government with a "proletarian" program 
advocating "power to the people." In reality, no such strong programmatic 
difference separated the parties in and out of power. However, the parties were 
clearly separated over their respective positions on decentralization. To the 
opposition groups represented by Bart Ulu'faalu and Solomon Mamaloni, power 
denied them at the center could conceivably be obtained at the periphery. To the 
group in government represented by Prime Minister Peter Kenilorea (1975-81), 
maintaining power was equated with preserving central control over the affairs of 
state. The momentum towards decentralization received half-hearted support from 
the outgoing colonial administration and its local sympathizers who had succeeded 
to power. Despite the ethnically diverse and geographically disparate nature of the 
Solomon Islands, the critical and dominant determinant of the manner in which 
decentralization was perceived and introduced by those who governed rested with 
the colonial reality of hegemony from Honiara. 
The issue of inter-governmental relations was postured as a revision in local 
government, not fundamental alterations in the balance of power between center 
and periphery. The underlying assumption was that the Solomon Islands was and 
would continue to be a unitary system of government. 1 Under Kenilorea the 
regime's policy makers-political and administrative-seemed to agree on the need 
for a tame and toothless form of devolution to meet the ethno-geographic reality 
of the country; they felt threatened and were very cautious about the possible 
adverse political and social implications of decentralization. Devolution should not 
undermine the role and place of central authority. 
Given the absence of a strong assertive nationalist leadership challenging 
colonial rule, combined with weakly disciplined political parties and the reality of 
bureaucratic dominance, the discussion and elaboration of decentralization seemed 
non-ideological in character. 2 The central government attempted to cast debate 
between dissenters and advocates as a consensual process at a highly general level. 
To those who governed, it was overtly conceded that decentralization was good and 
necessary, but the details should safely be left to specialists and the central 
administration to work out in practice. The mood and tone were paternalistic: the 
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pace and direction, essentially bureaucratic. The strategy of the British trained 
administrators was to coopt the rhetoric of decentralization but in practice to 
implement if not as a political revolution but as an administrative exercise that 
retained the essential features of the centralist state. 
The one feature of a dissonant quality was cast by the shadow and demands of 
the people of the West for greater powers and a co-equal status with the central 
government.3 The potential of secession was held out as an alternative if their 
demands were not met. In this instance, the central administration was not in 
complete control over the process of decentralization. Rather, a degree of 
initiative had passed to another arena, distant from Honiara and potentially 
threatening to central perceptions and plans. For the first time, the central 
adjustment which took place was reactive in nature. This required a new strategic 
response, one which had to gauge the level of discord, anticipate possible points of 
difference which in retrospect seemed to alternate the severity and stridency of 
the Western challenge. But the Western case takes us too far ahead of our analysis. 
Our attention in this chapter will focus on the political and administrative changes 
that transpired in the first half of the 1970s, culminating in the appointment of the 
history-making Special Committee on Provincial Government in 1977. A separate 
chapter is devoted to this report. But setting the stage were earlier events which 
we must examine. These include: The Report of the Select Committee on 
Constitutional Development; The Campbell report; the 1974-77 Plan of Operations, 
the 1975 draft of the Independence Constitution and the Independence negotiations. 
These marked a subtle but important change in the perception and seriousness of a 
devolution commitment. A Plan of Operations was adopted to re-design local 
government. Drawing upon the CampbeU report, the Plan of Operations recast the 
number of local government units, identified in specific terms the functions which 
could usefully and realistically be transferred to the revised units of local 
government and scheduled a timetable for the introduction of the reforms.4 The 
1975 draft constitution and the Independence negotiations affirmed the commit-
ment of the Solomon Islands government to the principle of decentralization. 
References began to appear to "decentralization" in place of local government 
reform and to "provincial" as against "local" levels of government. However, and 
this is the crucial point, the momentum for change and the nature of the 
decentralization concept remained under the control of the central bureaucracy 
and senior public servants. 
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a) Report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, 1972 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
underwent a major change at the national government level. The legislative body 
of the 1960s-the Legislative Council-was transformed into a Governing Council 
in 1970 which merged executive and legislative power into one institutional setting. 
This Council was structured into standing committees which were chaired by 
elected members and had responsibility for overseeing departmental portfolios by 
subject areas. The merger of the Executive Council and Legislative Council into a 
Governing Council whose members were predominantly elected Solomon Islanders 
and the creation of standing committees to oversee departmental affairs marked an 
important movement towards a ministerial system of government and parlia-
mentary supremacy. 5 
In 1971, the Governing Council decided to establish a Special Select 
Committee on Constitutional Development with a broad mandate, 
To consider the next steps in the Constitutional development of the 
British Solomon Islands and, having regard to the economic, social and 
political situation, to submit such proposals for the amendment or 
replacement of the British Solomon Islands Order 1970 as it may consider 
desirable and appropriateo6 
The Special Select Committee was a misnomer for in fact all the members of the 
Governing Council were members of the Committee which was chaired by the 
Chief Secretary. 
In general political terms, the Special Select Committee recommended a 
further advance in constitutional development to proceed to internal self-
government? With respect to local government reform, however, the Special 
Select Committee was far more cautious. Neither the term "decentralization" nor 
any expressed commitment to the principle of decentralization appeared in the 
Report. Rather, the Committee adopted a clearly traditional colonial approach to 
the conceptualization of the issue: the key question was how to improve, " ••• the 
organization and quality of local government administration in the Protectorate,,,8 
not to alter and strengthen the relationship between central and local government. 
Increasingly, the Committee did not feel competent to venture any substantive 
changes in the existing structuring of power. That time would have to await the 
recruitment and report of an expert whose services the Government agreed to seek 
in April 1972. 
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The traditional colonial approach can be seen at several major points in the 
Report. In an overview of the social background of the Solomon Islands, local 
government was cast as a "foreign institution" which, in association with other 
elements, had ". . . substantially weakened traditional social systems and 
traditional patterns of leadershlp.,,9 The most salient and disturbing trend in 
recent Solomon Islands history was the decline of traditional authority and the rise 
of a new non-traditional leadership which wanted to move too quickly to assume 
leadership positions in a country which lacked a national identity.IO This 
perspective paralleled that of other colonial experiences where colonial administra-
tors lamented the erosion of traditional leadership and sought means to retard the 
decline. In part, the revival of traditional leaders was felt by the Committee to be 
instrumental to other goals, to overcome, for example, land problems and to foster 
economic development in rural society. More obvious, however, was the expressed 
desire to find some means of associating such leadership within a more general 
political framework. The Committee considered the creation of a Council of 
Elders at the national level to act as a consultative body which could be utilized by 
Ministers and the Legislative Assembly, "particularly on matters affecting custom 
and the quality of Melanesian life." 11 However, a number of major disadvantages 
of such an arrangement mitigated against its implementation. Fundamentally, the 
proposal ran counter to the more modern and democratic Solomon Islands that the 
elected members desired to create. 
The focus for a consideration of the place and role of traditional authority 
moved quickly to the local government level. It was here that chiefs could 
participate legitimately and make a real contribution, although the latter remained 
vague and unspecified. Although the underlying rationale for the argument that 
traditional authority be given a place in governmental affairs would change over 
time as well as the fact that the degree of concern was at its highest under this 
Committee, the place of traditional leaderShip would be a recurring theme in 
future discussions about decentralization and local government. 
With respect to center-periphery relations, the Special Select Committee 
advanced a number of suggestions for reform. These set the context within which 
the external adviser would view local government. They were inchoate in that no 
clear rationale was given for the advance of these new ideas. The suggestions did 
touch upon a number of important themes which deserve our attention. First, the 
idea was advanced that a separate ministry for local government be created at the 
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center. Presumably, this would provide a focus for local government coordination 
and control and at the same time be a powerful voice for local government 
interests in the central government. Second, participation by Legislative Assembly 
members, on an ex-officio basis, was suggested at the local council level. No 
elaboration was given but as the Special Select Committee was dominated by 
elected national representatives it is not surprising to see their concern for 
participation in structures of government that affect their constitutencies. Third, 
the Committee suggested that District Development Committees be merged into 
the local government organization. Although unexplained, this suggestion is one 
response to a common difficulty with the District Development Committee faced 
in other former British colonial territories. 12 Chaired by the District 
Commissioner, the predominant central force at the district level and composed of 
special departmental field staff and other coopted members, these structures 
tended to become administrative mechanisms for central coordination and control 
of district activity. Their transformation to real arenas for participation on 
development issues has never been successfully achieved. 13 Fourth, in light of the 
suggestion that District Commissioners be bypassed by the Minister in charge of 
the new department of local government who would now issue instructions direct to 
local. council presidents, the disappearance of District Development Committees 
becomes even more logical. This circumvention is a fascinating suggestion given 
the District Commissioner's central place in colonial administration for the 
Committee does not consider what role the District Commissioner should now 
assume nor what alternative position could give effect to central control. Fifth, 
the Committee suggested that the central government grant subsidies to local 
councils rather than permitting councils, " .•• to enter fields of taxation now the 
responsibility of central government. II14 This touches on a crucial point in center-
periphery relations, the distribution of revenue sources and implicitly the power to 
decide how revenues are to be spent. By implication, no change was foreseen in the 
balance of fiscal power between central and local governments. Finally, the 
Committee suggested that the presidents of local councils meet annually in 
Honiara, a suggestion which was implemented in 1973. 
It cannot be said that the Special Select Committee marked a sharp departure 
from past evaluations and revisions of the local government machinery. Despite 
the dominance of elected politicians, the Committee continued the incremental and 
evolutionary approach characteristic of past efforts. The two features of the 
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Committee's Report that stand out are the extremely tentative nature of its 
proposals, which appear as suggestions rather than recommendations unsupported 
by cogent arguments or an over arching framework and the continued expression of 
deep concern for the place of traditional leadership. Clearly, the momentum for 
change in local government remained in the careful control and hands of the 
colonial administration. 
b) The Campbell Report and Decentralization 
Following upon the Special Select Committee of 1972, the next stage in the 
decentralization process occurred with the appointment of Mr. M. J. Campbell as 
an adviser to the Government in January 1973. Campbell prepared a preliminary 
report, "Suggested Reforms to the Existing Local Government Structure in the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate," which was submitted to government in 
March 1973. He stayed on to act as a consultant during the drafting of the Local 
Government Committee's "The Development of Local Government-Plan of 
Operations 1974-77" which appeared in October 1973. The Campbell report was a 
rather hasty and cursory overview of local government in the Solomon Islands, a 
fact acknowledged by Campbell who saw the draft as an outline for the future 
development of local government. 15 
It is precisely from this perspective that Campbell's Preliminary Report 
should be viewed-it provided a framework for a decentralization of power from 
the central to local units of government based on certain assumptions about the 
need for and benefits of decentralization in the Solomons case. Significantly, it 
was cast from an administrator's perspective outlining the restructuring of 
functions and relationships necessary to achieve a measure of local autonomy 
within the existing unitary system of government. 
In terms of reference, Campbell was asked, 
To evaluate the existing system of local government in the British 
Solomon Islands and, bearing in mind the limitations on the financial and 
manpower resources of the Protectorate, to make recommendations for 
its future development. 16 
Instead of approaching the task from a purely technical point of view, Campbell 
outlined a theoretical perspective on decentralization and development which 
rested on the viability of "development from below" as the most appropriate 
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strategy to promote change. 17 Given the nature of the Solomon Islands, 
decentralization is a more appropriate response than a centralized and powerful 
administration modelled on the colonial pattern. The geographic factor and 
problems of communication between the center and the local level are important 
constraints to the promotion of effective development from the center. Campbell 
also agreed that the parochial and static nature of the population fostered an island 
identity and a preference to avoid migration. The third argument for 
decentralization was based on the multi-ethnic nature of the Solomons where there 
are a number of separate cultural and linguistic groups. Campbell assumed that 
decentralization will be integrative in nature, 
Experience in other democratically oriented countries indicates that 
where the population is multi-ethnic in nature and there are a number of 
linguistic and cultural groups within the one state, successful government 
depends upon a decentralized system which permits local aspirations full 
rein in order to preserve national unity or major issues. Under such 
conditions rivalries become aggravated at the centre over specific needs 
and the division of available reesources. 18 
The dangers of over-centralization, as counterpoint and support for his assumption, 
can be found in the Papua New Guinean case with respect to Bougainville and the 
Gazelle Peninsula. His final point suggested that a decentralized form of 
government would provide employment opportunities locally for school leavers and 
thus prevent migration to urban centers. 
On the basis of his claims for decentralization then, local government would 
serve three objectives-(a) it would provide the lower level of government and be a 
viable unit in terms of population and finance, (b) it would be the main agency for 
development and the provision of governmental services in its area, and (c) it would 
be the coordinator of the public service in its area. However, to fulfill this set of 
roles, local government requires that two essential preconditions be met-one is 
the recognition at the center both administratively and politically that local 
government is the principal agency for development in its area and that it has the 
responsibilities and second, that local government is seen as an integral part of 
government and that it became an "effective and necessary" partner in tandem 
with central government to promote national development. Without the precondi-
tions, local government would be isolated from central activities at the local level 
and sterile for lack of staff and resources. 19 
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Thus Campbell, in his overview, provides the arguments for moving further 
along the road of local government reform and presents a challenge to the central 
government to accept local government as a viable and essential form of 
government. For the first time in the evolutionary process, the term 
"decentralization" appears and to Campbell, development must be redefined in 
terms of decentralization: 
It appears valuable to define the term development within the context of 
local government if the above criteria are accepted. Firstly, it should 
mean the provision of an infra structure designed to promote and 
strengthen economic activity and local prosperity. Secondly, it should be 
designed to provide these social services calculated to promote and 
maintain higher standards of living within the local communities.20 
The remainder of the Campbell report introduced the administrative 
restructuring required to achieve decentralization. This included specifying the 
number of local government units which would be viable, financially and 
administratively. He proposed that the present 17 rural authorities be reduced to 
six major local government councils: 
1. Western Council 
2. North Central Council 
3. South Central Council 
4. North Eastern Council 
5. Eastern Inner Islands 
Council 
6. Eastern Outer Islands . 
Council 
to remain as at present 
Ysabel, Russell Islands, Bela 
and Savo Councils 
Guadalcanal and Mungabba-
Mungikki Councils 
Malaita, Sikaiana, Pelau and 
Luaniua 
Makira and Ulawa Councils 
Santa Cruz, Reef Islands, 
Utupua and Vanikoro 
This represented a crucial new theme in decentralization-to replace weak, local 
and isolated units through amalgamation with local government units of sufficient 
population and resources. Viability required amalgamation. Honiara would be 
treated as a separate concern and take the form of a Town Council. 
The form of local government would feature elected councils based on ward 
constituencies following a major principle of representation, that is, " ..• in so far 
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as is possible, all ethnic and linguistic groups obtain adequate representation.,,21 
Executive direction of Council affairs would be the task of an Executive 
Committee chosen from among the council members. The key committee of the 
Council would be the Development and Finance Committee. Campbell considered 
this committee to be at the heart of local government decision making and, 
therefore, should include a wide representational character, "It is suggested that all 
local Governing Council members should be ex-officio members of this committee. 
Coopted membership might also include representatives of missions, central 
government departments, large private enterprises or citizens with specialized 
knowledge. ,,22 
To complete the representational side of local government, sub-area 
committees, selected and organized on an informal basis, would be encouraged to 
represent and advance local village level interests as well as acting as a 
"mouthpiece" for local councils. They would occupy an intermediate position 
between the councils and people in the villages. Some degree of developmental and 
financial power would be devolved to these committees by the Councils but they 
would remain under Council authority and supervision. The area level would 
provide opportunities for participation by traditional leadership. 
From an administrative and staff perspective, three categories of staff would 
be designated: (1) senior local government staff, (2) seconded staff, and (3) other 
staff and labor. The senior staff at council level would feature three significant 
positions-the council executive officer, the council treasurer and the council 
works supervisor. Clearly, the Executive Officer is a critical individual. Campbell 
outlines his duties as follows: 
The role of the executive officer would be to supervise the administration, 
implement council decisions, act as secretary and adviser to the council 
and coordinate the work of the council staff. He would be responsible for 
the discipline and management of all staff. It is suggested that the holder 
of the post should be a District Officer in the first instance seconded full 
, h C '123 time to t e ounCi. 
Initially, these three posts would be filled by seconded central officers but at a 
later date, Campbell hoped a unified local government service would result. 
Specialist departmental officers from central departments would be seconded to 
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Council and would thereby come under the control and supervision of the Council. 
Technical matters would be handled in the relationship between such officers and 
their parent departments. Such individuals would remain as members of the central 
public service to maintain career advance prospects. Junior staff and laborers 
would be employed directly by the Council. 
A central concern when considering decentralization is the definition of 
functional responsibility to be accorded to local government units. Campbell 
provided for local government to assume responsibility for five major functional 
areas. In detail, these were the following: 24 
1. Improvement of Communications 
i) All local roads 
ii) Maintenance of airstrips 
iii) Wharves 
iv) Ferries 
2. The Development of Natural Resources 
i) Agricultural extension work and prevention of crop pests and 
diseases 
ii) Reforestation and timber control 
3. Social Services 
i) Rural health, clinics, disease prevention, sanitation, child welfare 
clinics, etc. 
H) Urban and rural water supplies 
iii) Education, maintenance of schools (where applicable), vocational 
training schemes 
iv) Maintenance and administration of local courts 
v) Community development 
4. Economic Services 
i) Markets 
H) Transportation of passengers, goods and livestock 
iii) Commercial enterprises (where these cannot be undertaken 
by the private sector) 
iv) Employment of schoolleavers 
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5. Administrative Services 
1) Rate collection 
ii) Registration of births and deaths 
iii) Elections 
Campbell cautioned against the central government delegating tasks to Council 
without transferring policy control as well. The functional responsibilities suggest 
that the status and power of local government would be upgraded appreciably. 
Indeed, this is the first maJor reconceptualization of the jurisdictional powers of 
local government and it reflects Campbell's commitment to associate decentrali-
zation with development. 
However, a key issue remained-" -finance'. This cut to the core of the 
problems faced by councils in the past which were largely weak and ineffectual 
structures. Internally, revenue had been generated largely through the levy of a 
basic rate, the successor to the classic colonial1nstrument, the head tax. Although 
unmentioned, the collection of such a tax has been perceived elsewhere as a major 
contributory factor in the lack of popular support for local government.25 
However, to expect the basic rate to be sufficient as a. revenue source was to 
Campbell's mind misplaced: 
At present there is a low taxability potential in terms of direct taxation. 
Rate returns from all the councils visited showed a short fall which varied 
from 10-20% of the estimate. Some of this short fall was due to 
movement out of the area but the norm.al excuse for the inability to pay 
the rate was the need to use available money on school fees. It would 
seem more likely that there is a reluctance to pay rates to a council which 
provides little in terms of tangible development. Confidence in the 
Council, combined with an efficient tax collection service might yield 
better results. For some time to come there seems little potential for 
anything but a slow increase in rating and this would only keep pace with 
h I ··· 26 t e annua rIse 10 ma10tenance costs. 
This meant a search for new local revenue sources would have to be initiated and in 
this light he suggested a number of alternatives. In the end, however, councils 
would require strong financial support through the mechanism of direct transfers 
from the central government. In the past, such transfers took the form of tied 
grants calculated according to a complicated formula. He recommended that the 
formula should be simplified and as well that consideration be given to the 
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introduction of block grants, based on a formula, which would presumably include 
not only recurrent expenditures but capital expenditures as well. It is instructive 
to note that the determination of the proportion of conditional as against 
unconditional grants was left extremely vague in addition to the issue of 
recurrent/capital expenditure finance. A useful recommendation advanced the 
need for councils to engage in the preparation of development plans which would be 
devised within the framework of a national development plan. Not only would this 
lead to a coordination of central and local objectives but as well such plans would 
serve to indicate a real commitment to the various areas under council jurisdiction 
of the development activities and projects planned for them. 
Two major recommendations of his study have been left to the end to present. 
Campbell suggested that, as evidence of the commitment to local government, a 
separate ministry should be created at the center, " •.• with the responsibility for 
encouraging and festering (sic) the new councils and for coordinating local needs at 
the centre.II27 The second recommendation which has implications for central 
control over the process of decentrlaization focuses on his recommendation to 
retain the post of District Commissioner as an agent of central authority who 
would act as an advisor to local councils and continue to assume the preponderance 
of his original functions. 28 The District Commissioner had been the major 
instrumental position for the advance of the colonial administrative presence at the 
local level.29 The fact that Campbell was prepared not only to retain the post but 
the status of the D.C. as well suggests that in the final balance local government 
would remain an administrative device in the hands of the central bureaucracy to 
penetrate local society to serve centrally defined interests.30 In this fundamental 
respect, the Campbell report is consistent with past approaches to local 
government. However, Campbell did mark an important point of departure in 
several ways-he advanced amalgamation of local government units; he linked 
decentralization to development; he pressed for clear functional responsibilities for 
councils wider than heretofore with sufficient finance and staff; he defined the key 
post of executive officer and through these reforms and the creation of a separate 
ministry, he sought a stronger commmitment to decentralization on the part of the 
central government. 
Campbell did put one final corollary to his recommendations expressed as an 
urgent priority-III would suggest that the important consideration at this stage is 
to ascertain popular reaction to the proposals and obtain acceptance of the idea of 
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the new council areas and the sub-area committees before any further steps are 
taken.,,31 This review of popular response would have to await the Kausimae 
Committee in 1977. In the interim, the momentum for decentralization continued 
under the auspices of the central government. We now turn to an overview of the 
next major document in the policy evolution, the Plan of Operations 1974-77, which 
was formed in an environment dominated by administrative power. 32 
c) The Plan of Operations 
The Plan of Operations 1974-77 is the first major and systematic overview of 
decentralization in the Solomon Islands to appear in the 1970s. In the Preface to 
the original draft it is clear that the Plan represents a further step stimulated by 
the 1972 Special Select Committee on Constitutional Development and the 
Campbell report.33 It was drafted in 1973 between March and October in a period 
yet a considerable distance from the constitutional negotiations and the final 
attainment of independence. The same Governing Council system was in effect as 
at 1972. 
The Plan is divided into five major sections: (1) a synopsis of the Plan on a 
chapter-by-chapter basis, (2) Chapter One which set forth the context and 
principles underlying decentralization, (3) Chapter Two which outlined the local 
government situation in 1973, (4) Chapters Three through Nine which detailed the 
creation, functions and responsibilities, finance and staff and the internal 
organization of central and local governments, and (5) the timetable for 
decentralization recommended in the Plan. The Plan was based on a consultative 
process which sought advice from all government departments, local councils and 
the members of the Governing Council. To cite the Plan, "It represents a 
remarkable level of agreement by all concerned as to the overall objectives and the 
broad methods by which local government should be developed • • • and . • • is 
intended to provide a firm basis for the development of local government in the 
period 1974-77 and for further natural growth thereafter.,,34 "Natural growth" 
suggests a measured and orderly evolution of future decentralization. 
Although the Plan of Operations appeared over the title of the Local 
Government Committee of the Governing Council, it has been conceded that the 
Plan was predominantly the creation of senior public servants and, in particular, 
reflects the influence of Mr. Tony Hughes, an influential and dynamic public 
servant, who was Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. It is not our 
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intention to outline and assess the Plan of Operations in aU its detail. Rather, we 
intend to focus on the context and principles of local government reform and to 
comment on a number of broad themes which are touched upon, in some cases only 
superficiaJly by the Plan of Operations. 
Chapter One--Context and Principles-is a crucial section of the Report and, 
indeed, the entire decentralization process. We are offered a glimpse of the major 
assumptions and propositions of the centralist perspective. Local government is 
framed in terms which suggest a real transfer of powers coupled with the creation 
of autonomous units of government. However, there is also a series of major 
checks which fall to the central government, suggesting a view of local government 
as administrative decentralization which can be retrieved if necessary by the 
central government acting within the justification of the national interest. To 
appreciate the centralist view, we must assess the context for local government 
reform. Two major points are conceded. First, there has been a degree of 
decentralization and autonomy in the Solomon Islands but a powerful central 
administration has tended to undermine its effects. The authors of the Plan of 
Operations admit this: 
The form of local government now existing in the Solomons implies a 
considerable degree of autonomy for the elected councils and a clear 
division of functions between those retained centrally by the government 
and those devolved to local councils. The system cannot, therefore, 
evolve directly from the British colonial administration, in which 
government was deconcentrated to district level but never decentralized 
to autonomous bodies. In the Solomons, as in many other British 
dependencies, an attempt at establishing decentralized local government 
roughly in the form in which it exists in Britain, has been made in the 
shadow of a powerful colonial administration in many ways resembling the 
regional systems of metropolitan France.35 
Second, the major reforms of the past several years have been the 
constitutional developments combined with growth in the economy and 
modernization whose primary effects are felt most keenly at the national level. 
The dynamic of change contrasts with the case of local government: 
Compared with the dramatic changes which have occurred at the centre 
and in the pattern and nature of economic activity, local government has 
63 
not moved forward as was hoped. New developments have largely by-
passed local councils and the village economy. Widespread feelings of frustration 
and withdrawal have resulted and the aims set out in 1962 have been overshadowed 
by more glamorous and better publicised objectives.36 
Local government has lagged behind, yet feelings of alienation and isolation at the 
local level have developed further, one assumes, than can be safely tolerated. 
Immediately the Plan of Operations turns to a centralist perspective of how 
to overcome the difficulties. The major statement which encapsulates this 
centralist perspective is put forward as a statement of principle: 
This plan of operations contains proposals for the development of local 
government to meet the likely needs of the people of the Solomons over 
the next ten years. These proposals are intended to provide internal 
systems of local government at once more effective, more responsive to 
the wishes of the people they govern and more capable of handling 
complex issues arising from social and economic modernization. The 
powers of local councils in the Solomons are devolved upon them on the 
British principle that they can only do what they have specifically been 
given the power to do and anything else is ultra vires. The discharge of 
these powers must be subject to legal scrutiny and ultimate control. 
While this plan of operations will reduce the amount of petty interference 
in council affairs by central government, the powers of government 
inspection and control on broader and more fundamental matters will be 
strengthened and the machinery for regulating central-local relationships 
will be completely rebuilt as part of the 1974 constitutional changes.37 
The intention of the central government is to create more viable and 
effective local government units. Significantly, the definition of powers will be 
specific. What remains unspecified will be deemed ultra vires, or beyond the power 
of local government. However, hand in hand with the revitalization of local 
government, there will be an increase in the central government's powers with 
respect to inspection and control. We elaborate on this issue in the next chapter. 
The central perspective on decentralization is elaborated further in a detailed 
statement of the major points of principle underlying local government. First, the 
success of rapid and stable development depends on the political responsibility for 
local development and the control over resources to implement local policies being 
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brought as close to the people as resources will permit. The redefinition of powers 
is seen as a redefinition of political responsibilitY'38 Second, the criterion for 
allocating responsibility and power is that " .•• local government should undertake 
all activities except those which, because of the wider effects of the issues or 
nature of the resources involved, cannot in practice be devolved to the local level . 
• • • 1139 The new allocation, it is claimed, goes beyond the 1962 reforms and beyond 
the existing level of responsibilities assumed by local councils. Third, the success 
of local government will depend on a sound allocation of functions and upon the 
creation of an effective machinery, in particular, to assure sufficient staff and 
finances. This point of principle raises the issue of the size of the new units of 
local government. Fourth, although the central government must try to assure the 
strengthening and effectiveness of local government, the predominant responsi-
bility remains to assure " .•. the overriding national interest of mutual security and 
interdependence of the island communities.II40 In a situation of conflict or 
breakdown, the central government must prevail even to the point of dismantling 
local government: 
The central government must always be able to act to safeguard these 
interests and to ensure that basic services are maintained, if necessary by 
suspending the local government and assuming direct responsibility.4l 
Finally, the distribution of resources to the local units will be based on the extent 
to which various areas' help themselves and contribute to the national income. This 
principle sees revenue transfers as more appropriately based on productivity rather 
than need. Equality of opportunities and services is not the effective principle, 
rather the replication of the colonial pattern of development and underdevelopment 
of the Solomon Islands will continue.42 
Significantly, the revitalization of local government is based on a particular 
perception by the central leadership of the political and economic reality of the 
Solomon Islands. Politics in the Solomon Islands is viewed as expressing local 
interests and needs, 
The political nature of the Solomons favours the development of local 
government. The pattern of the 1973 general election again emphasized 
the importance of local issues and local personalities and the comparative 
absence of national issues, political organizations or leadership conceived 
on a national basis; though a number of successful candidates campaigned 
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on agreed issues, there was no open party campaign. The political 
dynamic of the Solomons appears to lie in the close ties felt by fairly 
small communities and their tendency (so far at least) to judge individuals 
on personal merit or performance rather than ideology.43 
This political dynamic expresses a "localized concept of politics and 
power.II44 For the near future, government must recognize this fact and instead of 
resisting this reality, it should attempt to harness local energies for development 
purposes. In adopting this perspective, the central government accepts the failure 
as yet to establish the legitimacy of national institutions. In part, this reflects the 
nature of colonial rule which operated at an island or district level and, in part, this 
view reflects an assessment of popular political protests in the framework of island 
level politics. National government depends upon a "continuing consensus of 
advantage between a large number of local groups.II45 The political context which 
supports and legitimizes local government has the following characteristics: (1) 
lack of national concepts, (2) strong local identification, (3) willingness to support 
local movements and the need to use local leaderships, and (4) resentment of or 
lack of support for central government activity. 
The economic context of the Solomon Islands also favors a local government 
approach. Here, the argument rests with the likely requirements of future 
development planning. The emphasis will be " ••• to spread both the benefits of and 
responsibility for economic development as widely as possible.II46 To mobilize 
participation in modernization, it will be critical to have the energy and support of 
rural society. That cannot be achieved by central government. It is important as 
well ". • • to avoid the creation of favoured social groups at the expense of 
others.II47 A decision-making process which is brought closer to the grassroots will 
be more successful in promoting development and in attenuating social 
stratification than will a centralized decision-making process. The central 
characteristics of the economic context which favors decentralization are the 
following: (a) natural resources are largely known but difficult to exploit by direct 
central government policy, (b) local manpower is reluctant to mobilize for 
development unless plans and decisions are made at local level, (c) locally planned 
and executed development has potentially lower fixed costs and greater technical 
flexibility, than centrally controlled operations, and (d) the danger of creating 
favored social groups is lessened by devolving investment decisions to local 
communities wherever possible. 
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From a broad analytical overview of the substantial part of the Plan of 
Operations, a number of central themes emerge which are, at times, only addressed 
partially. 
Until the Plan of Operations, the process of decentralization was based on a 
pattern of devolution of administrative power within centralized departments of 
government coupled with a gradual evolution of local government bodies which was 
incremental in nature and scattered in results. Local government was perceived in 
a colonial framework which saw local councils as inherently weak, disorganized and 
ineffectual and, moreover, devoid of popular support. To carry local government 
reform further required a reconceptualization of the Solomon Islands which 
appeared early in the Plan of Operations in a description of the political and 
economic context of the country. The implications of this reconceptualization of 
local government required, firstly, fundamental changes in the district administra-
tion, 
It is most important that the staffing, name and status of the district 
administration should be deliberately changed in step with the 
strengthening of local government. The central government must decide 
whether it wishes to retain a general political officer in district or island 
headquarters. A post at the necessary level is expensive in money and 
manpower, and the resources may be better used elsewhere. If the 
government were to decide to retain such a post, it must be clearly 
distinguished from, and prevented from conflicting with, the management 
of local government . • •. If it were decided not to retain such a post, the 
functions would be carried out by the chief executive of the local council, 
touring ministry staff and politicians and the local headquarters of the 
central government policy. Either alternative represents a drastic change 
from the 1973 situation, but it is essential that the importance of this 
progressive restructuring is grasped by all concerned, since without it the 
proposals to create effective local government will run into difficulties 
which could prove fatal. 48 
The list of functions associated with the continuation of the position of a 
"general political officer" at district level is terribly revealing of the reality of the 
power relationship between centre and periphery. The functions included the 
following: 
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.•• observing and reporting (to Minister of Local Government or Chief 
Minister); acting as nodal point for communications and intelligence; local 
interpretation of central government policy on request; fostering of 
constructive central/local government realtions; safeguarding national 
o 0 1 1 d lOb 0 49 mterests In oca e I eratlOns. 
Here is the essence of the dilemma facing the central government. To 
progressively restructure local government would jeopardize the crucial 
penetration of central control to the grassroots. However, the open and direct 
intrusion of central administrative control would not be supportive of the claims 
being made for decentralization by the centre. Senior public servants were forced 
to adopt the indirect approach. The continuation of central administrative officers 
paralleling the local council structure would be "inconsistent" with the essence of 
the reforms. The creation of a local government ministry, with powers of advice 
and the ultimate approval of the Minister, to provide direction and support for local 
government units would resolve this dilemma. This would allow the functions and 
field staff associated with direct administration under the colonial pattern to pass 
to local councils with the Clerk as chief executive officer displacing the role of the 
District Commissioner, 
••• the clerk, as chief executive, will co-ordinate and command the 
council team so as to execute council policies. All information and 
directions will pass through him, upwards and downwards, except where he 
specifically delegates or directs otherwise; he cannot delegate his 
accountability or overall responsibility for the proper running of the 
organization. Communications with the centeral government will be 
addressed to the clerk, and will issue from his office unless he authorizes 
otherwise, as he may do, for example, on technical matters of a non-
10 50 po ICY nature. 
This contrasts sharply with the characterization of the Provincial Secretary in the 
Special Committee on Provincial Government (the Kausimae Report) which views 
him as the executive director of autonomous and secure units of government rather 
than an instrument to assure the dependence and control of the periphery by the 
erntre.51 
Although Campbell, in his Preliminary Report, called for an early test of 
popular support for his suggested reforms, the Plan of Operations proceeds from 
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the very comfortable assumption of unquestioned popular support for its 
recommendations. The political dynamic in the Solomon Islands is cast in local 
terms, the national political level is composed of politicians who act as spokesmen 
for local interests. The interpretation of Solomon Islands' history is one which sees 
political action defined in terms of local movements. The dual perception of 
government as being composed of, on the one hand, a dominant center unresponsive 
to local feelings and interests and, on the other hand, as an essential and 
benevolent dispenser of goods and services will be altered fundamentally. 
Functions which are critical to local aspirations, for example, agricultural 
extension services, and are distributive in nature, for example, medical facilities, 
will be transferred to local councils. Critically, however, the political 
responsibility for local development will no longer rest with the central 
government. 
The Plan of Operations reveals quite clearly that the central government was 
captured in yet another fundamental dilemma. Local government reform was seen 
as a precondition for effective development at the grassroots level of society in 
order to mobilize people behind development efforts and to actively encourage 
them to participate in the decision-making process. Yet to make local government 
effective, the existing rural councils must be amalgamated to create sufficiently 
large units to be administratively and financially viable. This leads to repeated 
statements that the new structures must be supported by sub-district bodies to 
bring government closer to the people. 
The need is widely recognized for an informal and flexible type of local 
government at the level of groups of villages, electoral wards or language 
area. Local councils of the size needed to implement this plan of 
operations tend to appear remote from daily problems at village level and 
they will not be able to afford the formal structures which full direct 
coverage would require. Local leadership commonly oeprates at clan or 
group-of-clans level, covering several villages or wards, often less than a 
whole language area. Traditional communication, co-operation and 
decision making tend to wither away or withdraw in face of legal 
formality. • .. Area Committees have been established in some islands 
with some success; but they have not been as widely used as might have 
been expected, perhaps because their potential has not been fully 
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understood. The Western Council is experiencing now some of the 
problems of amalgamation, which opens a gap between the enlarged but 
more distant council and the villagers who previously had a council ... 
much nearer home. Similar problems will arise with other proposed 
amalgamations. The need for an executive body which can be seen and 
felt in village daily life is genuine and widespread.52 
As with Campbell, the Plan of Operations recognizes that considerable effort 
will be required to increase the levels of funding and staffing of local councils. The 
Plan recognized that the sources of revenue of the local councils had been 
inadequate and proposed to restructure the entire revenue division: 
At present local government revenues comprise basic rate, property rate, 
court fees and fines, licenses,earnings of services, loans, investment 
revenues, and grants from the central government ... the last category is 
now by far the largest single source of money, but the bulk of this is for 
specific capital projects. This plan of operations will greatly increase the 
extent to which local government is centrally financed, by completely 
revising the grant system and providing for large transfers of recurrent 
resources, but local council autonomy will actually be increased by 
limiting central government's detailed intervention and defining the scope 
and functions of the two levels of government in a way not previously 
attempted.53 
With respect to direct revenue sources available to local councils, the basic rate 
forms the most important component. On this,and other revenue sources, the Plan 
of Operations assumed that the changing status of councils might lead to a greater 
capacity to tax: 
What is not known, of course, is how far the strengthened local councils 
will be able to increase both the effectiveness of collection and the level 
of basic rates in areas where cash incomes have increased; one aim of this 
plan of operations is to make councils more credible and more popular so 
that they will be able to adopt a more aggressive approach to revenue 
.. 54 
raIsmg. 
The major source of Council revenue, however, would take the form of 
transfers from the central government. On the recurrent expenditure side, three 
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forms of payments would be provided: (1) rate counterpart grants which are 
calculated according to the amount of basic rate collected and are unconditional in 
nature, (2) staff salary payments which will meet the salaries of public servants 
working in the functional areas transferred to local government, and (3) services 
grants which would allow councils to meet the costs of services maintained at the 
level when they were transferred to local government control. Councils would have 
the autonomy to decide whether or not to maintain the services, the particular 
distribution of expenditures between the various services and how to fund their 
costs. 
Capital grants would take two forms-the general developmental allocation 
(GOA) and specific projects grants. The GOA would form the basis of each 
council's capital budget and it would be an annual block allocation of development 
funds. The project grants would be tied to major projects largely financed by and 
falling under the preferences of external aid donors. Consequently, a claim was 
made that the GOA was to be unconditional in nature and the project grants by 
contrast, conditional, in that a large measure of control and direction would be 
exercised by the central government. However, the potential for central control 
over GOA, and thereby the perpetration of a form of influence from the centre, 
was apparent in the text.55 Central control was also expressed in the requirement 
that local councils become more planning oriented and that each council be 
required to design their development strategies in such a way so as to coordinate 
with the national development plan. Such control would arise as well from the 
introduction of more extensive performance checks on local councils through the 
strengthening of auditing procedures. 
The Plan of Operations recognized that a major constraint to the 
reorganization and revitalization of local government would depend upon the 
number and quality of central staff available for transfer to Council control. It 
was envisaged that the direct administration staff would form the core of the new 
administrative cadre serving local councils. The clerk to the Council would become 
the chief executive officer at the local government level. The transfer of 
specialist staff was tied to the allocation of functions between central and local 
governments which itself was based on a basic definition of functional 
responsibili ties: 
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The principal function of local government is direct and immediate 
government of the people in town or rural areas. Local government is 
concerned with the quality of life, economic prosperity and welfare of the 
people as expressed in and affected by day-to-day local activity, projects 
and common community services. Central government's function is to 
provide a secure and prosperous national context within which local 
government can function effectively; and to undertake legislation, 
planning and use of resources on a country-wide basis so as to achieve 
. I' . d . 56 natlona Unity, secunty an prospenty. 
Given this distinction, the Plan of Operations urged the transfer of departmental 
functions which corresponded with those specialized departments which utilized a 
field staff structure-that is, departments of agriculture and lands, medical 
services, education and works. The transitional arrangements would place under 
council control serving public officers at all levels of a transferred function. A 
single unified public service would be created above an established grade level. 
Whether a public servant worked for local or central government, each individual 
would have the same career prospects and opportunities for promotions available to 
him. A t the local government level, public servants would be under the supervision 
of the Clerk for their functional operations and activities to ensure that staff 
operated within the decisions made by local councils. The Plan of Operations did 
not address the key problem of a dual loyalty arising for specialist staff seconded 
to councils. 
This raises a broader theme which is the definition of the "responsibility" of 
local government. Through a number of qualifiers, the Plan of Operations 
suggested that planning and decision making on matters fundamental to the 
development process will remain at the center while "operational" responsibility 
will be transferred to local councils. The key issue was whether councils would be 
restricted to the implementation phase of development or actively participate in 
the decision-making phase. Would councils be conceived as overseers of 
development projects identified, planned and funded at the center or would councils 
be viewed as more autonomous units of government? The question is resolved in 
favor of the ultimate assertion of central power. What emerges is a rather unique 
public service view which places local government in a transitional phase with 
sufficient central checks to allow a re-assertion of central control if necessary. 
There are two components to the perspective advanced by the public service. 
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First, the activities of local government would be subject to administrative 
oversight and evaluation from the center. This power of oversight could potentially 
circumscribe and undermine local decision making for the release of funds 
depended upon central approval. To cite the Plan, 
The flow of finance and assignment of staff to local government will be 
regulated by the Minister for Local Government. Approved aid 
allocations, capital and recurrent, will be placed under the vote control of 
the local government department; where the release of funds is related to 
operation of a certain level of services by local government, a fiat by the 
appropriate technical department of central government will be required 
before funds start to issue. Further checks will be made in the field, by 
inspection visits from central government staff and by the making of rules 
by the Minister prescribing conditions for the use of central government 
funds. 57 
Second, the oversight role required the reorganization of and redefinition of the 
functions of central departments. 
During the period covered by this plan of operations, the headquarters 
departments of central government will be reorganized. Departments will 
be grouped according to sectors of political and economic affinity •... 
The functions of the new departments will be as follows: 
participation in national planning and policy making; sector planning 
and monitoring, reporting to the Minister; preparation of legislation at 
national level and monitoring and enforcing it; 
operational and financial control of: 
headquarters 
research institutions 
national training institutions 
projects planned and financed at national level 
Joint projects with local councils under agreed plans 
of operations; 
staff planning, training and technical supervision of staff working in 
local government service; 
coordination and exchange of information with other departments, 
especially that responsible for local government, to insure early 
warning of ggalfunctioning and avoid delays in funds, personnel or 
information. 
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The reforms at the center were just as important to the public service view as 
those at the periphery. They form the complimentary package of decentralization. 
When local decisions or performance are deemed inappropriate by the specialized 
central departments, then autonomy would be sacrificed. 
A fundamental reform advanced by Campbell and reiterated by the Plan of 
Operations, was the proposal to create a separate ministry of local government. 
This new ministry would be "the single overlord in central government,,59 for local 
government. To reinforce this role, the clear jurisdiction of the Minister of Local 
Government in all matters affecting local government was forcefully put: 
The Minister for Local Government will be kept informed of any matters 
affecting policy, overall performance, finances or seconded personnel and 
no formal action against local government will be taken without the 
approval or initiative of the Minister for Local Government.60 
On the key political question of conflict resolution in cases of local councils 
clashing with central departments, the Minister for Local Government would act as 
the representative of local interests. Dispute settlement ultimately would take 
place at Cabinet level. 
A correspondingly important theme is the relationship between elected 
councils and public servants. This relationship becomes especially significant as it 
is envisaged that the suggested reforms would strengthen local councils as 
instruments of political control and bring public servants under council direction. 
On this issue, the Plan of Operations assumed that public servants would have to be 
protected against improper pressures or interference. According to the Plan, 
The form of democratic local government being developed in the Solomons 
requires a clear and consistent view to be taken of the relationships 
between council members and council staff. This is in some ways 
analogous to that between central government's political members and 
civil servants with the main difference that local government has no 
executive members or ministers. It must be recognized that the proper 
function of the councillors is to decide policies and allocate priorities, 
while that of the staff is to manage, control and execute the decided 
policies and programmes. It is most important that council staff should 
not be subject to interference from individual councillors, or put in fear of 
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punishment for offending a council member while carrying out their 
proper duties. Many people are aware of the dangers of corruption, waste 
and confusion arising from councillors' interference with staff, but there 
are instances of it in most councils. With greatly increased staff and 
activities, it will be even more important to guard against this tendency 
by appropriate Staff Instructions, Standing Orders, inspections and the 
manner in which the chief executive or clerk discharges his duties of 
61 general management. 
The phraseology adopted later in the Plan came down clearly on the side of the 
protection of public servants through the creation of clear lines of command and 
responsibili ty. 
As with the Special Committee on Constitutional Development and the 
Campbell Report, the Plan of Operations attempted to reconcile the place of 
traditional leadership with the structures of local government. In this the Plan of 
Operations is more specific than was the case with the earlier attempts. The Plan 
recommended the creation of an advisory committee of chiefs at council level to 
consider and advise the council " ••• upon any matters referred to it by the council 
and in particular upon the social effects of any proposed projects or undertakings, 
and any steps the committee considered necessary to safeguard the traditional 
values of people in the council area. II62 The influence of traditional leadership 
would also be felt in the Area Committees at sub-district level. 
From a wider perspective, the Plan of Operations assumed that revitalized 
local councils would become a new arena for leadership participation. In the past, 
local councils were too weak and too subordinate to the district administration to 
develop as an attractive alternative for leadership aspirants. Their strengthening, 
however, would introduce a new and significant political field. In a sense, 
decentralization becomes a tool for the central bureaucracy to restructure political 
competition to a local rather than the national level. The creation of a new 
political elite tied to the local, island arena, with enhanced powers over matters of 
crucial importance to rural society would have serious implications for the 
emerging national political elite who seek support and influence over the same 
constituency. The potential for conflict between these two leadership groups was 
very real. Yet the Plan of Operations did not deal with this critical political issue. 
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The Plan of Operations assumed that the Governing Council would accept the 
proposed changes in local government. The authors therefore proceeded to outline 
the implementation process: 
By the end of 1974, the following should be achieved: 
i) amalgamations agreed and implemented; 
ii) management staff trained and at post; 
iii) systems and controls strengthened; 
iv) some major functions transferred to certain councils; 
v) preparations made for intoduction of new financial structure on 1st 
January 1975 and the transfer of further functions during 1975.63 
It was foreseen that by 1977 the new system would be established in full and would 
be operating effectively. Further alterations would be made as part of a continuing 
evaluation of local government performance. 
The expectation that the Plan of Operations would provide the framework for 
local government reform was fulfilled with the unanimous approval by the 
Governing Council of a policy statement, "The Development of Local Government," 
in November 1973. The twelve-point statement represented an encapsulation of 
the Plan of Operations. From this point forward the central bureaucracy provided 
the dynamics for administrative reform. The stages foreseen in implementation by 
year were as follows: 
1974 
1975 
September 1 
end of October 
end of year 
end of year 
January 
-the creation of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
- Second Annual Local Government Con-
ference 
- Amalgamation-the number of councils re-
duced from 18 to 9 
- Elections held for majority of councils 
-functions of District Administration passed 
to councils 
-District Commissioners become field 
officers for Ministry of Home Affairs 
Transfer of functions regarding Works and Agriculture to 
Malaita, Western, Makira and Eastern Islands councils. 
Completion of integration of Government sub-treasuries at Auki, 
Gizo and Kira Kira and creation of Council treasuries. 
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Transfer of government accounts staff to Councils. 
Preparation of Councils' 1975 Estimates on basis of the new 
grant structure. 
1976 Transfer of functions of Works and Agriculture to the remaining 
councils. 
Transfer of function of Education to all councils. 
Transfer of functions of Health to one major council. 
1977 Transfer of functions of Health to the remaining councils. 
d) National Politics and Decentralization 
Over the period that these administrative rearrangements were being made 
the Solomon Islands was caught up in the movement towards independence. The 
approach of independence crystallized a debate between Western Province political 
leaders and the central leadership-national politicians, senior public servants and 
the colonial administrators--over the future form of center-periphery relations.64 
The essential features of the Western position were expressed in a paper prepared 
by the Western Council which appeared in August 1975. From the Western 
perspective, only a quasi-federal system of government was appropriate for the 
Solomon Islands. 
The Solomon Islands structure and principles of government should, where 
possible, reflect the different cultures, respect the ethnic diversities, take 
into account the geo-political factors, and above all, answer the wishes of 
the people. The present structure of government does not really do this, 
because it has been designed in such a way that ultimate power is 
concentrated in a single central government having a legal omnipotence 
over all districts within the country. Yet it is acknowledged that the 
present structure has established a local Government Council system 
where an extensive delegation to local units of some functions has been 
admirably carried out. But in no way, it seems, would the present 
structure allow genuine provincial autonomy to take place because the 
unitary system of government is not designed to do that yet the realities 
of the Solomon Islands society requires genuine provincial autonomy to be 
set up. That is why the setting up of a Western state will from now on be 
a primary concern of the Western Council and its people. . .. It is •.. 
envisaged that when the state government system is established, it is 
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highly desirable that the national constitution should define the areas of 
responsibilities, functions and powers which would regulate and justify the 
existence and activities of the central and state governments, and in so 
doing the central government and the state should be self-ruling co-
ordinate bodies rather than subordinate to each other as is the case under 
65 the present system of government. 
Clearly, the Western demands cut at the heart of the decentralization 
program as conceived and directed by the central government. The central 
response appeared in the Report of the Constitutional Committee of 1975 which 
rejected a quasi-federal solution and reasserted instead the commitment to a 
. f 66 umtary system 0 government. 
Having reaffirmed the framework for local government reform, the: 
Constitutional Committee addressed three basic issues. The first issue was 
whether or not to entrench local government autonomy in the new constitution. 
The Committee decided against such a recommendation based on an argument 
which suggested that although the degree of autonomy conceded to this point in 
time was open to question that continued flexibility should be the primary 
consideration. To entrench local government powers in the constitution would lead 
to complexity and rigidity. Instead, the Committee recommended that the 
definition of local government powers be a matter for parliamentary authority 
through an act of parliament.67 The second issue concerned the degree of 
decentralization. The Committee conceded that local government reform had been 
disappointing to date asserting that decentralization had been primarily a 
delegation of functions without a corresponding decentralization of decision-
making powers. The Committee was unwilling to recommend any further measures 
calling instead for the creation of a special committee to consider how to 
proceed.68 Of far greater concern to the Committee was the need to assure that 
adequate checks be introduced against the national government being able to 
dissolve local government arbitrarily. This would require a 3/4 majority of 
P 1· 69 ar lament. 
The final preparations for the Independence negotiations culminated in a 
Constitutional Conference in Honiara in 1977. The Conference issued an agreed 
statement of principles which would form the basis of the Independence 
constitution. The preamble contained "a commitment to decentralization of 
70 legislative and executive power." Chapter Nine, Provincial Government, 
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contained eleven basic principles designed to give force to the commitment to 
decentralize and to assure the continuation of the process. The eleven principles, 
briefly summarized were as follows: (1) the Solomon Islands shall be divided into 
provinces; (2) a provincial government will be formed in each province; (3) a 
provincial assembly will be provided for each province; (4) an Act of Parliament 
will Prescribe the finances and taxing powers of the provinces; (6) provincial 
assemblies will prepare annual estimates; (7) provincial governments will be subject 
to audit by the Auditor General; (8) dissolution procedures were carefully specified; 
(9) an Act of Parliament will provide for the composition, powers, functions and 
procedures of provincial assemblies and governments; (10) until this occurs, 
provincial government shall be regulated by the Local Government Ordinance; and 
finally, (11) a special committee shall be established, "to examine the relationship 
between the National Government, Provincial Governments and Area Councils and 
to recommend on the measures to promote the effective decentralization of 
legislative, administrative and financial powers.,,71 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DECENTRALIZA nON: THE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENT A nON 
The devolution of substantial functions to local government units between 
1973 and 1978 required a major undertaking by national administrators. On 
successful implementation, the new local authorities would fulfill a complex set of 
tasks ranging from symbolic aspects of democratic participation to practical 
matters related to economic development. If it were possible under the Plan of 
Operations to realize even half of the enunciated objectives, the exercise in 
decentralization could be declared a success. However the aims of a project and 
their fulfillment can be worlds apart. "Policy" and "implementation" are supposed 
to be relatively congruent concepts at least in an optimist's world. In the case of 
the Solomon Islands, we posit that the experiment in decentralization under the 
Plan of Operations underwent such transformation at the implementation level that 
the expectations of policy were substantially denied. 
However, we do not share the view that policies are "only a collection of 
words" as suggested by one authority. 1 When the scarce resources of a poor nation 
are committed to solve fundamental issues related to national unity and elementary 
economic needs, such an outlook is an intolerable admission of failure from the 
outset. If the implementation of policy encounters constraints, then the task we 
believe is to isolate the causes and search for solutions. In the end, the policy aims 
of a project may have to be modified to take account of the limitations inherent in 
the implementation process. However, this would not be the same as to suggest 
that the objectives are whatever has been implemented. As noted by one observer, 
"in these cases, policy is effectively 'made' by the people who implement it."2 In 
our study of the decentralization exercise in the Solomon Islands, we found 
innumerable cases where during the implementation process "policies have been 
turned on their heads.,,3 Our task is to examine the entire experiment to ascertain 
the causes of the divergence between policy and implementation. 
We begin this by examining the explicit policies and aims of the Plan of 
Operations in relation to the implementation exercise. In particular, we shall 
analyze the policy aims for their explictness and internal contradictions with an 
eye towards the latitude of discretion that was permitted the implementors. The 
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perceptions and interests of the implementors are also taken into account. We 
shall sum up and evaluate the achievements of the experiment after seven years of 
its progressive implementation. 
A. The Policies 
The policy aims of the reforms undertaken in the local government system 
were set forth by the Governing Council in November 1973. They were as follows: 4 
(1) Local Government should be developed and strengthened to become an 
important agent for development and services, and the coordinator of 
all forms of government activity in its area. 
(2) Central government's commitment to the development of local govern-
ment should be clear and consistent and its advisory and control systems 
should allow considerable local autonomy while ensuring that national 
interests are safeguarded and developed. 
(3) There should be a well-understood division of functions between central 
and local government based on the principle that all those functions 
which in the opinion of the Government Council could best be 
performed by a well-established local authority, should be progressively 
allocated to local government. 
(4) There should be a ministry responsible for local government, charged 
with: 
central government policy, planning and coordination in relation to 
local government; 
watching over advising and operating controls over local govern-
ment; 
control of central government staffing and financial assistant to 
local government as provided by the Governing Council; 
inspections systems and training of staff; 
the introduction of legislation and regulations, and voting of council 
legislation. 
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(5) The functions of general field administration, agriculture and associated 
extension services and certain functions of public works, health and 
education services should be progressively transferred to local 
government. 
(6) Staff to assist in carrying out these functions should be provided from 
the public service and placed under the operational control of local 
government; suitable arrangements should be made to protect their 
terms of service and those persons employed directly by local 
government, and to stimulate productive and well-ordered work by all 
employees. 
(7) The financial arrangements between central and local government will 
be revised to take account of the transfer of functions and to make 
provision for block grants. There should not be a net expenditure 
increase as a result of the transfer of functions and associated 
payments. The size of grants to local councils will be considered each 
year in the context of the supply estimates. 
(8) The small local councils should be encouraged to amalgamate to 
produce seven rural councils plus the Honiara Town Council. 
(9) In all areas, and especially where amalgamations of small councils are 
proposed, care should be taken to see that local government is 
functioning through informal areas, subdistrict ward committees, that 
the work of such committees is understood and supported, and that they 
have some resources for minor local projects and services. 
(I 0) Customary leaders and chiefs should be recognized as an important 
source of wisdom and leadership; they should have a consultative rule in 
informal committees at area or subdistrict level. 
(11) The first priority in achieving all these aims should be to strengthen and 
improve the management and financial systems of local government. 
(12) By the end of 1974, the following should be achieved: 
i} amalgamations agreed and achieved; 
ii) management staff trained and at post; 
iii) systems and controls strengthened; 
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iv)some major functions transferred to certain Councils; 
v) preparations made for introduction of new financial structure on 1st 
January 1975 and the transfer of further functions during 1975. 
Accompanying this set of objectives was "The Plan of Operations" in which a 
program of implementation was described. In a real sense, the Plan of Operations 
was the blueprint for day-to-day action outlining what the policy objectives meant 
to the implementor. In analyzing the objectives then, it would be useful to look at 
them also in terms of what they communicated to those who executed the entire 
. 5 proJect. 
Among the policies enunciated, three in particular were internal to council 
operations.6 These were items 5, 6, 11. They dealt with staff, financial, and 
management issues. With regard to staff in item 6, special note must be taken of 
the words: "placed under the operational control of local government." In 
practice, numerous violations of this guideline would emerge to mar much of the 
experiment especially at its early stage. In item 6, the new financial 
responsibilities of the councils would be met through block grants. The revenue 
issue would generate intense controversy taking many forms, but in essence, it 
would be related to the meaningfulness of the local responsibility concept. Item 11 
underscores the administrator's concern for efficiency and order as vital sign posts 
of success or failure in the experiment with local initiative and democracyJ 
Two items, numbers 4 and 8, in the aims were concerned with the creation of 
new entities. Item 4 directed that a separate Ministry of Local Government be 
created to oversee and coordinate the reform experiment. This act, by itself, 
suggested the grave importance that the Governing Council had attached to the 
reforms. In practice, the local government responsibilities would be subsumed 
under the functions of a Ministry of Home Affairs which had other tasks apart from 
local government. Item 8 related to the amalgamation of smaller councils so that 
the larger and more viable units would be created. Here, the economies of scale 
and overhead costs would take precedence over the social identify issue. 
Overall, items 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11 of the objectives appeared to be concerned 
with innocent pragmatic issues of council efficiency. Hardly any internal 
contradictions or ambiguity were immediately discernible in them. The problem 
that would arise, however, would be concerned more with politics than administra-
tive issues which, in turn, would severely taint the way the simple pragmatic items 
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were executed. We must look at other items in the policy aims list for the political 
aspects in the experiment. These are included in items l, 2, and 3. 
The emphasis in items 1, 2, and 3 is on extending powers and functions to the 
councils. The experiment would be bold as well as innovative for the Solomon 
Islands: the sphere of local democracy could be substantially enlarged at both the 
administrative and political levels. To be sure, in extending the new functions, the 
central government safeguarded its own powers indicating that devolved powers 
would not be allowed to encroach on "national interests." This limitation was a 
very broad formulation lacking precise boundaries separating local autonomy from 
national interests. 
Nothing in the policy aims clearly indicated how much political autonomy 
would accompany the new administrative functions assigned to local councils. Did 
the Governing Council contemplate reforms mainly in the administrative area? Or 
did they also mean that political devolution would occur simultaneously with 
administrative delegation of tasks? The issue was absolutely crucial to the 
direction of implementation. In several post-colonial states where rural develop-
ment occupies the strategic place in social and economic change, decentralization 
in the sense of devolving both decision-making and administrative powers is the 
preferred form. In the case of the Solomon Islands, the policy aims for local 
government reform lacked adequate precision to justify a label as either 
"decentralization" or "deconcentration." The direction of political change in the 
country suggested the former. 
At various places in the Plan of Operations a rhetoric that characterizes the 
decentralist approach to reform is betrayed: 
"It is fundamental to these proposals that any assumption of an existing 
local government function by local councils is matched by a withdrawal by 
the central government and in most cases by the transfer of government 
staff and assets to local council control.,,8 
But much more frequently we find statements which suggest that political 
autonomy would be tightly bridled. For example, 
". • • in return for greatly increased functional powers and massive 
transfer of resources, local councils will be subject to increased 
standardization, scrutiny and general tightening up of key aspects of 
management." 9 
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"while this Plan of Operations will reduce the amount of petty 
interference in council affairs by the central government, the powers of 
government inspection and control on broader and more fundamental 
matters, will be strengthened."IO 
The impression is imparted that a condition of indecisiveness of not outright 
schizophrenia divided the functions allocated to local units and the central 
government respectively. 1 1 An inescapable part of the Plan of Operations was its 
insistence on inspection and efficiency in council affairs to be enforced by the 
national government. This theme was much more evident than the periodic lapses 
into decentralist phraseology. An inevitable consequence of the limited duality of 
split image in policy purpose, was that those who advocated centralist oversight 
could find passages to substantiate their claims, while those who espoused 
decentralist devolution of both political and administrative powers could also find 
justifying passages in the Plan of Operations. In the end, the Plan of Operations 
would be implemented in a form reflecting the philosophies and interests of the 
implementors. Much of the direction of the reform which would be guided not by 
precisely prescribed laws but by ministerial directives and bureaucratic imper-
atives. The end shape of the experiment, whatever the politicians in the Governing 
Council might have envisaged in drawing up their policy aims, would be determined 
by the political interests of administrators at the central level. 
C. Implementation: Evaluating the Record 
Seven years after the experiment in local government reform, specifically in 
the direction of devolving powers and functions to subordinate council units, the 
record of achievement remained very mixed. 12 The experiment itself was supposed 
to have concluded at the end of 1977. And the success anticipated from 
implementing the policy objectives was projected to last at least ten years before 
further reforms would be required. But the implementors were overly optimistic of 
their plan's durability. Even before the Plan of Operations had been fully 
implemented, widespread demand for further devolution had become urgent and 
vocal. The Western Province was, in particular, unhappy with the degree of 
decentraliztion that had occurred under the Plan of Operations. The West wanted a 
federal system as the price for its continued participation in the Solomon Islands 
sovereign state. Other provinces were less extreme in their demands but 
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nevertheless wanted further decentralization of both political and administrative 
powers. The Kausimae Committee was appointed to elicit views from the public, 
the councils, and the central government about the decentralization issue. The 
results of the Committee'S hearing pointed unequivocally to the widespread 
sentiment for a political system in which extensive powers and functions would be 
decentralized to the local councils which were renamed "provinces." 
When the research for this work was undertaken in mid-1980, the accomplish-
ments of the Plan of Operations were to be the base from which further reforms 
issuing from the Kausimae Report were to be undertaken. The lessons learned, 
however, from the implementation problems associated with the Plan of Operations 
are essential for evaluating the prospects of further devolution of powers. In this 
section, we briefly describe and analyze the record of implementation under the 
Plan of Operations. Apart from the practical value they may have for further 
devolution of powers and functions, this part of the work will raise theoretical 
issues related to implementation in Third World countries. 
A. External Amalgamation; Internal Organization; and a New Ministry 
We shall begin by looking at three items which are related to large scale 
organizational matters. It was proposed that the large number of councils in the 
country be reduced so as to make them more economically viable administrative 
units. Prior to the Plan of Operations, there were 17 councils ranging from Malaita 
Council with 50,000 people to Sikaiana Council with 200 people. Only four councils 
had more than 10,000 people. The budgets of the councils ranged from $234,000 for 
the Western Council to $800 for Sikaiana Council. The implications of these 
figures for a central government that was about to embark on a massive 
experiment that would inevitably involve the transfer of scarce skilled staff from 
headquarters to the councils were immediate concern for administrative efficiency. 
Too many councils but too few skilled staff meant only one solution: that is, a 
reduction in the number of councils. This expedient would also convert a number of 
very small councils, especially those established around the small and sparsely-
populated Polynesian outer islands, into viable units capable of undertaking large 
and expensive projects. The main problem with this exercise was that the large 
council units were likely to be more remote from their constituents. 
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The amalgamation task was, however, completed by 1975, as follows: 
Old Councils New Council Unit 
1. Western Western (no change) 
2. Ysabel Y sabel (no change) 
3. Guadalcanal Guadalcanal (no change) 
4. Malaita; Sikaiana; Luanina; Pelau Malaita (change) 
5. Ngella; Savo; Russells; Munggabe- Central (change) 
Mungiki 
6. Makira; Ulawa Makira (change) 
7. Santa Cruz; Reefs; Vanikoro; Utupa Eastern (change) 
The pattern of amalgamation adopted by the implementors followed a strategy that 
deviated least from established forms of administration and communication thereby 
causing a minimum of disruption in the political lives of citizens. The seven rural 
councils and one town council covering Honiara, the capital city, together covered 
all parts of the Solomons apart from Tikopia and Anuta which were two very 
remote Polynesian islands. These were administered directly by the central 
government. 
Accompanying the council amalgamation exercise was a sub-council ward 
redelineation task that sought to reduce the number of wards which in some council 
areas gave a very low ration of one councillor for every 50 people. Ward 
redefinition was undertaken so as to achieve an average of 1,000 people per ward. 
Clearly, this aspect of the amalgamation exercise overlapped with the separate 
assignment of council internal organization. Before proceeding to this area, note 
must be taken that the amalgamation exercise was almost completely an 
administrator-initiated plan. What would be gained from this aspect of the reform 
experiment would be efficiency. The problem that would be created would be 
associated with the creation of too large units that subsumed widely different 
people in a multi-ethnic setting. The Makira and Ulawa amalgamation was 
problematic in this regard. The residents of Ulawa are mainly Polynesians with a 
different form of social organization than the Melanesians on Makira. The issue of 
mixing unrelated peoples and different social systems together would re-emerge 
again in 1978 during the tours taken by the Kausimae Committee on Decentraliza-
tion. For some communities, it was preferable to be run efficiently by others. The 
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problem of multi-ethnic distrust underlies this proposition. The upshot would be 
the loss of a sense of identification with councils by the small units that were 
absorbed by the larger. 
The problem of identification with council activities stemming partly from 
large size would re-emerge at the area committee level. The internal 
reorganization aspect of reforming local government was again efficiency oriented. 
While new committees and organizational relationships were prescribed leading to 
continuity and accountability in council affairs, the larger councils were inade-
quately linked to communities at the village level. One of the policy objectives of 
the local government reform was stated as follows: 
In all areas and especially where amalgamations of small councils are 
proposed care should be taken to see that local government is functioning 
through informal area, sub-district, ward committees, that the work of 
such committees is understood, and supported, and that they have some 
resources for minor local projects and services. 
If any item had equal if not prior salience to the efficiency aspects of the reform 
exercise, it would be the idea of enhancing local participation and cultivating a 
sense of belonging to a council. The structure of Solomon Island society would 
bedevil this task. As noted earlier, village communities were small scale units. 
Thousands of such societal fragments inhabit the plains, valleys, mountain sides, 
and atolls in a culturally diverse and linguistically fragmented country. The 
solution to one problem is often the curse or complication to another in this sort of 
social system. Hence, emphasis on council amalgamation so as to produce more 
efficiently run units simultaneously creates alienation among many village 
communities. The problem is to choose which goal is more significant: efficiency 
or identity? 
When asked to comment on how strong the sub-council area committees were 
after nearly six years of the reform, the Ministry of Home Affairs replied: 
Area or subdistrict committees have not been as successful as was hoped 
due mainly to the aims and functions being so informal that no clear 
direction has been given. A number of these committees seem to be 
interested in only their sitting allowances and few have initiated minor 
. . 14 projects or serVIces. 
92 
It is noteworthy that the reason given for the failure was mainly administrative. In 
the same vein, the Ministry continued: 
It will be essential for area councils to have definite stated functions to 
be backed by a small staff for administrative and financial control and to 
be accountable for their handling of public funds. There should also be 
adequate lines of communication between provincial assemblies and area 
. h f· d· . d 1·· 15 commIttees to ensure an exc ange 0 vIews, eCIslOns, an po ICIes. 
Insofar as the problem of inadequate performance by the area committees was 
organizational, the evaluation of the Ministry of Home Affairs was correct. In 
particular, our research confirmed the proposition that the lines of communication 
between area committees and the councils were woefully inadequate. In places 
where rugged mountains and widely distributed islands characterize a council's 
jurisdiction, these topographical features were often compounded by the lack of 
roads and vehicles. But these administrative and physical factors were only part of 
the problem with area committees. 
It must be recognized that in the entire scheme of local government 
organization that the area committee was the main link with villagers. The area 
committees were small and coterminous with the cultural and physical limits of 
village communities. In a real sense, the area communities were the only face-to-
face organization that was capable of commiting the loyalty of villagers to local 
government. If properly constituted and adequately empowered to carry 
substantial functions, they could revitalize local initiative. One of the policy aims 
in fact attempted to provide for this aspect of the experiment: 
Customary leaders or chiefs should be recognized as an important source 
of wisdom and leadership: they should have a consultative role in 
informal committees at area or subdistrict level. 
When asked whether this part of the policy directives was implemented, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs candidly admitted: 
It is debatable whether customary leaders or chiefs have had any 
influence over the work of local councils through the informal 
committees. 16 
Hence, a critical source of legitimacy in area committee affairs had not been 
successfully harnessed. It could be argued that local chiefs were no longer relevant 
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to the new and modern challenges of council affairs. This might be true insofar as 
technical know-how in project design and execution was concerned. But the 
usefulness of the chiefs was more pertinent at the level of approving a project and 
mobilizing local initiative to its support. Without these fundamental points, it is 
doubtful whether any project could adequately engage community support, 
identification, and pride. 
It was discovered from this project that political rivalries and jealousies also 
hampered the operations of area committees. In direct competition were "modern" 
leaders and "traditional" leaders. The so-called modern leaders apart from being 
younger were persons with formal education and occupational skills. In some cases, 
a traditional leader who had obtained his position by descent, would also possess 
"modern" education and skills. For the most part, however, the position of an 
elected councillor was occupied by a "modern" type. Council seats were acquired 
by electoral competition; it had a measure of prestige and a variety of sitting and 
travel allowances. At the area committee level, leadership was non-elective and 
some funds were available for sitting allowances. Most councillors would conduct 
their duties over a diverse ward population and, while in theory they should consult 
the area committees for advice and information, often the consultative process was 
done directly or through separate village contacts. The area committee's limited 
funds but major task of collecting head tax probably further enfeebled its vitality. 
However, the main point here is that the "modern" leader found at the council level 
often did not attend area committee meetings. Instead he developed his own 
network of wantoks for information and requests from individual villages. The 
general effect was as follows: (1) The area committees lacked substantial powers 
and attracted some traditional leaders. It was responsible for collecting the head 
tax. Together, the incentives to attract able and recognized leaders were weak at 
this level. The funds that were available to area committees were allocated to the 
area councillors primarily in the form of sitting allowances. This practice further 
demeaned the prestige of the area committee not only as impotent but self-serving. 
(2) The provincial councillor was elected from several ethnic groups. Without a 
vibrant system of area committees to link him to the diverse communities, a 
councillor who was normally a full-time farmer or wage worker, had to rely on his 
own network to obtain feedback and demands from villagers. Often the network 
was weak and only sporadically tapped. Together these items point to feeble 
political linkages between council and village sentiment. Without area committees 
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being strengthened, citizen identification with and support for councils were found 
to be weak, sporadic, and indifferent. 
The fact that administrators were allocated the task of implementing the 
council reforms to devolve powers and responsibilities inevitably led to greater 
emphasis being put on administrative and efficiency criteria in measuring success 
or failure. The political dimension, in particular, the mobilization of local support 
was not given more perfunctory attention. The elected councillors were left with a 
burden of operating with area committees which were weak and not given much 
encouragement to perform their limited roles actively. As it stood, the potentially 
pivotal position of area committees in tapping local leadership and catering to the 
issue of identity loss was starkly neglected in the reform exercise. To the councils, 
this task would be assigned. But they themselves plagued by their own 
administrative difficulties would not carry out this function of upgrading area 
committees adequately. The relatively easy business of drawing new organization 
maps with all efforts directed to building council headquarters facilities would take 
precedence over the most demanding undertaking of cultivating grassroots village 
sentiments. 
In the other organizational aspects of the reform experiment, a major shift 
was required at the national level by the policy directives. A new ministry solely 
responsible for local government was to be created. From this focal point, a 
variety of tasks would be undertaken including planning, coordination, advising, 
monitoring, training, etc. In effect, radical reorganization at the bottom required 
radical reorganization at the top also. But more than that idea was the 
commitment to local initiative that such a new department would symbolize if the 
central government would ensure that it was adequately staffed and financed. In 
1974, a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) was established. The preponderant part of 
its function was Local Government; however, it was assigned other responsibilities 
as well. From the outset, two events would severely limit the capability of the 
ministry from carrying out the devolution of powers and functions effectively. 
First, the MHA was understaffed. Said a MHA submission: 
••• at one crucial time, the central ministry was run by one level 7, one 
level 5, one level 3, a typist, and a registry clerk. It has never had 
sufficient staff to cope adequately with all the functions outlined in the 
policy statement. Also, with the exception of a few months, no legal 
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officer has ever been appointed to the Home Affairs staff making it 
necessary to go through the often laborious process of seeking advice and 
consultation from the Attorney General's Chambers. I7 
The inadequate staff situation was partly created by the devolution process itself. 
The new councils required trained managerial staff to undertake their expanded 
functions. Many of these were transferred from MHA to them. But staff shortage 
was a minor problem as compared with the political viewpoints espoused by the 
staff. The Plan of Operations itself noted that the MHA should "help shape the 
attitudes and operations of all central government ministries and organizations.,,18 
It was acknowledged that some hostility was bound to be generated by the loss of 
functions that would be incurred by ministries and public servants in the devolution 
of responsibilities to the councils. For many years, public servants had operated 
from an administration that was highly centralist in structure. Public servants 
became very powerful people in the colonial setting because of this fact. At the 
local government level, district commissioners and their assistants had enormous 
powers and discretionary authority. Under the experiment in local reforms, both 
senior public servants and the district commissioners were slated for loss of 
powers. What would have a severe adverse effect on the new local councils would 
be the decision, on withdrawing all the district commissioners from the field, to 
place them in the Ministry of Home Affairs to implement the devolution of powers. 
In other words, a strong centralist viewpoint with vested interests was placed in a 
strategic position to frustrate the devolution of powers to local councils. Said the 
Plan of Operations in allocating this new assignment: "District Commissioners will 
remain for some time, as field officers of the Ministry of Home Affairs with 
responsibility for locally planning and coordinating local government reforms.,,19 
The MHA became subsequently a symbol of resistance to the devolution of 
functions. Relations between the councils and MHA have grown progressively 
worse throughout the entire implementation period and beyond. When the 
researchers for this project arrived in the Solomon Islands, the malaise continued 
with no solution in sight. It soon became apparent, as we shall discuss later, that 
the MHA not only contained colonial staff that was suspicious of strong local 
governments but it was inspired and egged on by the centralist attitudes of those 
politicians in the government who regarded the devolution exercise as a threat to 
their own political careers. Suffice it to note here that when the reform began, the 
MHA's staff inadequacy might very well have been a blessing since the fewer 
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centralists available the greater the changes for devolution without interference. 
The attitude of MHA to hamstring the local councils would be imitated by other 
ministries but for their own ends. In an attempt to pass on the blame for the 
deficiencies in implementing the policy aims of the reform, the MHA said to the 
Kausimae Committee: 
Whilst the Government has stated the priority of development of local 
government the message has taken many years to reach certain ministries 
and initially there was obstruction and an attitude that the councils would 
fail and then ask the ministries to take back the services. When it was 
seen that this was not to happen attitudes gradually changed but often 
cooperation between ministry and council still remains poor. 20 
Our evidence from field analyses clearly pointed to the proposition that the 
transfer process threatened too many centers of concentrated power built up during 
the colonial period. The fact that those who were to lose from the experiment 
were asked to literally provide the skills for their own diminished prestige and 
power indicated a major deficiency in the implementation exercise. In the next 
section, we look at other political aspects of the experiment that would enter to 
further frustrate the devolution of powers. 
B. Management and Financial Systems; Field Administration Functions; Staffing 
The second set of policy objectives dealt mainly with seemingly technical and 
administrative tasks and with the transfer of staff and field functions. A graduated 
system of transfers of functions was adopted. The field administration functions to 
be transferred were: 
(1) administration 
(2) agriculture 
(3) health 
(4) works 
(5) education 
The transfer of these field functions was orchestrated with the development 
of a council's financial and management capability to undertake and execute its 
new tasks efficiently. Hence, one of the policy objectives stated that: 
•.• the first priority in achieving all these aims should be to strengthen 
and improve the management and financial systems of local 
government. 
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A training school was established to provide skilled personnel such as accountants 
for the councils. Staff was supplied from the public service seconded from various 
ministries in the central government to the councils. When the seconded staff was 
transferred, it was explicitly stated that they would be "placed under the 
operational control of local government." To complete this process, finance was to 
be provided via bloc grants to enable the councils to meet the costs of the new 
functions that were devolved to them. In this financial arrangement, it was 
stipulated that the cost of executing the new responsibilities "should not be a net 
expenditure increase •••• " That is, at the very outset the new inexperienced 
councils had to perform at a level of efficiency similar to that of the central 
government. No concessions would be granted to novelty or inexperience. 
By 1980, practically all the field items were transferred to the local councils. 
But along the way, three events were noteworthy: (1) the Honiara Town Council 
was suspended; (2) the health functions were re-centralized; and (3) a breakaway 
movement had emerged around the Western Council complaining about inadequate 
decentralization of functions and protection of provinical powers. We shall 
examine these cases in relation to the devolution exercise. But to understand the 
reasons why the transfer of powers, although completed in a mechanical sense, 
stirred so much public comment, and political dispute between the councils and the 
central government, we must analyze individually each of the first three policy 
principles under which the local government reform was to be implemented. These 
policy principles dealt with "relationships" between units and not merely with the 
transferred elements such as vehicles, public servants, etc. 
(1) "Local government should be developed and strengthened to become an 
important agent for development and services, and the coordinator of all 
forms of government activity in its area." 
In this statement, the words "developed" and "strengthened" were related to 
the performance of two sets of roles: (i) services, and (ii) development. Great 
expectations were stirred widely in the public mind that the new councils would 
become vibrant vehicles for change in their respective provinces. What was to 
transpire, however, would be a long and on-going battle between the councils and 
the central government over the extent to which the former was equipped by the 
latter to carry out its tasks. The councils claimed that they were perennially 
understaffed and whatever staff they had were caught in a game of serving two 
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masters at the same time. All the council clerks, assistant clerks, presidents, 
secretaries, and ordinary members interviewed by us complained bitterly that they 
were understaffed causing significant problems in implementing their programs. 
This, in particular, occurred in the works division where engineering skills are 
required to execute the various council projects. When transfers and resignations 
occurred, another area of frustration was immediately created by the failure of the 
central government to recruit replacements swiftly. At least three councils felt 
that the problem of adequate staffing was so continual and frustrating that they 
disagreed with the concept of a single unified public service for the Solomon 
Islands. They wanted to take things literally into their own hands. They felt that 
should they be permitted to have their own public service, they would expeditiously 
attend to the issue of staffing. Investigations into the pervasive staffing problem 
showed that the blame was misplaced on the MHA. The bad feeling between the 
councils and the MHA had so intensified that any deficiency in local government 
operations was laid on the latter's doorstep. It was the Public Service Commission 
which was responsible for staff recruitment and training. Many of the vacancies at 
the council level required technical and tertiary backgrounds. Because of the 
shortage of such personnel among the indigenous population, this meant that 
expensive expatriate staff had to be recruited. The process could be protracted but 
when a public service commission fails to anticipate this problem in its recruitment 
procedures over several years of accumulated experience, then the complaints of 
the local councils about deliberate sabotage and non-cooperation by central 
government bureaucrats deserve a second look. Regardless of the accuracy of the 
charges of deliberate footdragging by the Public Service Commission, the 
significant point is that without adequate staff, basic council functions as well as 
development projects were not likely to be implemented. In turn, this reflected 
badly on council performance confirming the predictions of critics and pessimists 
that the councils could not be entrusted with extensive functions. The vicious 
circle between inadequate staff needs and implementation deficiencies had led to 
mutual recriminating charges between councils and the MHA about each other's 
efficiency rating. In the end, the councils began a concerted campaign for further 
reforms to give them more power over their affairs. 
There was reason to believe that the central government had acted 
deliberately to slow down the pace of staff recruitment so as to maximize the use 
of scarce resources at the national level. The government had undertaken several 
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massive job-producing and revenue-generating projects requiring the use of all its 
skilled manpower at the national level. Council projects were not spectacular and 
were less capable of utilizing scarce skills efficiently. In any event, there is 
competition between the national bureaucracy and the local councils for skilled 
staff. This tension was anticipated and a prestigious regional organization had 
recommended the slowing down of decentralization as the solution: 
An aspect related to the new Development Plan is the implementation of 
government proposals to decentralize decision making to provincial 
governments. This is seen as an important requirement if there is to be 
widespread involvement in development and decision-making processes in 
a country of widely scattered islands and poor transport and communica-
tion links. A major issue is the extent to which decentralization should be 
taken. Many of the projects, especially those of a resource development 
nature designed to expand export production, will necessarily involve 
general issues of central policy if the best use is to be made of resources 
and thus may be unsuitable for handling at the provincial level. Further, 
there is a question of the availability of trained manpower at all levels to 
enable decentralization to be effective. Such manpower, especially of 
Solomon Islands origin, is already very scarce and to thin it out further by 
too fast a rate of decentralization may prove counter-productive and 
detract from the notable progress that has already been made in 
bl " h" "b 21 esta IS mg a strong economIc ase. 
It would appear that such advice would percolate to policy areas in the Solomon 
Islands government thereby affecting the availability of staff to local councils. 
At another level, the staffing issue that emerged dealt with the loyalty of 
seconded staff to the councils. This was underlaid by the charge that the central 
government ministries continued to give direct orders to seconded staff in the 
field. The written arrangement in the Plan of Operations stated that seconded 
staff had to be operationally responsible to the clerk of a council. Our evidence on 
this charge shows that when the Plan of Operations was first being implemented, 
frequent interference by central government ministries did occur. By 1980, this 
problem was substantially resolved. Seconded staff received their instructions 
from the clerk of a council and this was recognized by the ministries. The problem 
became very acute partly because practically all senior level staff members 
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attached to the councils were seconded from central government ministries. All 
positions above level 4 were public service positions; others were direct council 
employees. In effect, nearly all the senior staff carrying out local council orders in 
the division of agriculture, works, education, administration, and health was 
derived from the central government. Their "seconded" status created an image of 
temporariness and consequently thwarted the development of loyalty to local 
issues. One top level official in MHA even disputed that the terms "seconded" was 
appropriate. He said the staff was "posted" suggesting that their final loyalty was 
not with the councils. It was felt that this ambiguousness of "seconded" status had 
created a problem of discipline at the local level. 
Finally, on the idea that the "developed" and "strengthened" councils would 
coordinate "all forms of government activity in its area," this has not eventuated. 
In fact, because of staff shortages, the councils have voluntarily returned their 
responsibility for local courts to the national judiciary and constables to the 
national police commission. Overall, the performance in implementing 
"strengthened" councils with enlarged responsibilities has been mixed, but generally 
staffing has been the most difficult problem area. 
The central government's commitment to the development of local 
government should be clear and consistent and its advisory and control 
systems should allow considerable local autonomy while ensuring that 
national interests are safe-guarded and developed. 
The devolution of functions to local councils was not a simple mechanical 
exercise in administration. An intense struggle between the central government 
and local councils was initiated at the very inception of the exercise. The 
impression imparted was that the authorities at the center were forced into an 
experiment that they did not believe in. Evidence of sabotage and non-cooperation 
by functionaries in the ministries is not difficult to find. Indeed, a submission by 
MHA to the Kausimae Committee on Provincial Government admitted those early 
difficul ties: 
While the central government has stated the priority of development of 
local government, the message has taken many years to reach certain 
ministries and initially there was obstruction and an attitude that the 
councils would fail and then ask the ministries to take back the services. 
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When it was seen that this was not to happen, attitudes gradually changed 
but often cooperation between ministry and council still remains poor.22 
The list of important charges against the central government included: (1) lack of 
respect for council decisions; (2) interference in the activities of staff seconded to 
local councils resulting in the undermining of council authority and leading to 
confusion and double loyalty; (3) lack of consultation with councils in formulating 
national legislation that were likely to affect council affairs; (4) failure to fill staff 
vacancies promptly resulting in frustrations in implementing council projects; and 
(5) continued growth of the central /?ovEtrnment staff establishments and activities 
at the same time that much of these items were suppqsed to be decentralized to 
local counciJs. The total effect of these practices, ap~rt from stirring controversy 
and conflict betwe'en the centr~l government and 10calalFt~v·r::iti~s, was to limit the 
autonomy of the latt~r. Tht· MHA in its submission to the Kausima,e <;ommittee 
noted that: 
It is debatable whetper local councils have considerable autonomy as yet 
and councils are bound to say not enough. 23 
This was an understatement but coming from one of the two primary parties in the 
controversy, it was a candid admission of the grave difficulties into which the 
experiment had fallen. What the statement failed to capture and communicate was 
the frustration and bitterness expressed by councils universally that the MHA had 
become an impenetrable barrier to council demands and aspirations. The MHA, on 
the other hand, had replied that councils were asking for more powers than were 
contemplated under the Plan of Operations. A stalemate marked by mutual 
suspicion and intolerance was the essential nature of the relationship between the 
MHA and the councils at the time research for this project was undertaken. The 
MHA felt it should not proceed further with devolving powers until the Kausimae 
Report on Provincial Government was acted upon by the central government. The 
councils attached less hope for a solution in the Kenilorea government, placing its 
demands for more autonomy on a possible change of government in the next 
I . 24 e ectlOns. 
We have posited earlier that part of the explanation for the malaise between 
the central government and the local councils stemmed from the centralist 
orientation of certain staff who were charged . with the responsibility of 
implementing the Plan of Operations. Further, we noted that the devolution 
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experiment entailed the loss of powers and functions from one locus (the ministries 
in the central government) to another (the new local councils). In turn, this 
provoked acts of non-cooperation by the ministries. Consequently, when the 
experiment was implemented, bitter struggles ensued. We suggested that other 
factors related to scarce resources, overload, and cultural values served as 
variables that limited the effectiveness of the implementation process. However, 
in the analysis up to this point we have only peripherally discussed the political 
factor as it was connected to the difficulties that the devolution experiment 
encountered. 
The decision to devolve extensive functions and powers to subordinate units 
of government through the Plan of Operations occurred at a time when the national 
political arena was being enlarged. Constitutional changes were rapidly advancing 
towards the transfer of powers to Solomon Island institutions and leaders. For the 
first time, Solomon Islanders were to be made masters of their own political 
destiny. Operationally, this meant that powers were transferred from the imperial 
power overseas to institutions in a central government in the Solomon Islands. 
Those who were elected or selected to staff and direct the operations of the new 
central institutions such as the ministries and the public service would wield 
unprecedented political power. However, simultaneous with the transfer of 
extensive powers from the metropolitan base to the colonial country was the Plan 
of Operations which sought to transfer power from Honiara, the capital city, to 
local councils located predominantly in a rural periphery. In effect, two processes 
of decolonization were being undertaken at the same time. However, the two 
operations were not similar. At the national level, sovereign institutions in a 
unitary state were being created. Political power to make binding decisions for a 
new Solomon Island state was being transferred in this exercise. At the local level, 
however, through the Plan of Operations, mainly administrative functions were 
being devolved. A grey area related to the proportion of political to administrative 
powers to be transferred to local councils was very evident. There was no question 
that the local councils were units subordinate to the will of the central 
government. What was not clearly and adequately spelled out was the amount of 
political autonomy local councils would have in undertaking to execute the new 
functions transferred to them. This became a cause of bitter dispute as was 
pointed out earlier. The main reason stemmed from political motivations and 
interests. 
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To the local occupants of the new central institutions were entrusted the 
responsibility of maintaining national unity and protecting national interests. In 
relation to the local government reform contemplated under the Plan of 
Operations, it was stated that "the central government's commitment to the 
development of local government ... should allow for considerable local autonomy 
while ensuring that national interests are safeguarded and developed." The idea of 
a "national interest" was a new one. There was no clear definition of its main 
features. It was left to those who controlled the institutions of the central 
government to determine its content C:l,nd meaning. Inevitably, this would tempt the 
new national leaders to confuse "national interest" with "personal political 
interest." To the inheritors of sovereign political power will the task of separating 
national interest from personal political interest fall. We believe that the 
experiment in local government devolution would become an early victim to the 
tensions inherent in this issue. 
By 1976, it had become clear that indigenous competition for control of the 
new central government was between two main personalities: (1) Peter Kenilorea; 
and (2) Solomon Mamaloni. Kenilorea was the contestant for the position of Chief 
Minister and at independence the coveted post of Prime Minister. Mamaloni who 
was the first Chief Minister resigned from Parliament after a scandal had tarnished 
the image of his government. While Kenilorea slowly consolidated his control over 
the central government, Mamaloni and many of his sympathizers agitated for a 
system of decentralized provincial government. Hence, the experiment in local 
government devolution became a central issue over which political competition at 
the highest level in the Solomons was conducted. Mamaloni wanted to return to 
power as much as Kenilorea wanted to stay in office. Mamaloni's agitation for 
greater provincial autonomy was seen as a strategy to weaken the central 
government as well as to transfer powers to sympathetic politicians at the 
provincial level. David Kausimae, a close associate of Mamaloni, was subsequently 
to become chairman of the Committee on Provincial Government. This Committee 
toured the Solomon Islands extensively, received frequent and widespread publicity, 
and finally recommended extensive decentralization of functions and powers to the 
local councils. The Kenilorea government saw the Kausimae Report as a political 
device intended to enfeeble it and eventually remove it from office. The Kausimae 
Committee was very critical of the manner in which the central government 
undertook its responsibility to devolve powers to local councils. The Committee 
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sympathized with the multitude of complaints that the councils advanced against 
the MHA. More powers were recommended for the councils. 
As a political vehicle, the Kausimae Committee was suspect. Appointed by 
Parliament, the Committee was a concession by the central government to 
accelerate the wheels towards independence. 25 The Chairman of the Committee, 
David Kausimae, was leader of one of the small opposition parties in Parliament. 
He was subsequently to become the Chairman of the People's Alliance Party, the 
main opposition party after the July 1980 general elections. The People's Alliance 
Party nominated Solomon Mamaloni as its chief spokesman and political leader. 
Mamaloni became Opposition Leader in Parliament. In August 1981, Mamaloni 
succeeded Kenilorea as Prime Minister. In these respects, the Kausimae Report 
posed as a threat to the Kenilorea government. If the central government should 
accede to an extensively decentralized system of local government, not only would 
it lose more political and administrative powers to local councils, but the 
Kausimae-Mamaloni coalition would receive the praise for this achievement. The 
beneficiaries of a decentralized provincial government system would be local 
councils renamed provincial councils which would owe a major political debt to the 
Kausimae-Mamaloni group. Give that elections were scheduled within a year of the 
Kausimae Report in 1979, the Kenilorea Government decided to accept the Report 
for further action. Such action would be deferred until after the general elections. 
In the interim, a government White Paper on provincial government was prepared. 
The White Paper which was accepted by Parliament approved the general ideas of 
the Kausimae Report but left ample room for changes when the Paper is translated 
into law. 
The manner in which the central government approached issues on devolution 
underscored the political interests that had come to dominate the entire 
experiment in local initiative particularly after 1976. The Kenilorea-led 
government would be under heavy pressure to decentralize further powers but 
would react to these proposals by utilizing delaying tactics and by invoking 
"national interest" considerations. In effect, it became difficult to disentangle the 
political interest to maintain power from the national interest. We shall examine 
briefly three cases in which these themes were intertwined: (1) the suspension of 
the Honiara Town Council, the Medical Health Act of 1978, and (3) the Western 
breakaway movements. 
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1. The Suspension of the Honiara Town Council 
The Honiara Town Council was established in 1969 under the Local 
Government Act of 1963. The council was responsible for local government in the 
country's capital. It was endowed with powers and functions similar to that of 
other local councils in the Solomon Islands. However, as a subordinate unit of 
government in a unitary system, the Town Council was creature to the wishes of 
the central government. According to the Local Government Act, the council 
could be suspended and dissolved by the Minister for Home Affairs without 
consultation or approval of Parliament. 
As party politics gradually became a salient aspect of national political life, 
various centers of power became arenas of partisan contest and control. After the 
1976 general elections, a Peter Kenilorea-led government came into existence.26 
Simultaneously, a labor-based party called NADEPA (National Democratic Party) 
became the main Opposition (1976-80) in Parliament. Led by Bart Ulufaalu, 
NADEPA decided to contest the elections also for seats in the Honiara Town 
Council. NADEPA candidates and sympathizers won most of the seats thereby 
gaining control of the council in the 1979 elections. 
From the town council chambers where the national Opposition leader 
simultaneously held a seat and chaired the council's finance committee, NADEPA 
was able to become a vocal critic of the national government. In the same capital 
city, then, the headquarters of two governments were located. The Kenilorea 
government faced NADEPA not only in the national parliament, but in addition, 
faced opposition criticisms from the town council chambers less than half a mile 
away. NADEPA was, therefore, able to command considerable national attention 
to challenge the day-to-day performance of the Kenilorea regime. General 
elections which were due in July 1980 could possibly witness serious setbacks to 
Kenilorea and his United Party because of the strategic hold that NADEPA had 
over the Honiara Town Council. 
In April 1980, the Minister for Home Affairs on behalf of the central 
government suspended and dissolved the Honiara Town Council giving as the main 
reason "financial mismanagement." Said the Minister in giving his reasons: 
As Minister with Portfolio responsible for the affairs of the Honiara Town 
Council, I have for some time been worried about its financial situation. 
Two aspects give rise to particular concern: the mounting burden of 
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undischarged debt and the lack of financial control which appears to have 
'b d h' 27 contr 1 ute to tIS. 
The Minister then requested the Auditor-General to investigate the charge of 
financial mismanagement. What was significant in this regard was that the 
suspension preceded the Auditor-General's report. Attending the suspension was 
intense media coverage of the event. The accusation of wrongdoing spilled over to 
tarnish the image of the Opposition Leader and NADEPA. With general elections 
only a few months away, most observers agreed that the suspension was a carefully 
calculated act intended to fulfill the narrow political interests of the Kenilorea 
government in the forthcoming elections. Interviews carried out by the research 
team in this project confirmed that NADEPA's overwhelming defeat in the general 
elections was partly attributable to the negative image that the charge of financial 
mismanagement by a NADEPA-controlled council had on the public's perception of 
the political parties in the elections. 
The auditor-general's report exonerated the Town Council from the charge of 
financial mismanagement, but it came too late to erase the damage inflicted on 
NADEPA. Said the Auditor-General's report: 
A t the time of audit, the revenue collected according to the ledger and 
after allowing for itmes b, c, d, and e above was practically in line with 
the Estimates. On the expenditure side the ledger showed under spending 
of approximately $194,000, but against this, of course, must be set net 
outstanding debt, detailed in paragraph 12 of $201,000. It can be seen, 
therefore, that the overall position was very little different to that 
d ' hE' 28 approve In t estImates. 
The blatant nature of the suspension order was underscored by the fact that the 
charges made against the Town Council were about events committed in 1979 by a 
previous council that had since been superseded by a new group of councillors after 
the September 1979 elections. It was never explained why the new council 
controlled by NADEPA had to bear the blame of the previous council's alleged 
transgressions. Finally, the political motivations that underlied the suspension of 
the council were adequately borne out when note was made of the fact that the 
local councils across the country habitually overspent by large amounts without 
suffering dissolution. 
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2. The Recentralization of Health Services 
In June 1979, a Health Services Act was passed by the Solomon Islands 
Parliament resulting in the recentralization of a variety of health services which 
were transferred several years ago to local councils under the Plan of Operations. 
No local council was consulted or informed about the measure before it became 
law. The passage through Parliament of the Health Services Act was as arbitrary 
as it was swift, rendering into shambles many years of careful planning under which 
local councils received substantial functions in the area of medical and health care. 
Under the Local Government Act of 1963, the new local councils were 
empowered "to safeguard and promote public health"; "to provide health and 
medical services"; "to operate clinics, aid posts, dressing stations and health 
centers"; "to operate hospitals and referral centers"; and "to establish, maintain 
and control cemeteries or burial grounds" (Section 22). These were potential 
functions that councils could perform when they were deemed prepared to 
undertake them. When the Plan of Operations came into existence, health services 
were deemed prepa.red to undertake them. When the Plan of Operations came into 
existence, health services were distributed between the central and local 
29 governments as follows: 
Central: 
Local: 
National policy, legislation, standards, staff training and registration. 
Principal referral and teaching hospitals; specialist services. Central 
procurement of supplies; major campaigns and central recording and 
reporting machinery. Coordination of measures against major health 
threats. Capital and recurrent aid to local government and provision 
of staff on secondment. 
Provision of all rural health services and hospitals. Public health and 
preventative measures. Collaboration with central government in 
campaigns and epidemiological measures. 
A dispute developed between the Ministry of Medical Services and Health at 
the national level and the Malaita Provincial Council at the local level. The crux 
of the problem stemmed from the transfer of a medical doctor seconded from the 
Ministry to the council. Complaints over the performance of the doctor in question 
at a provincially-run hospital had reached the Ministry. The normal channel for 
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complaints to be acted upon would lead first to the provincial council, then the 
national Ministry. The Malaita Council insisted that the seconded doctor remain in 
the service of the province. The Ministry in turn demanded that he be transferred 
to another province. Failure to resolve the dispute led to the enactment of the 
Health Services Act of June 1979. Under the Act the Minister of Health was 
empowered to "make arrangements as appear to him desirable" to compel any 
provincial council to carry out health services "as an agent of the Ministry.,,30 
Also, the Act stated that councils would be called upon to "provide, equip, and 
maintain,j their own clinics with "advice and assistance" from the Ministry of 
Health. 31 
The Health Services Act was almost a clandestine operation. Neither Malaita 
nor any other province was aware of its introduction as a bill in Parliament. What 
was even more intriguing about this Act was that it was only applied to the Malaita 
provincial council. When interviews with other councils about the Health Act were 
carried out as part of this project, it was discovered that no other council had its 
health services recentralized. Clearly, the central government sought to solve a 
minor dispute by utilizing a massive form of remedy. the crucial point was that a 
Health Services Act with sweeping powers of recentralization was used almost 
casually even though it threatened to undo a major part of the devolution exercise. 
Further investigation of the background of the Health Services Act yielded 
evidence that the Ministry of Medical Services and Health had the worst 
relationship with councils among central ministries over the transfer of functions. 
The Malaita Council noted that even after health functions were transferred to 
local councils, "direct orders were issued by the Ministry to seconded nursing staff, 
posting them to undertake Ministry functions, without consultation with the 
Province or working through the proper channels.,,32 . The upshot was the 
undermining of the authority of local councils in directing the duties of seconded 
staff. 
3. The Western Breakaway Movement 
The Western Province is one of seven provinces in the Solomon Islands. It 
contains about 20 percent of the country's total population and occupies about 30 
percent of the land area. The evidence on comparative regional economic well-
being presented earlier shows that the Western Province is the most developed part 
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of the Solomons. The Western Provincial Council, which represents the western 
region, demanded, prior to the Solomon Islands' independence, a federal form of 
government for the country as a whole. The Western submission stated: 
It is envisaged that when the state government system is established, it is 
highly desirable that the national constitution should define the areas of 
responsibilities, functions, and powers which would regulate and justify 
the existence and activities of the central and state governments, and in 
so doing the central government and the state should be self-ruling 
coordinate bodies rather than subordinate to each other as is the case 
33 
under the present system of government. 
Several reasons motivated the West to seek such a constitutional arrange-
ment. In the Solomon Islands' multi-ethnic setting, the West held a minority status 
both in population and in parliamentary representation. "Malaitan domination" was 
a major Western concern. Fear of "internal colonialism" that would diminish the 
pre-eminent standing of the West's economic well-being led the West to charge that 
it obtained less in benefits from the central government than it paid in revenues. 
Further, the West argued that centralizing forces were at work in the national 
government.34 Local initiative was being stifled. The philosophy and practice of 
the government, it was charged, tended to emphasize a centralist approach to 
nation-building, final decision making, and ultimate direction in most significant 
" , 
matters. In this scheme of things, local government units such as Western 
Province, were relegated to serve as an agent of the central government merely 
carrying out decisions made at the center. Said the Western submission to the 
central government: 
The present local government Councils act only as local coordinators, 
overseers, and agents of the central government's plans and policies.35 
The Westerners requested a system of government that returned initiative to them 
for local development. They wanted a meaningful division of powers entrenched in 
a constitution. When maximum powers were assigned to them, they wanted to 
ensure that the concession was not a temporary measure that could be easily 
revoked at the convenience of the central government. Hence, they demanded a 
federal arrangement in which separate spheres of exclusive powers could be 
created. 
110 
The response of the central government was based on fear. Such sweeping 
powers, if extended to the West, would be but one short step to full independence. 
What was equally alarming about the West's demands was the encouragement 
concessions might give to other self-differentiating groups in the Solomons. The 
accommodation of diversity through adopting a federal system could drive the 
various linguistic and island groups further apart. National unity would be 
thwarted. These were some of the underlying views of the central government. 
However, narrow political motivations were also at work. The West's demands 
could only be met by the loss of significant functions and powers by politicians and 
bureaucrats who prospered at the level of the central government. The alterations 
to the political system would be fundamental. New centers of power would be 
created at the provincial level. In addition, decentralization would entail transfers 
of public personnel from the capital city to rural provincial centers. 
The central government's response attempted to placate the West's demand 
for more financial benefits by introducing a system of "deprivation" grants. Under 
this formula, the different regional councils received central government grants in 
proportion to the monetary value of their economic contribution to production. 
There were other eleme,nts in the final formula that was adopted. However, the 
symbolic aspects of Western demands dealing with decentralization and internal 
colonialism were unattended. The central government acceded to the formation of 
a parliamentary committee to solicit views and make recommendations for a 
system of provincial government. This was conceded as a means of temporarily 
relieving secessionist tensions generated by the Western movement. David 
Kausimae was appointed Chairman of the Committee. Independence was finally 
attained on July 7, 1978, but the issue of decentralization remained unsolved. The 
report of the Kausimae committee advocated an extensive system of decentralized 
powers short of a complete federal system. The Kenilorea government which 
postponed facing the issue of decentralization by creating the Kausimae committee 
had discovered that the demands would not go away by delaying tactics. Failure to 
grant extensive powers to local councils through temporizing had led to a build-up 
of further frustrations. The act of postponement had exacerbated provincial-
central government malaise. The Kausimae Report, in turn, had underscored the 
urgency for action. 
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We can set forth graphically the government's response to the three issues 
briefly examined. 
Issue 
1. Western 
Breakaway 
2. Honiara Town 
Council 
3. Medical Health 
Act 
Demand 
1. Greater provincial 
autonomy 
2. Powers similar to a 
federal system 
1. To be left alone. 
2. To be treated equally 
to other local 
councils. 
1. To recognize the 
powers and functions 
devolved to 
provinces. 
Response 
1. Kausimae Committee; 
fear of national frag-
mentation at national 
interest level; fear 
of loss of powers to 
provinces creating a 
weak central government; 
fear of loss of political 
power. 
1. Suspension; 
Discrediting of Oppo-
tion Party in prepar-
ation for elections. 
1. Re-centralization of 
health functions. 
These three cases suggested that the Kenilorea government placed its own 
political future as a matter of first priority in implementing reform in local or 
provincial government. In the Honiara Town Council case, it dissolved an entire 
local council so as to discredit the Opposition party. The government was oblivious 
of the repercussions this action would have for local autonomy. Primarily, local 
councils lived thereafter in fear that they would also be suspended if they happened 
to espouse political views or to harbor political parties with views contrary to that 
of the government. The Honiara Town Council case established a precedent that 
any deficient performance by a council can be used as an excuse to rein a 
provincial council into line with central government wishes. The Honiara Town 
Council suspension brought vividly to the surface the meaning of "national interest" 
to the Kenilorea government. The Medical Health Act case pointed to the 
arbitrariness and inconsistency that overshadowed the experiment in devolution. 
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One of five major functions transferred to the local councils was in a single stroke 
recentralized .. No council was consulted. The Act was pushed through Parliament 
without ceremony. It would be difficult to argue in support of recentralizing an 
entire division because of a minor personnel problem over a medical doctor. This 
could only happen where the transfer of functions was regarded lightly by MHA. 
Finally, there are many perspectives from which the Western breakaway movement 
can be analyzed. For our purposes, the Western movement summarized the 
demands by local authorities for greater involvement in decisions affecting their 
lives. The government's response was intended to "buy time" by appointing the 
Kausimae Committee. It hoped that the problem would disappear. It is, in effect, 
a dangerous if not irresponsible form of national policy making to promote the 
national interest. 
Overall, the central government's attitude to the devolution of local initiative 
to provincial councils was motivated to preserve its own political power. Because 
the devolution exercise became intermix~d with the quest and competition for 
control of the central government, its course was marked by general inconsistency. 
Not much of a sense of local autonomy had been imparted. "National interest" had 
provided a useful cover to conceal the political interest of those who governed. In 
one notable interview with a council president, he referred to the central 
government's commitment to the development of local government and autonomy 
as "a lot of talk." What he meant was that the governing regime had not discarded 
the rhetoric of decentralization but in practice it acted to strengthen the powers of 
the central government. 
(3) "There should be a well-understood division of functions between central and 
local government based on the principle that all those functions which in the 
opinion of the governing council could best be performed by a well-
established local authority should be progressively allocated to local 
government. " 
In the implementation of the Plan of Operations the phrase "transfer of 
functions" was used very frequ~ntly. Rarely, however, was the enabling phrase 
"transfer of powers" used. It is from the connection of these two phrases which 
would lead to confusion. In speaking of "transfer of functions," the idea 
communicated was that of an administrative exercise in which councils merely 
served as agents of central government fiat. However, the phrase "transfer of 
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powers" communicated the idea of autonomous decision making. Any plan that 
advocated devolution of functions must inevitably entail the means by which the 
functions were to be executed. Yet it was precisely in this area of powers that the 
most bitter inter-governmental disputes would transpire. 
There was implicit fear in the Plan of Operations to discuss "powers" to be 
transferred as against "functions." In a submission to the Kausimae Committee, 
the MHA argued that it was asked by councils to transfer more powers than were 
intended by the Plan of Operations. Interviews with officials of several councils, 
however, indicated that their uncertainty about the extent of their powers required 
them to consult too frequently with MHA officials about their activities. 
The MHA was partly forthright in commenting on the clear division of 
functions when it said: 
••• in the transfer of functions ••• there are still many areas ill-defined 
and confusion exists as to the control of staff and certain capital projects. 
Indeed, in some ministries still there is some doubt as to the role of local 
"I 36 counCl s. 
This statement was part of the MHA submission to the Kausimae Committee in 
1978, that is, five years after the Plan of Operations was first implemented. At 
the time of research, in the area of staffing, the question of loyalty and source of 
direction had been resolved for the most part. The clerks of councils gave orders 
to all seconded staff from the central government. However, new ways of 
interference with staff had been designed. The most extensively used strategem 
was the use of inquiries and requests for information from the central government 
ministries about activities in the provinces. In these "inquiries," guidelines were 
directly and indirectly dispensed. 
The recentralization of powers in the Health Act pointed to another area of 
clarity or lack of clarity in the division of functions. Although it was clear where 
immediate power resided in field Health services, the ministry of Medical and 
Health Services decided to bypass the powers of councils in directing a seconded 
staff member to a new post. That is, even where clarity of division in functions 
existed, that was not enough to empower the Ministry of Health to act within its 
sphere of authority. 
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Areas in which local councils contended that they lacked well-understood 
powers were land and natural resources. The councils regarded control over the use 
of provincial land and resources as their own exclusive monopoly. Because they had 
very limited powers to raise their own revenue depending on the central 
government for over 70 percent of all their funds, they demanded powers to decide 
on the use of their land and natural resources. All councils felt very strongly about 
their dependency on the central government for revenues. They wanted an 
independent revenue base which could be employed as they wished in directing 
council projects and activities. 
The central government on the other hand was concerned about the loss of 
control over councils if they were to become relatively independent of external 
financing. Further, some provinces better endowed with resources, were likely to 
benefit from private and foreign investment more than other provinces. The 
problem of provincial inequality could be the cause of national disunity, Finally, 
control over the use of land, in particular, could conflict with the constitutional 
provisions allowing freedom of movement of all citizens. Several councils were 
likely to misuse this power to exclude other provincial residents from migrating or 
working wherever they wished. 
In the end, the implementation process did not create clear-cut divisions of 
functions and powers to avert confusion. Many areas of ambiguity existed. These 
were clouded by controversy not only over division of functions, but demands for 
more functions and powers by local councils. When the political aspects of the 
issue are considered, it is clear that "powers" meant autonomous decision-making 
devolved to councils. The impulse of the central government was to deconcentrate 
administrative functions without relinquishing much decision-making powers to 
councils. The interest of the councils were diametrically opposed seeking to 
maximize decision-making at the grassroots level. The acrimony over this 
controversy would grow to a swell of demands from the periphery for a re-
evaluation of the entire devolution exercise under the Plan of Operations. The 
issue exploded in menacing proportions when one province, the West, sought either 
more provincial autonomy or else full independence via secession. The upshot was 
the Kausimae Inquiry to which we turn next. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE COMMITMENT TO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
The Plan of Operations which had set out to devolve a measure of 
responsibility to local councils fell into an administrative quagmire. Widespread 
grassroot protests against the manner in which it was implemented came swiftly on 
its heels. In a sense, the Plan provoked a sleeping tiger into a marauding animal. 
Promising in its rhetoric development and respect for local initiative, the central 
government succeeded in evoking complaints of bad faith. Confronted with 
frequent and vociferous demands to devolve more powers to the peripheralized 
local councils, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) countered that the people 
expected more from the reform than was promised. The tension between council 
demands and central government recalcitrance would progressively deteriorate into 
an unhealthy atmosphere incapable of supporting cooperation in inter-governmental 
relations. A stalemate of mutual distrust and disrespect between the parties 
persisted unto the time of this research undertaking. Regardless of the claims and 
counter-claims, it cannot be gainsaid that the implementation of the Plan of 
Operations did instigate new impetus towards extensive local autonomy. The case 
of the Western province's demand for a federal structure to safeguard its regional 
interests was not necessarily an extreme expression of the sentiment for devolution 
across the Solomons. What would demonstrate beyond doubt that people practically 
everywhere wanted government closer to them, responsive to their needs and under 
their control, was the Kausimae Committee of Inquiry into provincial government. 
While the appointment of the Kausimae Committee was a tactic by the Kenilorea 
government to facilitate the movement of the colony towards independence under 
its control, the impact of the protracted inquiry was to activate and mobilize 
demands for further devolution. Touring the country extensively and convening 
meetings with villagers to solicit their views, the Kausimae committee commanded 
the attention of the media continually for nearly two years. The decentralization 
issue literally explored as an intractable problem bedevilling the central govern-
ment. It could not be swept under the rug or rendered stale by procrastination. Its 
appetite for attention was fueled by the approach of new elections in 1981, the 
first since independence. The demand for decentralized provincial government was 
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associated by a number of candidates with meaningful decolonization, symbolizing 
a return of power to the people. In this chapter we examine the Kausimae Inquiry 
and its findings. 
The Special Committee on Provincial Government was given extremely broad 
terms of reference and included in its membership David Kausimae as Chairman, 
backbench M.P.'s who did not hold ministerial portfolios and the Presidents of the 
seven provinces. The Special Committee undertook a thorough-going review of 
provincial government including extensive tours by sub-committees of the country 
to hold public meetings in each of the provinces. In response to Western demands, 
the full committee spent two days in Western Province at a special meeting called 
just before Independence.3 The committee received and considered a wide range of 
briefs, drew upon background and option papers and had the advice of three 
external advisers as well as a full-time secretary. Decisions taken by the Special 
Committee were based on consensus and the Special Committee decided in August 
1978 to circulate a draft of its report to seek the reaction of provincial assemblies 
and ministries of the central government before proceeding in March 1979 to 
produce the final draft for presentation to Parliament in May 1979. This extra-
consultative device added to the aura and legitimacy of the Committee's report. In 
addition, the Chairman and Secretary made two visits abroad to study the 
decentralization experiment in Papua New Guinea and the system of state 
government in Malaysia. 
In the past,the decentralization process had been subject to administra-
tive direction and control. The political leadership affirmed the principle and 
commitment to decentralization but left the design and pace of reform to the 
central bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, senior public servants defined decentraliza-
tion in highly technical and pragmatic terms. Policy evolved from an evolutionary 
and incremental process which determined local government reform as a series of 
administrative readjustments. These readjustments reflected central perceptions 
and preferences. 
The report of the Special Committee changed the entire context and 
substance of decentralization away from the technical, pragmatic and realist 
approach of the administration. In its place, the Report provided an ideological 
framework or set of ideas, characteristic of a mobilization approach to decentrali-
zation, which stood to be a coherent whole. In conceptual terms, the Report 
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marked a real distance from the past, including fascinatingly, the submissions 
presented to the Committee. Let us offer several examples of this new approach. 
From the very beginning, the Special Committee denied a view which would suggest 
that decentralization might threaten and undermine national unity. 
The committee believed that centralization does not necessarily encour-
age national unity, and that decentralization does not necessarily 
discourage it. Political decentralization can work both ways: providing a 
base to challenge unity, or a base for building unity. It depends on the 
time, the circumstances, the systems of decentralization and how it is 
used. The committee believed that for some time after Independence, 
decentralization of power will be necessary for national unity •••. The 
system the committee has recommended-particularly the method of 
division of powers-is based on cooperation not conflict. It assumes a 
unitary state with devolution and local autonomy within it: technically, it 
is a "unitary devolved" system.4 
Although the Special Committee was enjoined in its letters of appointment 
that "no recommendation should be made which increases substantially the cost of 
local government administration,,,5 the Special Committee took a unique view of 
the cost constraint. This view was based on the important realization that the 
political development of new institutions was at stake: 
The recommendations offer opportunities for saving and spending money. 
Even if the system ends up costing more, the costs must be measured 
against the benefits in political development and national unity. The costs 
must also be measured against the costs of alternatives, particularly the 
costs of continuing centralisation, including-administrative delay; the 
costs about failure to consult about projects early on; poor coordination in 
the field; cutting off local initiatives.6 
The most revealing example, however, marks a critical point of departure 
from the past-that is, decentralization is fundamentally a political process where 
new centers of political power are created which open up new political 
opportunities and lead to the formation of a new political leadership. At issue are 
political questions, not just simply a series of administrative reforms and 
rearrangements: 
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The Committee felt that decentralization of government should be a 
political process. It should involve the development of institutions that 
would provide opportunities for local leadership, participation and 
responsibility. These institutions should be based in local communities and 
provide a place for traditional leadership. Independence, and the 
negotiations that led to it, brought political changes at the centre, but 
fewer changes outside. People sometimes talked about a need for 
"political education" but often only meant instructing other people about 
what had already been decided in Honiara (or London). Committees went 
on tour, but the institutions they reported to were in Honiara. The 
Committee felt that the development of political institutions is an 
essential part of the whole process of development.7 
The Special Committee, therefore, marks a major break with the administra-
tive direction and control of decentralization. The reassertion of the preeminence 
of the political and not the administrative process is reflected throughout the 
Report. Consider, for example, the following statement: 
Part of the framework for provincial government is already set out in the 
national constitutions (which, for example, brings provincial assembly 
members under the Leadership Code). The rest of the framework should 
be designated to encourage provincial and local leaders to make their own 
decisions, and to make sure they have the resources, time and good advice 
to use the opportunities the framework provides.8 
This challenge for a fundamental change in the approach to decentralization 
and a corresponding transfer of powers and resources sufficient to realize it in 
practice is forced upon the National Parliament. Decentralization, from the 
Committee's perspective, requires an act of political will and, moreover, national 
politicians must be aware of and support the political dimensions of the process. 
Although the Report covers the full range of concerns associated with 
provincial government, the core recommendations and reforms appear under the 
headings of Political Leadership and Structure, Powers and Functions, Finance, 
Staff and Relations Between Governments. 
The basic structure of provincial government includes elected provincial 
assemblies with four-year terms of office which have the power to coopt a 
paramount chief and representatives of church, business and community interests. 
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National parliamentarians and civil servants could not be so coopted. Further, if 
they intend to seek election to a provincial assembly, national parliamentarians and 
civil servants must resign their positions upon nomination for election. In addition, 
national parliamentarians should be invited to attend meetings of the provincial 
assembly but they may only do so if invited. Coordination between politicians at 
the two levels would be achieved by the creation of coordinative committees: 
Each provincial assembly and the Honiara City Council must establish a 
co-ordinating committee in which its members meet regularly with 
members of National Parliament constituencies in the province or city to 
discuss common problems, future policies and proposed laws.9 
Provincial assemblies would operate as legislative bodies in every sense of the 
word. The chief executive and political head of each province, designated the 
Premier, would be chosen from among members of the Assembly on nomination and 
by means of a vote. The same process for selection of a Prime Minister in the 
National Assembly would operate in the case of a Premier. A vote of no-
confidence in the Premier could be held on a week's notification and would require 
a two-thirds majority. The executive as a whole could either be chosen from 
among members of the Assembly by the Premier or by the body as a whole 
depending upon each province's determination. The minimum and maximum size of 
the executive would also be left to provincial decision. Similarly, the structure of 
the Executive was subject to various alternative methods of operation: "They may 
carry out their duties-by working together in a single executive committee, by 
forming special subject committees or by accepting individual responsibility for 
particular subjects."IO As with the Pre~ier, the members of the Executive must 
hold the confidence of the assembly. The Assembly could be dissolved at any time 
providing notice of motion to do so was given in sufficient time and a majority of 
the members voted in support through a secret ballot. 
To highlight the essential political nature of provincial government and the 
pivotal role of the Premier as a political leader, the Committee made provision for 
the post of political secretary to the Premier or Mayor. As the Committee stated: 
The political secretary should act as advisor to the premier or mayor, and 
should not be allowed to give instructions to civil servants or direct 
I f .. I h H·· ·1 11 emp oyees 0 prOVinCia governments or t e omara City counci • 
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This position would be open to recruitment from either inside or outside the civil 
service and would have a salary range reflecting the significance of the new role. 
In addition to provincial level institutions and relationships, provision was 
made in the Report for the creation of a further tier of local government units 
below the councils. To cite the Report: 
An Act of the National Parliament should say that local governments must 
be set up in every province; and must be given protection in the provincial 
constitutions .•• against being arbitrarily suspended, dissolved or deprived 
of their powers, functions and sources of revenue. 12 
The Report envisaged that such structures would be dominated by traditional 
leaders selected according to local custom rather than election. In such cases, it 
would be important to assure that other interests were represented by means of co-
optation. These new local units, their area of jurisdiction, their size and how 
members were to be selected, would be matters of provincial government 
determination. 
Unlike previous references to area committe~s and local level village politics, 
the Report was careful to make certain that the new grassroots units would become 
significant and assure local participation in development. The Committee 
suggested the following provisions: 
An Act of the National Parliament should say that the new subprovinciallocal 
government units must .•.. 
have the power to act, collect and decide how to spend the taxes and fees 
... including basic rate; 
have the power to make by-laws under provincial laws ... 
be consulted before provincial laws are made .. 
be capable of receiving from the provincial governments law-and policy-
making powers . . • revenue-raising powers • .• and responsibility for 
carrying out government functions .•. provided that the recipient agrees; 
and 
be endowed with disciplinary powers to be delegated to local government 
clerks .•. to see that civil servants and direct employees of provincial 
governments in rural areas attend relevant meetings and work together 
with local governments. 13 
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The Kausimae Report in its overview on these grassroots units came to the 
point of suggesting a federal approach whereby their powers and relationships to 
other levels of government are entrenched in the country's constitution. 
A major contribution of the Kausimae Report lay in its approach to the issue 
of the division of powers between the central and provincial levels of government. 
In the past, the sittuation with respect to provincial power depended heavily on the 
discretion of the central government, to make room within its powers, for 
provincial action. By the dependent nature of the relationship, provincial action 
required ministerial approval and could be overridden by the predominant force of 
national laws. In this situation of uncertainty and dependence, the Committee 
outlined the result: 
The committee found that provincial assemblies have not made full use of 
the powers they have because-{a) they did not always know they had 
them; (b) they did not know how far they could go without being overruled; 
(c) they lacked sufficient skilled, committed or trained staff to advise 
them; (d) they lacked money or staff to carry out their decisions; or (e) 
14 they were told that they could not do what they wanted. 
Essentially, to resolve the dilemma of provincial ineffectualness, the Special 
Committee adopted a decentralist approach. In this, the Committee, after having 
undertaken an intensive effort to tap popular opinion, used the popular demand that 
provincial government should be given more power and greater autonomy to 
legitimate their proposals for far-reaching changes. 15 These changes were based 
upon "the power to make laws and policies on more subjects and the right to have 
the final say on certain subjects.,,16 At a minimum, the decentralist approach 
required a clear definition and description of powers and responsibilities for each of 
the two levels of government. To quote the Report, 
The Committee decided that the simplest and most effective way of-(a) 
giving effect to its recommendations about the division of powers between 
the national and provincial government; and (b) securing provincial 
autonomy within a united Solomon Islands was the scheme outlined below. 
The scheme has three main elements -(a) a list of subjects on which 
provincial assemblies have the final power to make laws and policies (List 
A); (b) a list of subjects on which provincial assemblies may make laws and 
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policies, but on which the National Parliament has, once it has consulted 
the provinces, the final say (List B); and (c) the vesting of final authority 
over all unlisted subjects in the National Parliament (with provision for 
consultation with provinces affected by laws and policies on some of these 
b " ) 17 su Jects 0 
The entire thrust of the Special Committee's recommendations was calculated to ". 
make space for provincial governments. lll8 Lists A, Band C are presented in an 
Appendix at the end of this monograph. 
The Special Committee's overview of the reforms of powers and functions of 
the provinces and central government anticipated four major consequences for the 
decentralization process. First, in place of a narrow view of provincial power 
which would focus exclusively on law-making, the Special Committee argued that 
policy-making powers for the relevant subject areas would also fall to their 
provinces. To quote the Committee, 
The scheme covers powers to make policy as well as laws. Laws are made 
by Parliament or provincial assemblies. Policies may also be made by the 
cabinet or provincial executives, or other bodies legally empowered to 
make them. The Committee decided that the division of law and policy-
making powers should be written into the law to ensure clarity, certainty 
and autonomy. Every government's policies must be lawful: they must be 
made within or under a: law. But policies need not take the form of laws. 
If provincial and national governments respect each other's autonomy, 
they need not waste time and legal resources giving legal form to every 
policy the make. 19 
This is a critical point. Not only are provincial governments to be autonomous 
units with their own jurisdictions for legislative purposes, but as forms of 
government, provincial governments will have the same executive authority to 
issue new policies and directives as is the case with the national government. To 
reinforce the autonomy of the provinces and to give effect to their policy-making 
as well as law-making powers, the Special Committee felt the need to reiterate 
firmly that staff were to be under the control of and responsible to provincial 
governments: 
Both civil servants and directly employed staff carrying out functions for 
which a provincial government or the Honiara City Council is legally 
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responsible should be under the control of the provincial government or 
City Council, not of national government ministries. The staff should be 
legally responsible for carrying out their duties to the provincial 
C· C '1 20 government or Ity ounCI. 
A major concern for staff loyalties, their quality and behaviour was keenly felt by 
the Special Committee. Chapter Six on Staff was careful to reiterate time and 
again the concept of provincial control over civil service staff.2l The major 
mechanism to achieve such control lay in the powers of supervision and discipline 
which would fall to the Provincial Secretary (the former Clerk to the Council). The 
Provincial Secretary is to be the chief executive officer of the province armed with 
wide powers over staff to assure compliance with provincial wishes: 
As the senior civil servant in the province, the Provincial Secretary should 
be responsible for-(a) coordinating the work of all civil servants, 
including those performing national functions; (b) ensuring that all 
government officers, including directly employed staff, work efficiently 
and together; and (c) the exercise of disciplinary powers, including 
delegated powers • while in the province, staff carrying out C List 
functions that have become the responsibility of the provincial govern-
ment will become responsible to the Provincial Secretary.22 
The power to discipline civil servants would be delegated to the Provincial 
Secretary by the Public Service Commission. 
The third major implication of the chapter on powers and functions was the 
continued strengthening of provinces beyond the functions transferred under the 
Plan of Operations. The Special Committee, for example, included social 
development as a provincial function under the C List. 23 Beyond the specification 
of new areas of jurisdiction, the recommendations would have the effect of further 
dismantling the central bureaucracy. Thus, the clear implication of the suggested 
reforms would be a major restructuring of the state in the Solomon Islands. 24 This 
restructuring would mean a progressive reduction in the power of the inherited 
colonial administration. Associated with the decline of the center was the Special 
Committee'S call for provincial representation on statutory authorities, which had 
been created by the center, whose operations were felt at the provincial level. The 
Committee also provided that provincial governments could, if they so desired, 
establish statutory authorities of their own. 25 A major instrument of development 
would henceforth be available to provincial governments. 
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The division of sources of revenue and taxing powers are crucial elements of 
any scheme to decentralize power to levels of government below the national level. 
Autonomy to act in some fields requires the ability to raise money and pay for 
services independent of the national government. Thus, meaningful decentrali-
zation must include known and stable revenue sources being available to provincial 
governments. 
Under the Plan of Operations some progress had been made in the direction of 
establishing assured and acceptable levels of provincial revenue.26 This took 
several forms. The Plan clearly delineated a range of subjects which fell within 
provincial taxing power. These included the basic rate and a series of license fees. 
Block grants were introduced to permit provinces to maintain existing services at 
the time of the transfer of a function. Provincial governments were free to decide 
whether or not to maintain the particular service at the current level of funding or 
to place their priorities elsewhere. These block grants were calculated on the basis 
of a formula which related population and contribution to productivity by a 
particular province to the total national income. In addition, the Plan of 
Operations encouraged the national government to try to convince aid donors to 
untie development assistance so that external funds for development projects could 
be transferred to provinces on an unconditional basis. 
Although these reforms represented a first step toward revenue creation for 
the provinces, the Kauslmae Committee found that the existing arrangements 
remained inadequate to assure provincial revenues. Yet to go any further would 
prove to be exceedingly difficult. The Committee identified two factors which 
critically limit a redistribution of revenue sufficient to meet provincial needs.27 
First, the largest proportion of provincial budgetary expenditure can be attributed 
to recurrent expenditures. Revenues to meet recurrent expenditures must be 
raised within the Solomon Islands which offers an extremely limited revenue base. 
Therefore, increased revenue cannot be attained by creating a more efficient 
ability to tax nor by simply redistributing existing revenue. To allow national, 
provincial and local governments to meet their future revenue needs requires a 
considerable expansion of productivity, export earnings and circulation of money 
within the country. The second constraint falls on the capital expenditure side. 
Here, the Solomon Islands is and will remain heavily dependent on external aid 
donors. The Special Committee conceded that the responsibility for foreign aid 
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must continue to rest with the national government. Instead of imposing any 
radical changes on the management of aid funds, the Committee recommended a 
number of procedural and substantive conditions governing their use. Such 
procedural changes would include, for example, a strengthened consultative process 
between the two levels of government on aid projects. On the substantive side, the 
Committee worked from the fundamental principle that aid policy should reflect 
the interests of national, provincial and local governments. Such a policy would, 
(1) emphasize the need for untying aid; (2) give preference to projects 
which help rural areas, equalise development, spread money-earning 
opportunities, and increase internal trade; (3) deal with the problem of 
projects with high recurrent costs for which aid is not provided; and (4) 
recognize the social costs of dependency on aid. 28 
The recurrent expenditure problem required a redefinition of the formula 
upon which block grants would be calculated, although one of the original 
criteria-to maintain the same level of service as a means of calculating revenue 
transfers-would form one of the basic principles underlying the formula. 
Fundamentally, the Kausimae Committee was concerned to establish the principles 
of the formula rather than specifying its actual calculation. The Committee 
recognized its inability to suggest specific figures: 
The Committee discussed whether it should try and put figures into the 
formula, suggest ways of measuring needs, or try to reach a consensus 
about which needs should get priority. But it felt it did not have 
sufficient information about how different figures, measures, and 
priorities would affect the revenue available, and the share each province 
might get. So the Committee preferred to recommend only the principles 
that the formula should follow. The principles are clear, and should be 
termed into a formula for implementation. 29 
However, a significant new emphasis appeared with the decision to alter the 
calculation-away from a population/productivity formula toward one which would 
place more weight on equity and equalization in revenue distribution between 
provinces. This represented an attempt to break the pattern of development which 
favored larger island groups at the exclusion of smaller island communities. The 
principles enunciated by the Special Committee were as follows: 
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the actual cost of carrying out functions at the same level as when they 
were transferred, even if provincial governments decide to cut back or 
change them ... 
contribution to national revenue (including manpower); and 
need, which should be defined to take account of--
- land area; 
- remoteness of province from Honiara and of parts of a province from 
each other; 
- lack of development for reasons, including cultural reasons, other than 
unw illingness; 
-disturbance and stress caused by development; 
- loss of land due to alienation; 
-depletion of non-renewable resources (e.g., minerals); 
- environmental damage; 
-equalisation of development between provinces and parts of - provinces; 
and 
-national welfare. 30 
To assure that provincial revenue would not fall dramatically or lag behind the 
level of increase in national revenue, the formula would be tied to national 
government revenue. To give provincial governments sufficient lead time in 
project planning and budgetary development, the formula would have a four-year 
lifespan. Renegotiation would be undertaken by a special committee composed of 
provincial and national representatives. 
On the taxation side, provincial governments and the Honiara City Council 
would be assured" ... the final power to decide whether the following taxes should 
be collected in their areas, to collect them and set the rate .•.. ,,31 In addition to 
the taxes already granted under the Local Government Act, provinces would be 
given further tax room by adding the following areas-sales taxes, land and 
property taxes, produce taxes, specific purpose head taxes, and taxes on animals, 
etc. Parallel to the transfer of powers and functions, these tax areas would be 
enumerated on a special list which could not be altered without provincial 
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permission. Provinces would also acquire the power to borrow and loan money, to 
charge fees for services and to impose license fees. Provinces would have final 
power in the preparation of their annual budgets. 
A significant reform designed to strengthen local government at the 
grassroots level of rural society appeared in the recommendation that ". 
(provincial governments) .•. must give local governments the power to set and 
collect basic rate.,,32 In the past, these units had been restricted to receipt of 25 
percent of the basic rate which was collected in their area. Other taxing powers 
could be devolved by provincial governments as well. In this entire sector of area 
committee-council relations, the Kausimae Committee adopted a federal stance 
whereby area committees would fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces, not the 
national government. 
On balance, the Special Committee introduced a series of reforms in revenue 
and taxation that were designed to reinforce the earlier division of powers between 
provincial and national government. However, the reality of the Solomon Islands 
economy with a narrow total revenue base and its dependence on external sources 
of development capital represented clear constraints on the level of provincial 
activity which could be achieved in practice. 
The Special Committee devoted a full chapter to relations between 
governments in an attempt to establish procedures for conflict resolution in the 
political arena rather than through the courts.33 Aside from earlier 
recommendations which advanced the need for active consultation between the two 
levels of government on a wide ranging basis, and for interaction between national, 
provincial and local politicians, the Committee advanced an institutionalized 
consultative process to resolve serious disputes. The main institutional forum 
would be the annual Premiers' Conference which would include the Prime Minister, 
the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Mayor of Honiara, the 
Premiers of the Provinces and the Mayor's and the Premier's political secretaries. 
Beyond its role as a forum for exchanging views, the Conference could make 
recommendations and perform as a body of inquiry under its power, 
... to invite national politicians, public servants or others to attend its 
meetings, to provide information, or to prepare papers and answer 
. 34 questlOns. 
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The national government would be under an obligation to respond to matters raised 
at the Conference: 
The national government should report directly, promptly and in detail to 
the mayor, the premiers and the Premiers' Conference on action taken or 
not taken on the recommendations of the Conference. It should give 
reasons when recommendations are not followed. 35 
A second institutional setting proposed by the Committee sought to reconcile 
anticipated differences between the Honiara City. Council and Guadalcanal 
Province with the creation of a Joint Consultative Committee composed of an 
equal representation of both government bodies and two members chosen by the 
national government. 
A central concern of the Special Committee focused on the need to provide 
for the suspension of provincial government by the national government and yet to 
guard against this power being used in an arbitrary manner. The power to suspend 
Provincial Assemblies was granted to the national government in the following 
si tua tions: 
natural disasters, including epidemics, which prevent provincial govern-
ments from working effectively; 
states of emergency declared during war-time in accordance with section 
16(a) of the national constitution; 
bankruptcy or persistent overspending of budgeted or available funds; 
corruption which cannot be effectively dealt with in other ways; 
financial mismanagement; 
administrative breakdown, including failure to maintain services essential 
to public health, safety or welfare; and 
unlawful use of power.36 
The provision for such an extraordinary power was carried even further in 8.35 
which stated, 
The national government should also have the power to suspend a 
provincial assembly for up to six months if the assembly has persistently 
and seriously--(a) frustrated lawful national government directives, or (b) 
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obstructed, whether through lawful means or not, the national 
government's ability to carry out its functions in a province provided that 
due notice has been given of the intention to suspend. 37 
As counterpoint, the Special Committee advanced the use of arbitration and 
mediation to resolve differences. To guarantee that the national government would 
not abuse its power of suspension for an indefinite period of time, the national 
government would be required to dissolve a provincial government and call 
elections within six months of the suspension. This entire discussion reflects the 
ultimate supremacy of the national government operating within a unitary system. 
The wide range of situations under which suspension can be invoked is qualitatively 
distinct from a federal system where each sphere of government is coordinate with 
and equal to the other with respect to its areas of jurisdiction. 
The Special Committee on Provincial Government received a wide range of 
submissions from central ministries, local councils, concerned individuals as well as 
hearing from local people through the tours held in each province. In all, 
approximately 140 documents and papers were available to the Special Committee 
for consideration. It is not our intention here to provide a systematic overview of 
the total submissions. Rather they will be analyzed under the following headings: 
(1) submissions by central ministries of government; (2) the responses from public 
meetings; (3) the views of field officers and traditional leadership; and (4) the 
position advanced by Western Province politicians. 
The perspective of central ministries on further decentralization to local 
councils and the process of province building elicited a variety of responses from 
outright hostility to continuing the momentum for change. A submission from the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs adopted a strict view of the dichotomy between 
national as against provincial functions, placing foreign policy unmistakably within 
the jurisdiction of the national government. The tone was harsh and unyielding: 
On the outset, we should be clear in our mind that foreign policy and 
provincial government are not inter-related subjects but two entirely 
separate issues performing entirely separate functions. .. The main 
objective of any state in its relations with other states is to direct and 
influence these relations for its own maximum benefit. Therefore, the 
formulation of foreign policy is one of the aspects of national politics and 
is the task of the politician of National Parliament. It is therefore clear, 
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foreign relations has nothing to do with domestic affairs which is in the 
f .. I 38 case 0 prOVinCIa government. 
Another administration response reflected, on the one hand, a concern for the 
speed of change, yet, on the other hand, reluctantly accepted the political will to 
decentralize further. The submission from the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources adopted this stance: 
Frankly, I think we are rushing our political changes too quickly. Local 
Government reform is yet to be settled, and now we are to abandon it for 
provincial government, and probably next the State Government. How-
ever, the political decision has been made that we are to proceed in 
examining the introduction of a Provincial system of Government 
throughout the country post-independence. So be it .... 39 
Coupled with hesitancy and a pessimistic view of decentralization, this response 
was clear and firm in its concern not to undermine the national government. 
Provincial Government should direct control the affairs of the area 
council and ••• [ be] .•• subordinate to the National Government. I say 
subordinate here, as I see it, the National Government still has the overall 
responsibility over the entire nation, and that the Provincial Government 
operate [s ] at a lower level within the framework of the National 
Government. No relationship is on equal terms between Provincial and 
National Government, as this will mean sovereign power and authority for 
individual provinces thus the idea of having a National Government 
become [s ] meaningless.40 
Another common reaction by central officials was highly functional in nature. 
Decentralization of power to provincial governments was accepted as an on-going 
reality. Therefore, the task was to calculate the most effective and efficient 
functional division of powers. This approach viewed decentralization as a matter 
of technical and administrative readjustment balancing provincial as against 
national interests, for example, the submissions of the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Lands and Transportation and the Central Planning Office.41 The need to develop 
a national policy which would transcend narrow provincial interests became the 
rationale for a strong central role with or without further decentralization. The 
Central Planning Office (CPO) brief represents a good example of this perspective: 
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While there is a need for increased planning capability at a Council (or 
P.G.) level, there will also be a continuing need for planning within 
Central Government . . .• CPO will still be required to define national 
objectives, and to draft and monitor national plans. The CPO will also be 
responsible for safeguarding the national interest in plans prepared by 
Provincial Government, by ensuring that projects also conform to the 
overall objectives of the national Government through the Council of 
Ministers. Although devolution of authority to Provincial Government is 
beneficial in that it enables decision making and responsibility to .•. 
[ be] ... carried out more <;:losely to the people affected it is also 
important to realize that excessive fragmentation can be wasteful of 
scarce resources. It is necessary to be aware of the need to maintain a 
balance between devolution and efficiency of larger scale activities.42 
The Public Service Office advocated the advantages of a unified public 
service for the Solomon Islands. As well, the brief attempted to dispell the myth 
that central public servants seconded to provincial governments would continue to 
identify with the national government. The Secretary for the Public Service 
declared firmly, 
It has been argued that by staffing Provincial and Local Government posts 
with Central Government Public Service officers the Provincial and Local 
Governments will not have the control over these Public Officers which 
they need. This is not so. The arrangements for the posting of Public 
Officers to Local Government which are in force at present provide that 
these officers must serve faithfully and fully the Local Government 
Authority to which they are posted, within the scope of functions 
allocated to that Authority. By and large this has proved successful and I 
see no reason why it should not continue to be so under a Provincial 
Government structure •... 43 
The Ministry of Home Affairs-the one responsible for overseeing provincial 
governments and for the implementation of further changes-provided a number of 
important documents including reports on progress achieved to date, the con-
straints which have appeared in implementation and possible future developments. 
In one paper, "Submission by Ministry of Home Affairs on the Local Government 
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Plan of Operations Implementation,,,44 the Ministry revealed that the rhetoric of 
past decentralization went considerably beyond actual achievements. In particular, 
the MHA recognized that part of the difficulty could be traced to recalcitrance and 
resistance by central departments of government, 
Whilst the Government has stated the priority of development of local 
government the message has taken many years to reach certain ministries 
and initially there was obstruction and an attitude that the councils would 
fail and then ask the ministries to take back the services. When it was 
seen that this was not to happen, attitudes gradually changed but often 
o bOO d 01 oIl 0 45 co-operatIon etween minIstry an counci Stl remains poor. 
To Home Affairs, the key constraint to the effective operation of decentralization 
to date and the first priority for the future was the need to improve the 
management and financial systems of local government.46 The major emphasis of 
Home Affairs suggested that the experiment with local government had revealed a 
number of major flaws which required concerted attention by the central 
administration before any further change could be contemplated. 
This careful administrative reaction to further decentralization cut against 
the grain of council submissions and the expression of popular views which emerged 
from the public meetings. Public meetings tended to concentrate on the major 
failure of government to bring development to the grassroots 47 and, coincidentally, 
to support the strengthening of provincial power. The smaller island councils also 
expressed a fundamental dissonance with being left behind in development in favour 
of the larger islands and areas with concentrations of population.48 
The key field officers at the local government level-the Clerks to the 
Council-reinforced the demand for greater provincial power and autonomy. Not 
unexpectedly, the frustrations of field officers were expressed in strong terms: 
The Solomon Islands obviously need Provincial Government set-up to 
ensure that a greater degree of autonomy is transferred to the lower level 
of political governmental bodies, the Local Authorities. Decision making 
at present is limited or restrictedly governed by the Local Government 
Ordinance. Councils in that respect are confined within the Law, which 
consequently result in frustration by the rather discontented rural 
population to a certain extent. The paternalistic approach in the hand-
outs of grants both by the Central Government and Aid Donors, paralysis 
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the Councils to attempt at exploring to the furthest depth, the ways and 
means of raising their own internal revenue from sources that are 
available locally, or even abroad through established agencies. Provincial 
Government could thus be a stimulus to productivity in the rural fields of 
economic, political and social developments. It would also attract better-
able persons to go into local politics at Provincial level, so as to improve 
and raise the political standard of decision making. It should also 
stimulate the much-needed aspects of regional self-reliance, pride and 
greater active participation in the regional developments within the 
respective Provinces by the the rural population. Much could be achieved 
under a more autonomous Local Authority than at present, when 
Provincial Government set-up is established.49 
One officer challenged the very basis of the central government's commitment to 
decentr aliza tion: 
The question often springs to mind as to whether Central Government is 
really committed to the devolution and decentralization which it preaches 
so effusively, and towards which end it inaugurated the recent Local 
Government Reform, or whether this is merely a convenient smokescreen 
for its own shortcomings. It is a never-ending source of amazement to me 
to hear some of the failures which are blamed upon Councils. The media 
are also largely at fault in this respect. • .. The lack of respect for 
Council decisions and proposals, and the inadequate programme for rural 
development also stem from Government officers' and politicians' 
reluctance to face up to the realities of the roles which they themselves 
have created for councils. The tone of Local Government Conferences 
and Clerks' Seminars is a sufficient indicator of the uneasy and unequal 
relationship which exists between Councils and Governments, one which is 
beautifully summed up in NDP Review: "In the Circumstances the 
Councils have done remarkably well." Well, I think that "in the 
Circumstances" the Central Planning Office has done remarkably well to 
produce its report, as it did not even bother to consult Councils. I fear 
that old attitudes die hard, and little is being done to give them the coup 
de grace. 50 
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From the periphery then-both official and public-the very strong expression of 
the need to move further in the decentralization of administrative and political 
power became the general theme. 
The one dissonant voice was expressed in the claims of traditional leaders. 
The tensions of social and political change were revealed in their desire for a 
recognition of their central place as the authorities most appropriate for governing 
and representing the people. 
I, the Prince of Kwara'ae and the 180 Tribal Chiefs believe that no matter 
whatever type of Government we try to adopt for the Malaita People if it 
is from outside our Traditional Culture, it will never meet our peoples' 
needs. We want to have our inherited Traditional Government which was 
lost about 600 years ago. We want people who are in the top posts of our 
future Government, people who are born leaders and that understand and 
respect our Kwara'ae Culture. We want people who are to serve and not 
just work as at present.51 
This call for a reassertion of their past status also advocated the fragmentation of 
existing council areas to fulfill their desire for the reemergence of traditional 
states. 52 
The most compelling feature of the submissions was the continuation of a 
Western challenge to the centralist perspective in the Solomon Islands. This found 
expression in the demand by the West for quasi-federal status. Despite the 
counterarguments of the Minister of Home Affairs at a meeting of the Western 
Council Executive Committee in March 1978, the Western councillors passed a 
motion which proposed and led to a boycott of the independence celebrations in 
July.53 At a meeting of the entire Special Committee with the Western Council in 
June 1978, the Western members pressed their argument to the point where the 
Chairman of the Special Committee conceded that the West represented, " ••• a 
special case.II54 The meeting accepted, as an appropriate gesture, a motion 
proposed by David Kausimae which stated, 
We in the Committee cannot make an interim report, but we are prepared 
to recommend that government give serious consideration to the matters 
set out in your resolution of March this year. 55 
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An explanation for the distanace between the Kausimae Report and the 
submissions and briefs presented to the Special Committee has to be sought in 
relation to the demands of Western Province. The political leadership articulating 
the Western position fundamentally undermined the central perspective and its 
incremental approach to decentralization. In the end, the process of formulating a 
framework for provincial government was intimately bound up in accommodating 
Western demands and extending the reforms which derived from such an 
accommodation to the entire country. 
Taken together, the Special Committee's recommendations amounted to a 
reconceptualization of the role and powers of provincial government. The 
Committee was conscious not only of the administrative implications but more 
significantly of the political implications of its decentralization framework. A new 
political field would be created at the provincial level which would become the 
arena for crucial development decisions. The reforms envisaged a qualitatively 
improved provincial government able to attract capable political and administra-
tive leadership. The Special Committee's recommendations would have far-
reaching implications for the predominant structure of power in the Solomon 
Islands-the central bureaucracy. New centers of administrative power with 
sufficient resources and staff would be formed at the expense of the center. In 
both political and administrative terms, therefore, the Kausimae Report proposed a 
major transformation of the political system. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEVOLUTION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEVELOPMENT 
The study in this monograph focused on the devolution of powers and 
functions from a central government to subordinate local council units in a unitary 
state. The Solomon Islands case was intensely studied in this experiment. Part of 
the explicit purpose of the devolution exercise was to endow the councils with the 
capability to become agents in development •.. That is, apart from performing the 
traditional service functions such as building local roads, sanitation facilities, 
water supply, and medical clinics, the subordinate units of government were to be 
geared to participate in the country's efforts in economic and political develop .... 
mente In the chapter dealing with the colonial origins of local authorities, we 
indicated that traditional forms of decision-making at the village level were 
arbitrarily displaced by the colonizer'S ~wn administrative system. For nearly fifty 
years, attempts were undertaken to devise council organizations which would be 
accepted by Solomon Islanders. Maasina· Ruru, a massive indigenous protest 
movement that was initiated on the island of Malaita against the externally 
imposed forms of government, underscored the futility of atl previous externally-
initiated efforts. The cardinal lesson imparted by Maasina Rule was that Solomon 
Islanders could govern themselves without outside assistance. More specifically, 
" 
the lesson pointed to the inescapable conclusion that any council that became 
legitimate had to be run by local· leaders widely recognized and chosen by the 
village people. Up until the 1963 local government act, all positions in the previous 
forms of local council were appointed by the British administrators. Hence, local 
councils were not only creations of an alien power but so were most of the 
leadership appointed to the councils. 
When the task of reforming local government was launched, then, a major 
priority was to convert the councils into elective bodies responsible to the people. 
The democratic procedure was a familiar form in Melanesian culture. At the 
village level where most Solomon Islanders live, decisions were reached after 
extended discussions among villagers and only after a consensus had been reached 
on specific items or issues. The introduced councils tended to encompass large 
numbers of villages thereby invalidating the direct face to face method of 
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democratic decision-making among people who shared the same values. Neverthe-
less, by introducing the elective principle by which representatives were chosen, 
some recognition was given to the will of villagers in council behavior. 
The 1963 Local Government reform inaugurated a system of elections for 
political offices in local councils. Ten years later, under the Plan of Operations, 
the councils were to be charged with wider responsibilities for managing 
community and village affairs. The impulse to decentralization of powers and 
functions was part of a larger democratic movement occurring at the national level 
where institutions for self-government were being introduced. Simultaneous with 
the transfer of sovereign powers from the overseas metropoitan power to the 
colony's central government was an exercise to transfer concentrated functions 
from the central government to widely dispersed local councils. The ideology of 
political change emphasized indigenous participation in collective decision-making 
at all levels of government. 
The Solomon Island citizen was under three tiers of government all of which 
professed to represent his interests. After self-government was attained, a House 
of Assembly elected by all the people under universal adult suffrage, was the 
national democratic institution that represented Solomon Islanders. Our field 
research has showed that the typical villager knew who was his member of 
Parliament. A parliamentary seat was a highly coveted prize. Attached to it were 
various tangible rewards such as a salary, paid trips to the capital city, overseas 
trips, and publicity in the mass media. At the level below the national parliament 
was the local council renamed provincial councils. The seven provincial councils 
were divided into wards which constituted the basis for electing local representa-
tives to the councils. Tables I and II provide samples of election results for the 
provincial councils. When the Plan of Operations was announced to the public, 
great interest was galvanized around council activities. Participation for the 
elective council offices drew high percentages of villagers. Subsequently, 
participation fell from about 70 percent to 50 percent, still a very respectable 
figure for a preponderantly rural country with difficult communication barriers. 
The position of a provincial councillor was not as prestigious as that of a national 
parliamentarian. The president of the council ,obtained a monthly salary of about 
$200, but councillors were paid only sitting allowances. The prestige of a 
councillor was also likely to be extended only to his own ward. Rarely would a 
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TABLE I 
GUADALCANAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS - 1974 
WARD Candidates Votes Elected 
l. SAGALU IMOGEN VIDA PHILLIPS 119 Elected 
E. O. Torling 40 
Total Votes 159 
2. SAVULAI PAUL WAINONI Unopposed 
3. TANGARARE LEONARD ASHLEY SYDINHAM 186 Elected 
Savino Kokopu 124 
Romano Vaolu 31 
Total Votes 341 
4. WANDERERS BAY MICHAEL SAMBONA 197 Elected 
Cecil J. T etega 53 , 
Bartholemus Belei 28 
Total Votes 278 
5. DUIDUI WILFRED ISOM DIDIVERA 198 Elected 
Marcus Pipisi 113 
Alpheus Tohavi 63 
Timi Chaku 30 
Total Votes 404 
6. VATUKULAU JOCHIM GAPU 111 Elected 
Albert Pitu 53 
Jackson Gray 34 
Total Votes 198 
7. TALISE LASI W. WATCH 103 Elected 
Wilson Low 97 
Samuel Lavea 34 
Total Votes 234 
8. AVUAVU LEONE LAKU Unopposed 
9. MOll ISHMAEL BOLAKE 81 Elected 
Benjamin Manganikoe 32 
Elihu Sinoi 31 
Kalisto Agu 23 
Timotheus Touosia 19 
Total Votes 186 
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10. TETAKANJI JAMES MANE 67 Elected 
Saddias Chachia 58 
Jimmy Suiolia 25 
Joseph Goraiga 6 
Total Votes 156 
II. BIRAO JOEL KIKOLO 186 Elected 
John Vulu 102 
Julius Tiapou 15 
Total Votes 303 
12. VALASI-LONGGU CHARLES KAOMANE MAU 243 Elected 
Mareko Done 125 
Casper Kokoluvia 27 
Reuben Bula 27 
Mark Masodo 9 
Total Votes 441 
13. KOLOKARAKO ERASTUS A VINIA 32 Elected 
Adr iel Kotiuania 25 
Jesineth Sui 2 
Total Votes 59 
14. AOLA DAVID KAULI 138 Elected 
Manegoli Buluvua 76 
Solomon Votaia 23 
Total Votes 237 
15. PARIPAO ERIC KUTA Equal Votes Election 
JIM KOMPAO void. Another 
election will 
be held for 
this ward in 
due course. 
Eric Kuta 43 
Jim Kompao 43 
Joel Lember 42 
William T eteo 40 
Phillip Samanea 27 
Total Votes 197 
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TABLE II 
SANTA YSABEL COUNCIL ELECTIONS - 1974 
WARD Candidates Votes Elected 
1. KIA WILSON SAGEVAKA Unopposed 
2. BAOLO/ HEDLEY VIKASI 62 Elected 
SAMASODU 
Ernest Panisi 58 
Total Votes 120 
3. HOBOKOIO HUDSON KIKOVAKA 189 Elected 
Ernest Supa 41 
Total Votes 230 
4. BUALA DANIEL DARA 185 Elected 
Baldwin Tangogaba 80 
Total Votes 265 
5. TIROTONGA PAUL KOKOMANA Unopposed 
6. KOVILOKO CHARLES THEGNA Unopposed 
7. KMAGA HUGO MANEHEVA Unopposed 
8. KALOKA PAUL BEN RENTON Unopposed 
9. TATABA PHILIP MANEHA THA 75 Elected 
Nathaniel Supa 42 
Benjamin Analau 40 
Ernest Huinodi 32 
Total Votes 189 
10. SIGANA JOSES BOGESE 102 Elected 
Daniel Tafuselo 77 
Total Votes 279 
11. JPAUANA CUL WICK VAHIA 183 Elected 
12. EAST T ASIMBOKO JOHN MANEKA 198 Elected 
SamuelOno 78 
Joseph Tobani 24 
Joel Inu 14 
Total Votes 314 
147 
13. VULOLO JACK RAE 26 Elected 
Peter Ramidiha 12 
MareseHno Manevera 10 
Joachimo Gala 7 
Total Votes 55 
14. WEST T ASIMBOKO BARNABAS BAESODUA 86 Elected 
Jacob Vouza 85 
Bill Letega 68 
Total Votes 239 
15. MALANGO MOSES ALBERT RERE 89 Elected 
Alpheus Vla 54 
Jesmiel Kesi 37 
Total Votes 180 
Honiara. E. Bulu 
30th July 1974 Returning Officer 
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councillor receive mention in the mass media. In spite of these comparative 
limitations, councillors tended to be persons with high standing and achievement in 
their community, but not as high especially in educational achievement as national 
par liamentar ians. 
Finally, below the tier of provincial councils, were area committees. 
Officially, these were the units of government which were closest to the people. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, area committees were constituted through a 
nominating process and tended to be staffed by local chiefs and assorted 
community leaders. The meetings of area committees were also attended by 
government field officers in the province's agriculture, health, education, works, 
and administration divisions. They were given responsibility for a few services and 
had at their disposal about 25 percent of all basic rate collected in an area. 
Generally, the area committees had functioned well in some parts of the Solomon 
Islands more so than others. They complained that they worked in isolation and 
that their meetings were not attended by provincial counCillors and national 
parliamentarians. One council president described their role as "dreaming" 
meaning that they tended to have little conception of how projects were identified 
and implemented. The area committees also lacked permanent staff to carry out 
any projects that they undertook. Consequently, they tended to be sporadic in 
performance with only minimal interest in their activities. The role of area 
constables was transferred to the police commission. Little prestige attached to 
area committee positions. Part of the basic rate funds were used for sitting 
allowances, an item which engaged much of the committee'S deliberations. 
Overall, the area committees, although the closest unit of government to the 
villager, were still remote from the villagers' interest. What was probably required 
was yet a further tier called "village committees" to obtain the direct participation 
of the villager in community affairs. 
The total effect of having three tiers of representation for the Solomon 
Islander in national and community decision-making should be a close correlation 
between the public will and public policy. Yet much of this correspondence 
depended on the inter-relationship between these levels of representation. There 
was little cooperation generally between representatives at the national, 
provincial, and area committee levels. The national parliamentarian often felt 
threatened by the provincial councillor who was likely to be one of his challengers 
in the next elections. The provincial councillor, in turn, might feel a stranger to 
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attend area committee meetings in villages which did not practice his customs or 
might see no point in talking to area committee leaders who had very few functions 
and little prestige. A number of provinces had created "political coordinating 
committees" constituted of parliamentarians and councillors from a province. 
These committees, when they are activated, served to put pressure on the national 
government to meet a particular provincial demand. Both the Western and Malaita 
provinces utilized these coordinating committees when they individually experi-
enced crisis confrontations between themselves and the central bureaucracy. 
Apart from these committees which were not universal among the provincial 
councils, the areas of collaboration and cooperation between parliamentarians, 
councillors, and area committee persons were weak and sporadic. 
At the provincial level, some attempt had been made to involve councillors in 
local government decision-making. This had been done by creating a variety of 
committees within the council with the task of developing policy alternatives and 
oversight responsibilities vis-a-vis the provincial bureaucracy. For example, a 
typical council had an executive, agriculture, health, works, and administration 
committee. The agriculture committee was constituted of a number of councillors 
whose task was to receive, and process, demands about agriculture in the province. 
From this committee would come recommendations about what agricultural 
policies should be adopted by the province. The health, education, administration, 
and works committees operated the same way. The premier role was played by the 
executive committee which was in continuous operation. It was a type of 
collective cabinet with responsibility for the day to day policy direction of the 
council. The clerk of the council was the chief executive officer of the province. 
The research team in this project has found that the most invigorating participant 
role in decision-making at the provincial level took place at the level of these 
council committees. Attempts were made both by these committees as well as the 
council setting as a whole to convene regularly scheduled meetings at various parts 
of a province so as to bring "government closer to the people." At a number of 
these meetings attended by these researchers, we have found the participation of 
the public extensive. Periodically, local chiefs were brought into the council 
meetings as consultants. But, for the most part, provincial councillors preferred to 
work through their own contacts and networks, avoiding area committees, to obtain 
their views of local demands. Area committee minutes were written out; demands 
in them reached the councils in that form. Clearly, the connection between 
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councillors and area committee persons need urgent bridging. This, notwith-
standing, provincial council committees operated fairly vigorously. Apart from 
spending an inordinate amount of time dealing with sitting allowances and other 
self-serving benefits, they did maintain a strong and vibrant connection between 
provincial policy and action. 
Political participation of villagers via their representatives in provincial 
decision-making may be regarded as an end in itself. The idea of democracy in this 
regard bears heavily on its symbolic significance. The Plan of Operations, however, 
had more pragmatic objectives in transferring functions to local councils. It had 
envisaged that people at the grassroots would become actively involved, especially 
in aspects of council activities dealing with development. Indeed, an examination 
of the Plan of Operations' original internal re-organization scheme for the 
provincial councils showed the existence of a "Development Committee." The role 
of development committees was to plan development programs for each province. 
The committees were to bring together various social and leadership groups in a 
province to identify projects for capital development. Through the development 
committees, local initiative, energies, and resources were to be tapped for 
provincial development. At the time of researching this project, no council had 
adopted the development committee structure. In effect, the initiative for 
promoting local development was left to the competing representatives of the 
three tiers of government. In practice, development became an item heavily 
entangled in the political careers of politicians who wanted to get re-elected. 
Demands for development were consequently heard from many quarters at the 
same time. Intra-provincial council committees became embattled places where 
they were deluged by demands for capital projects for agriculture, works, health, 
and education. The lack of a central coordinating committee to receive and 
process the myriad demands for projects meant that a coherent and rational plan 
for deploying scarce resources was lacking. Partly, this void was filled by a 
provincial planning officer, where one was available to be seconded from the 
central government to the provincial councils. Each province was still in the 
process of establishing a planning unit at the time of research. In any case, the 
provincial planning office would have benefitted enormously by the guidance over 
priorities coming from a provincial planning committee. 
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Part of the reason why the provinces have failed to establish a development 
committee was traceable to the continuing frustrations in obtaining competent 
staff to implement even the recurrent budget. A Council received revenues from 
three main streams of funding: 
1) Collection of basic rate; a rate counterpart grant; business licenses; 
court fines; etc. 
2) A service grant from the central government to defray the cost of the 
new funcions transferred to the councils. 
3) A capital grant for development. 
The capital grant was referred to as "the general development allocation" (GOA). 
This was derived from the central government which in turn obtained it as foreign 
project aid from the United Kingdom. The GOA was to be utilized for six types of 
projects: (1) roads; (2) wharves; (3) water supplies; (4) drains and sewers; (5) staff 
housing; and (6) minor works. The amount of GOA allocated to a province was 
decided by a complex formula utilizing several variables including the area and 
population of a province. For a council to undertake a capital project involving the 
use of GOA funds, it must research the project, estimate its costs, and give it a 
priority. Then it is submitted to the Central Planning Office and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs for analysis to ensure that it fitted in with country's development 
plan. The entire process, complex and cumbersome as it was, was to be part of the 
province's long term plan which was also to be prepared. The exercise in itself was 
a deterrent to provincial planning. But it was done, however, haphazardly. In the 
end, the development of a council's annual activities was not frustrated so much by 
the lack of planning capability and central government bureaucracy, as by the lack 
of skilled staff and equipment to implement the few capital projects that were 
undertaken. Table III shows clearly the extent to which the government's annual 
development budget expenditures were realized from 1975 to 1979: 
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T ABLE III (Actual expenditures against budget in $'000) 
Development Budget 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Estimates 6,505 8,157 10,329 18,639 25,246 
Actual Expenditure 4,781 7,039 7,690 13,434 15,000 
Shortfall as % of estimate 26.5 13.7 25.5 27.9 40 
(Source: Solomon Islands National Development Plan, 1980-84, Vol. II, 
Table 3.15, p. 31. Government Printery, Honiara, April 1980.) 
Development funds are spent by the councils for projects they identify. An average 
of about 30 percent of these funds go unspent annually. Further, the sorts of 
projects undertaken by councils are rarely capable of generating revenues. The 
large and significant projects in the country were national undertakings. The 
national government itself suffered from the lack of trained manpower. It was a 
competitor with the provinces for skilled personnel. Several provinces had said 
that their dependence on the central government for seconded staff had led 
consistently to frustrations. They challenged the concept of a unified public 
service demanding they be empowered to recruit their own staff on their own 
terms. They underlined the proposition that continued frustrations stemming from 
unskilled and inadequate staff and equipment tended to discredit the image of 
councils as responsible and capable bodies. Councillors had openly expressed 
suspicion that much of the denial of staff was a deliberate ploy by central 
government politicians to discredit them. If the provincial governments could 
demonstrate their competence in discharging their functions, then the call for 
further decentralization would be justified. The gain of the provinces in this script 
becomes the loss of the central government. Put politically, the development 
aspect of provincial functions has become embroiled in the political aspirations of 
politicians at both the national and local level. 
The "participation" and "development" themes in the devolution of powers and 
responsibilities are entangled also in the debate about autonomy. The provincial 
councils complain bitterly about the restraints by the central government on their 
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expenditures. They were required to submit their plans and estimates to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs for practically whatever activity they undertook 
regardless of whether it was a recurrent or capital project. The central 
government justified its close oversight of council expenditures on the basis that 
over two-thirds of council revenues were derived from the national treasury. The 
councils in turn were demanding new and more extensive powers to raise their own 
revenues to win greater control over expenditures and general decision-making. As 
it currently stood, the councils' main source of internal revenues came from basic 
rate. However, this must be extracted from a rural population that was not rich or 
extensively engaged in cash employment. 
The sorts of items which provincial councils can tax to obtain additional 
revenues include: 
1) Business licenses 
2) Dogs fee 
3) Slaughter house licenses 
4) Auctioneers, insurance agents, and cinema licenses 
5) Liquor licenses 
6) Death, births, and marriage fees 
7) Petroleum licenses 
8) Investment interest 
9) Rest house fees 
10) Library fines 
11) Hire of equipment 
12) Refuse collection fees 
Revenues from the basic rate and the other items enumerated above without any 
form of central government grant constitute about 10 to 15 percent of the total 
expenditure budget of a typical provincial council. Councils needed a subsidy of 
over 70 percent of their budgets from the central government. This is why they 
were demanding powers to raise revenues from their own natural resources and 
from control over their land. These two items "land" and "natural resources" had 
become rallying points around which all the councils seek their autonomy. They 
calculate that, given their own sources of funds, they would be able to proceed in 
identifying and implementing projects. This, in turn, would stimulate greater 
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citizen pride in council performance and perhaps generate greater participation in 
council activities. But, as it stood, the councils felt that they were being stifled by 
the central government. 
The exercise in devoling powers and functions in the Solomon Islands shows 
the complexity of the problems involved. Fundamentally, the experiment invoked 
political stakes that converted the pragmatic administrative issues into intense 
controversy over regional equality and national unity. Devolution, from the 
foregoing analysis, must not be a task devised and implemented mainly by 
administrators. Politicians whose interests are affected must be brought into the 
exercise. Much of the frustration in implementing the Plan of Operations can be 
traced to political interests that were threatened. This is not to deny the role of 
social, cultural, and physical constraints in the implementation environment. It is 
to underline that devolution means that power must be shifted from one source to 
another. Devolution, in this context, is intensely political. The virtues of 
devolution and decentralization-political participation, grassroots autonomy, 
effective administration etc.-are all secondary to the powerful political interests 
that are likely to be affected in the experiment. In the end, what this means is 
that political organization-political parties; pressure groups; movements; rallies 
etc.-is the prerequisite factor to create and mobilize support in forging into 
existence a new order. Decentralization entails no less an ambition and 
undertaking than the politicization and mobilization of the rural population. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SOME BROAD OBSER VA nONS: THEORY 
No one has as yet identified and empirically validated the optimum conditions 
under which decentralization can be best achieved. Several factors have generally 
been noted. These include: (1) skills; (2) communications; (3) stage of 
development; (4) political culture; (5) stability and crisis; and (6) political parties 
and leadership.l The item, "skills" points to the increased demand for trained 
personnel stemming from the creation of more units of government. A viable 
governmental organization that provides for health services, non-tertiary educa-
tion, the building and maintenance resources. A typical developing country lacks 
skilled and professional staff. A decentralized form of local autonomy would have 
to compete with other pressing priorities in the allocation of scarce skilled 
personnel. The United Nations workshop on Decentralization states the issue as 
follows: 
Staffing is the most vital element of any programme of decentralization 
for development purposes. A government may organize effectively for 
decentralization, mark out optimum areas of administration, allocate 
functions rationally between units at different levels and arrange for 
popular participation and representation in the programme; but the 
success of the programme will, in the end, depend largely on the 
availability of qualified staff for sustained work in small towns and rural 
areas, the rapport between staff and the people, the ability of staff 
members to work effectively together and the administrative as well as 
technical support and supervision they receive. 2 
The communications factor becomes salient in societies which are territorially 
extensive and topographically difficult to traverse. Where the population spread 
out, the decentralization of responsibility would appear to be an expedient 
necessity. 
The "stage of development variable" is problematic to pin down. The idea 
that a country is at a particular stage of development suggests, inter alia, that only 
certain things can be appropriately undertaken at specific junctures of time. There 
is some merit in this proposition if economic factors such as available skilled 
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personnel, level of literacy, transport infrastructure in a social system are 
considered in relation to the basic requirements of operating a government. 
However, when the political dimension is examined, the question that may be asked 
is whether a group of people needs to be at any stage of development to qualify to 
govern themselves. The "preparation" concept is controversial as it is ill-defined. 
It was thrown up as a tactic to delay the independence of numerous colonies in the 
Third World. Within a country, the same objections can be raised against a 
community being granted devolved responsibility for its own affairs. The issue 
basically turns on whether political autonomy precedes or follows the establishment 
of certain minimal conditions associated with governmental viability. In our mind, 
while the pragmatic economic issues are obviously important for viability, they are 
secondary to the need to first grant the political kingdom. 
Underlying the factor political culture is the proposition that social structure 
and political behavior should be congruent for the smooth functioning of political 
institutions. Are the habits and history of the people supportive of a democratic 
device such as suggested by decentralization of responsibility? If they are, what 
are these social traits and in what proportions are they required? Clearly, in the 
face of many communities acquiescing or succumbing to patterns of local 
domination, the issue is a crucial one. If the political culture argument is 
maintained, however, then it would be tantamount to endorsing elitism and local 
autarky in perpetuity. That a traditional order has been seeped in differential 
distribution of status and access to privileges from time immemorial should not be 
equated with the proposition that the traditional is the only legitimate order that 
can be visualized. The Third World environment is rapidly changing; most 
traditional systems have already been eroded substantially. In this situation, we 
suspect that most persons would prefer to have some sort of institutional 
mechanism by which their views can be expressed and accommodated in community 
decision-making. There is no single decentralization format; local autonomy and 
participation can be expressed in various ways consonant with indigenous practices. 
Indeed, one of the fundamental motifs of decentralizing decision-making is to adapt 
it to the myriad cultural forms that exists in the typical Third World environment. 
Both the factors "crisis" and "stability" have been associated with optimum 
conditions for initiating and implementing decentralization. Clearly, the two 
factors are diametrically different. The first proposition suggests that a crisis is 
required to initiate decentralized change while the other emphasizes the need for 
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stable conditions. On the one hand, it is said that "crisis" is a prerequisite to jolt 
an established hierarchic order out of its ways, while on the other hand, it is argued 
that a stable order provides the security to central decision-makers to undertake 
the challenge of re-arranging the periphery. We can see how both factors can be 
useful or conducive to change to a decentralized system of local responsibility. 
The "crisis" variable, however, may have to precede the "stability" factor. A 
radical re-arrangement of the old order is not likely to be initiated with the 
consent of the existing power wielders at the grassroots. To that extent, a "crisis" 
is literally required to dislodge the prevailing order. After the crisis stage has 
passed, however, a new consolidated regime committed to devolving responsibilities 
to the grassroots may strive on stability to implement its program. 
Finally, the factors leadership and party organization are briefly examined. 
Essentially, these factors postulate a need for a movement broadly based and led by 
a charismatic-type leader as prerequisites for radical change. A mass party would 
be in a superior position to challenge and overthrow an ingrained hierarchic order 
than a weak sporadically organized electoral-type movement. The mass party must 
not merely confront the old elites and local autocrats in the struggle for power, but 
also the experts in the public bureaucracy. Together, they constitute a formidable 
block against change. The leadership and party factors are pre-eminently political 
devices aimed at acquiring power first then converging the strength gained from its 
mass support into desired goals. The main obstacle such a movement must 
transcend is the tendency for it to lose its enthusiasm and momentum before full 
implementation of its goals has been attained. In such an eventuality, the old order 
can be restored with the bureaucrats back in de facto control of the state. 
Taken together, then, the preceding variables-skills; communications; stage 
of development; political culture; crisis and stability; and leadership and party 
organization-are all related in different ways to a successful transfer of 
responsibility and initiative from the center to the periphery. It is clear that they 
would have to be inter-related in some way to formulate a theory of decentraliza-
tion. This is, however, not our undertaking in this monograph. We have seen in the 
body of the monograph how all these factors have played a role in the 
determination of the course of the decentralization experiment in the Solomon 
Islands. If we have to put our fingers on any single critical variable, it would be the 
political ones related to the struggle between party and bureaucracy. Yet this 
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struggle has not fully taken form in the Solomon Islands, accounting for the 
domination of the devolution process by the public servants. In other case studies 
contemplated under this project, our data base would be extended and enriched so 
that at some point we should be in a position to propound a general theory of 
decentralization. 
Footnotes to Chapter Eight 
1 Most of these materials are scattered throughout the literature on 
decentralization. See in particular Maddick, Ope cit. and Decentralization for 
National and Local Development (United Nations,· 1962); and Douglas Ashford, 
Democracy, Decentralization, and Decisions in Sub-National Politics (London: Sage 
Publications, 1976), p. 13; pp. 40-49. 
2Decentralization for National and Local Development, Ope cit., p. 45. 
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